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ABSTRACT 
 
The study of metaphor is an interdisciplinary endeavor crossing such fields as cognitive 
linguistics, psychology, and creativity studies. Two important conclusions on the nature 
of metaphor have been drawn to date: (1) the ability to use metaphor is a normal human 
cognitive ability and widespread in language; (2) metaphor is not a unitary construct and 
varies greatly from the highly familiar and conventional to the creative. Viewing 
metaphor as lying along a continuum, this thesis narrows the concept of metaphoric 
competence to creative metaphoric competence, which looks at this ability from a 
creativity perspective. In this thesis, it is hypothesized that creative metaphoric 
competence is an underlying competency, which is related to a more general creative 
competence, and therefore is projected onto both the L1 (Japanese) and L2 (English). In 
order to test this hypothesis, data from creative metaphor production tasks were collected 
in both languages. In addition, a number of creativity measurements were also developed 
with the aim of measuring the multifaceted nature of creativity. Relationships between 
these variables were investigated. Findings suggest that creative metaphoric competence 
is an individual difference variable, which could be described as a disposition towards 
novelty and is related to other measurements of creativity. 
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 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This study explores two intersecting and diverging bodies of research, metaphor and 
creativity studies. Both areas of research have matured and flourished over the past 30 
years, yet this has often occurred in isolation from one another. Although metaphor has 
been frequently mentioned as being a mental process critical for creativity, especially as a 
means of conceptual combination (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Mumford & Gustafason, 
1988; Ward, Smith, & Vaid, 1997), creativity research has not closely followed the more 
recent theoretical developments regarding metaphor and thought. This thesis therefore 
aims to fill this gap and to combine research from these interdisciplinary fields in order to 
better understand the process of creative metaphor production. In order to accomplish 
this, I examine whether or not this competence is an individual difference that is 
projected onto both a first language (L1) and a second language (L2). In addition, I also 
explore the relationship between creative metaphoric competence and other instruments 
that typically are utilized to measure the many different facets of creativity.  
Metaphoric competence is a broad term that refers to an individual’s knowledge 
of, and ability to use metaphor and plays a key role in one’s overall communicative 
competence with the language (Littlemore & Low, 2006b). It has been hypothesized that 
metaphoric competence is an individual difference variable, which learners are able to 
transfer from a first language (L1) to a second language (L2), though research into this 
topic is still rather scarce (Littlemore, 2010). In this thesis, I narrow the term of 
metaphoric competence from the broad ability to use and comprehend metaphors to the 
ability to produce and interpret creative metaphors. It is important to make this distinction 
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for conventional and creative metaphors are processed differently, the former relies on 
semantic retrieval from the mental lexicon, while the latter requires conceptually 
exploring relations between distantly related concepts and then real-time mapping 
between these two concepts (see Chapter 3). However, since metaphor in natural 
language uses words to express meaning, there is needless to say, an overlap between 
metaphor and vocabulary knowledge. Past research has often used corpora to investigate 
the usage of metaphors in natural, everyday occurring language (Deignan, 2005) and 
more recently in a second language (see Nacey, 2013; Pitzl, 2011). Since many 
metaphors used in everyday language are not necessarily creative, but in fact are highly 
conventional and likely unconscious, in consequence, this thesis did not aim to measure 
such ability.  
In contrast, being highly competent in producing creative metaphors relies on 
combinatorial abilities or the ability to bring two seemingly disparate concepts together in 
new and insightful ways. So in fact, conventional metaphors fall on a contradictory pole 
from creative ones for “when metaphors become routine or over-familiar they dull rather 
than sharpen experience, and they tend to inhibit rather than enable creativity” (Pope, 
2005, p. 139). A number of methodological issues need to be addressed in order to 
compare creative metaphoric competences between a first and second language. This 
mainly has to do with designing a measurement instrument that does not reduce this 
competency to a vocabulary assessment and therefore it needs to be sufficiently open-
ended whereby the participants can generate a wide range of possible responses. 
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In short, the aim of this study is to investigate how individuals produce creative 
metaphors through various prompts in an experimental setting. The goal is to look at 
creative metaphoric production and to examine this from an individual differences 
perspective. Therefore throughout this thesis, I clearly and carefully distinguish metaphor 
types in order to show that metaphor is not a unitary construct.  
Moreover, I acknowledge that producing creative metaphors is an exceptional 
trait shared by all people (Carter, 2004), but at the same time differences in this 
competency between individuals is subject to variation. This everyday ability to generate 
creative metaphors is a highly creative act and as Miall (1987) suggests “the value of 
research on metaphor lies in the fact that metaphor shows on a small scale all the 
principal features of the thought processes that are most significant in creativity” (p.82).  
Creativity and novel metaphors both harness the idea of surprise through seeing 
something in a new light, through creating connections between seemingly disparate 
concepts and “upsetting expectations” (Anderson, 1964). So this thesis has two main 
aims. The first one is to compare individual differences in producing creative metaphors 
in both an L1 and an L2; in this research these languages are Japanese and English, 
respectively. It is hypothesized that this is not simply a linguistic ability, but a cognitive 
ability that can be projected from one language to another. That is to say, if one has a 
disposition towards producing creative metaphors in the L1 this likely will also be 
projected onto the L2. In addition, it is hypothesized that this cognitive ability to produce 
creative metaphors in both an L1 and an L2 may be directly related to the more general 
individual difference of creativity. Creativity is best studied via a multifaceted approach 
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(Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Ward, 2007) that looks at a 
creative product, but also considers the creative person, as well as, the creative process. 
The relationship between creativity and foreign language learning has been inconclusive 
(Albert & Kormos, 2004; Ottó, 1998), but as far I know, no research has examined the 
relationship between creativity and creative metaphoric competence in an L1 and L2.  
In summary, this thesis contributes to the growing interest in novel figurative 
language production (see Beaty, Silvia, & Benedek, 2017; Chiappe & Chiappe, 2007; 
Vartanian, 2012;) and especially how this competency shows up in both a first and a 
second language.  
1.1 OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis describes an empirical study where participants completed different sets of 
tasks that aimed to capture creative metaphoric competence in an L1 and L2 and the 
multifaceted nature of creativity. The creative metaphoric competence tasks prompted the 
participants to perform certain metaphor production activities that were identical in 
format, but differed in content and language. One was in Japanese (L1 of the participants) 
and the other was in English (L2 of the participants). As for the first set of creativity 
tasks, these aimed to measure the creative person and past creative achievements through 
administering four questionnaires: a Big Five creative personality questionnaire, a broad 
creative personality profile questionnaire, a past creative achievement questionnaire, and 
a creative self-beliefs questionnaire. All of these were designed and developed by the 
author in Japanese for the purpose of this research. The second set of creativity tasks 
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included both verbal and non-verbal creative product tasks. The layout of the thesis is as 
follows: 
In Chapter 2, I address how metaphor emerges in language through embodied 
experiences interacting with the world and how children develop the ability to 
comprehend metaphors in a first language. It is pointed out that this is a general cognitive 
ability that all children acquire at a young age, except those who have certain language 
impairments like autistic spectrum disorder (Rundblad & Annaz, 2010). I then shift the 
focus and discuss metaphors in a foreign language and the difficulties foreign language 
learners have with this type of language. In addition, I briefly review some approaches to 
teaching metaphors to foreign language learners. I conclude that most methods involve 
teaching conventional metaphoric language often found in multiword expressions like 
idioms and phrasal verbs.  
In the third chapter, I argue that not all metaphors are the same and that it is 
crucial to distinguish between conventional and non-conventional metaphors for the two 
are processed differently. I explore three major approaches that distinguish creative 
metaphors from the more conventional and salient ones that are commonly used in 
everyday language: Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), the Career 
of Metaphor Theory (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), and Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 
2003). I then provide a review of the literature within the field of neuroscience that has 
recently flourished that aims to discover the neuroanatomical mappings of figurative 
language processing. The purpose of this is to review research that shows how novel 
metaphors utilize different parts of the brain from conventional ones. This chapter 
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concludes by laying out a framework that narrows and distinguishes the broad construct 
of metaphors by way of their conventionality and novelty. The goal here is to show that 
metaphors exist on a cline from the conventional to the unconventional and making this 
distinction is crucial for this thesis since the goal of this thesis is to focus on only one 
type of metaphors, those that are novel, unfamiliar, and original.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss creativity, as an individual difference, and develop a 
multifaceted approach to creativity that considers the creative person, past creative 
achievements, creative potential and the creative product. It is hypothesized that creative 
metaphoric competence is a creative act for both involve the momentary fusing of what is 
habitually considered two independent and incompatible concepts (Koestler, 1964). This 
chapter provides the background literature in how I developed the measurement 
instruments used in this thesis to measure the different facets of creativity.  
In Chapter 5, I first describe a short pilot study that provided insight into the 
complications and limitations of conducting this research. From this study, I had to adapt 
and make some changes to the method and materials used in this thesis. In the second 
part of this chapter, I first provide background to how the various questionnaires that 
were used in this thesis were developed and made. In addition, I provide a description of 
the development of the specific instruments used to measure the creative products, such 
as the figural and verbal creative product tasks. In the final part of this chapter, I describe 
the development of the various tasks used to measure creative metaphoric competence, 
which include such activities as asking the participants to produce nominal metaphors, as 
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well as, numerous sentences that provide a certain amount of contextual support and 
prime the participants to complete them with a metaphor.  
In Chapter 6, I describe the method used to conduct this research. This includes 
details about the participants, the setting where the research took place and the procedure 
in how I conducted this study. Moreover, I describe in detail how I scored the 
questionnaires and how I assessed the creative products, as well as, the creative metaphor 
production tasks through the use of the consensual assessment technique, as put forth by 
Amabile (1982, 1996). 
Then in the first part of Chapter 7, I describe the results from the main study. 
First, I address the relationships found among the creativity instruments. I do a 
correlation analysis between the variables and then perform a multiple regression 
analyses to examine which variables show predictability for real-life creativity, as 
measured by a questionnaire that assesses past creative achievements. Then I investigate 
the relationships between the metaphor scores in the two languages. I look at both the 
differences between the scores between the two languages, as well as, correlations 
between all of the metaphor tasks. Finally I analyze the relationships between the 
creativity instruments and these metaphor tasks. In the second part of this chapter, I 
discuss these results. Here I mainly focus on the individual difference, a “need for 
novelty”, which entails inhibiting the conventional responses, risk taking, and conceptual 
reorganization when presented with a linguistic stimulus. 
The final chapter (eight) provides an overall summary of the research. 
Implications of this study on creativity research and creativity in the language-learning 
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classroom are also considered. In addition, this chapter briefly discusses limitations of 
this study and possible avenues for future research. 
 
  
Chapter 2 The Development of Metaphors in Language and the 
Individual  
Metaphor is a powerful tool that is widely used in many facets of everyday life. 
Metaphors can be found in advertisements, lines of poetry, everyday talk of children in 
the schoolyard, and newspaper articles. The traditional view of metaphor, which viewed 
it as something isolated and exceptional, has greatly changed over the past few decades 
and now it is widely assumed to be a common and ordinary feature of language and 
thought.  
 In this chapter, I first provide some background to the study of metaphor. Then I 
examine one approach, called embodied cognition, which provides some explanatory 
insight into how metaphors emerge in language. This approach views metaphors arising 
from our sensory-motor experiences interacting with the world. Finally, I address how 
individuals develop the ability to use metaphors. In this section, I look at the ontogeny of 
metaphor from a developmental perspective in both an L1 and then an L2. Looking at it 
from a developmental perspective shows the messy trajectory of how one acquires this 
cognitive ability of producing and interpreting metaphors initially in a first language and 
then subsequently how it develops in a foreign or second language. It should be noted 
here that this does not take into account how bilinguals acquire this ability for this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, since all the participants in this study were foreign 
language learners of English.  
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2.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF METAPHOR 
In order to delve into the workings of metaphor, it is crucial to first look at some 
terminology. Historically, I. A. Richards (1936) provided names to the two elements 
within a metaphor; the first is called the topic and the latter the vehicle. The topic is that 
which one is trying to talk about and the vehicle provides information on how to talk 
about this topic. So in the following metaphor, “our friendship is a fortress”, our 
friendship is the topic and a fortress is the vehicle.  
 In one early view of metaphor, called the substitution view of metaphor, it was 
believed that the metaphor could in fact be replaced by a literal expression, so that 
“understanding a metaphor is like deciphering a code or unraveling a riddle” (Black, 
1954-55, p. 280). In the above example, one could replace this metaphor with the 
following literal statement, “our friendship is strong and protective”. According to the 
substitution view, metaphors exist on the periphery of language and should take more 
time to comprehend, since one has to “unravel the riddle” of the metaphor. Another view, 
which is often incorporated into this substitution view of metaphor, is the view that 
metaphor is an abbreviated simile or an implicit comparison between two things. So if I 
say, “college is a garden”, what I am really saying is that “college is like a garden”. In 
this example, one works out the meaning of the metaphor through a process of 
comparison and finding a ground of similarity between the vehicle and topic.  
 These theories held a few unquestionable assumptions at the time; firstly that the 
literal and metaphorical are clearly distinguishable categories and secondly that the 
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literal, as being intuitively more comprehensible, had priority over the metaphorical. In 
the following subsections, I address these assumptions and show how questionable they 
are.  
2.1.1 THE THIN LINE: LITERAL AND NONLITERAL LANGUAGE 
For a long time, the terms “literal” and “metaphorical” were perceived to be in stark 
contrast to one another. The word “literal” comes from Latin, “literalis/litteralis”, which 
means "of or belonging to letters or writing," from Latin litera/littera "letter, alphabetic 
sign; literature, books” similar in etymology to the word “letter”. In the 1590s, the word 
began to be used in the sense of “verbally exact”, as in the primary sense of the word1. So 
what is this “exactitude” or this primary meaning that exists in opposition to metaphors? 
If we take a basic word like “salary” and assume that it has the literal meaning “of a fixed 
payment for work” are we not overlooking the metaphorical origins of this word, which 
comes from the word “salt” (Cameron, 1999)? Or how do we account for polysemy in 
many words? For example, “garage” in British English may refer to a parking structure or 
a repair shop (Clark, 1996). Does one literal meaning have priority over the other? 
According to the before mentioned view of metaphor, a metaphor creates a riddle and the 
literal provides the tools to solve it. This assumption that the literal is such a fundamental 
part of language prompted Gibbs (1994) to state, “we assume that there must be literal 
concepts and literal meanings in order for people to communicate successfully” (p. 26). 
This stark contrast between the literal and metaphorical is fraught with a number of 
problems and many literal expressions are in fact “dead” metaphors. Yet the vitality of a 
                                                      
 
1 http://etymonline.com 
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metaphor is really activated by the specific speaker within that specific moment of use 
and therefore is dynamic and dependent on the cognitive activation at the individual and 
contextual level (Müller, 2009).  
 One goal of Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis is to argue that metaphors sit and move 
along a continuum. That is to say, some metaphors through use become more salient and 
entrenched in the mental lexicon of individuals and consequently move along this 
continuum towards conventionalization. For instance, on the one end are metaphors 
whose figurative meanings, due to their familiarity and conventionality, have lexicalized 
set units within the dictionary (e.g., “their dream was crushed”). On the other end are 
metaphors whose figurative meanings are freely compiled and due to their novelty and 
unfamiliarity are non-lexicalized and not a set unit (e.g., “their dream was a drop of water 
on a hot stone”). This idea will be further developed in Chapter 3. The point here, to 
return to the focus of this chapter, is to highlight the fact that when speaking of metaphor, 
some metaphors are more highly salient and prominent in language and therefore have 
more of a “literal” feel to them. Therefore all metaphors are likely not riddle-like, as 
indicated in the previous section, and as a consequence do not take more time to process 
than a literal sentence with equivalent meaning. This is further discussed in the next 
subsection.  
2.1.2 PROCESSING METAPHORS: SECONDARY OR PARALLEL TO LITERAL LANGUAGE? 
The Standard Pragmatic Model based on the work of the philosophers, Paul Grice (1975) 
and John Searle (1979) makes a clear distinction between the literal and the nonliteral (or 
figurative meaning) and subsequently ascribed priority to the literal meaning. Whether or 
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not the sentence has a literal or nonliteral meaning, the literal meaning of the utterance is 
obligatorily accessed first. If this literal interpretation is regarded as anomalous and 
without any discernable meaning in the context, the literal meaning of the phrase is 
discarded and then one attempts to seek out the figurative meaning in an additional 
optional stage. This multi-stage processing model views metaphor comprehension as 
requiring a greater amount of cognitive effort for it only occurs after the literal meaning 
is tested and then rejected. The main point here is that the literal meaning is automatic 
and a priori to the figurative meaning and this figurative meaning is the result of a so-
called failure in appropriating a reasonable literal meaning to the phrase.  
 In contrast, a parallel-processing view (Gibbs, 1994; Glucksberg, 2003) holds that 
the literal and the metaphorical occur concurrently and thereby one does not have priority 
over the other. In this direct-access processing model, metaphors are comprehended 
directly without a literal interpretation, for the figurative meaning is extracted directly 
from the sentence through the available context. In one famous study, Glucksberg and 
colleagues (1982) used a similar style of test to the Stroop Test in order to see if people 
have difficulty rejecting metaphors as literally false. In this study, they prepared four 
types of sentences; literally true sentences, literally false ones, metaphors, and scrambled 
metaphors. The participants were asked to judge and then reject sentences that were 
literally false. They observed that it took people a longer time to reject the metaphors, to 
which they labeled this as the “metaphor interference effect”. They interpreted this 
interference as the result of both the literal and metaphorical meanings simultaneously 
being activated and concluded that the literal does not have priority. There has also been 
a growing consensus in the field that supports this parallel-processing view (Gibbs, 1984; 
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Keysar, 1989; McElree & Nordlie, 1999). Another crucial element involving metaphors 
is the question of why do people use metaphors in the first place. The next subsection 
describes why and how metaphors arise in language.  
2.1.3 PLUGGING THE GAP: WHY DO PEOPLE USE METAPHORS? 
According to the substitution view of metaphor, a literal statement of equal meaning can 
easily replace a metaphor, if this were true, then why do people use metaphors in the first 
place? Black (1962) presents a couple answers to this question. First there is the stylistic 
reason, which is firmly based on the idea that metaphor is a literary or rhetorical device, 
and the delight one experiences in finding the hidden meanings of the metaphor or 
solving the puzzle. The second reason is the pragmatic function of metaphors. That is to 
say, metaphors act as a linguistic tool to coin new terms for new concepts when there is a 
void in the language. For instance, with the invention of the computer, numerous 
metaphorical neologisms arose in the past half century such as; “web”, “mouse”, 
“cookie”, “firewall”, “worm” and so on. Black (1954-55) picturesquely states, “metaphor 
plugs the gap in the literal vocabulary” (p. 280).  In essence, metaphors are “the major 
vehicle through which words acquire new or broader meaning” (Hock & Joseph, 1996, p. 
228). So in essence, metaphors are essential in the ongoing expansion of language and 
therefore the substitution view of metaphor in untenable.  
The Necessity of Metaphors 
Ortony (1975) provides three theses that motivate people to use metaphors; the 
compactness thesis, the inexpressibility thesis, and the vividness thesis. In the 
compactness thesis, metaphors have the ability to densely pack a vast amount of 
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information using a minimal amount of language. The inexpressibility thesis, as 
previously mentioned, views metaphors as a key way to coin new words. Finally in the 
vividness thesis, metaphors are closer to and provide a more experientialist account of the 
situation and thus have emotive force. The vividness of the metaphor can arouse a mental 
image, rich in detail and closely linked to our perceptual and sensory experiences of the 
world. 
 In addition to Ortony’s above thesis, others have also provided differing opinions 
on why people use metaphors. For instance, Cohen (1978) suggests that it is to achieve 
“intimacy” and the use of metaphors acts as a special invitation to the interlocutor and 
builds a close community much like a joke does. There is also a metaphor-to-theory 
relationship in the sciences where metaphors are instrumental for developing theories 
from Darwin to the cognitive revolution (Gruber, 1974; Thagard, 1992) for metaphors 
provide an easier, more graspable, and warmer vehicle to understanding an abstract 
notion (Feist, 2006). In education, metaphors are viewed as a heuristic for learning, as 
well as for teaching (Littlemore & Low, 2006a; Stevick, 1982). Metaphors also provide 
language to express the emotions (Kövecses, 2003).  
 In short, metaphors have various functions in language. One key aspect of 
metaphor is that it allows people to talk about abstract or less well understood concepts 
by comparing them to something more concrete or physical. In the following section, I 
outline a key theoretical argument in the cognitive sciences called embodied cognition. 
According to this view, which is far from having a singular viewpoint (see Wilson, 
2002), but generally speaking, holds that cognitive processes are deeply linked to 
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sensory-motor systems and the body’s interactions with the environment. A number of 
studies have provided support for this theory in regards to concrete concepts, but to a 
lesser extent for abstract language. This has been one major and unresolved issue in this 
field. One proposed viewpoint within embodied cognition theories is that abstract 
concepts are also embodied, which has been labeled the Strong Embodiment view of 
cognition. In this view, it is proposed that abstract concepts are understood through 
analogy to sensations and actions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Gibbs, 2006). 
Therefore metaphors emerge in language from our embodied interactions with the world 
around us. The theory of embodied metaphor seeks to explain how abstract thought is 
often bound metaphorically to a concrete concept. This is one aspect of the broad 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory view of metaphor, which is also discussed in this next 
section. In addition, I also present some controversies and support for this theory. 
Understanding the embodied nature of metaphors sheds some light more generally on the 
emergence of metaphor in language.  
2.2 EMBODIMENT: HOW METAPHORS ARISE IN LANGUAGE 
Traditional models approach cognition as being amodal and disembodied (see Fodor, 
1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). This means that cognition functions independently from 
the sensory, motor, and emotional systems. This separate and encapsulated cognitive 
architecture manipulates symbols. Sensory, motor, and emotional information goes 
through a process called “transduction”, where the information is transformed into a 
symbol that can then be easily manipulated through various cognitive processes 
(Pylyshyn, 1984). This model developed along with the development of the computer, 
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which is viewed as a “symbol manipulating device” and likewise the mind too, began to 
be viewed as having “symbol manipulating processes” (Newell & Simon, 1961). One of 
the major shortcomings of this approach is called the “symbol grounding problem” 
(Hanard, 1990; Vogt, 2002). This problem refers to the idea that if symbols are internal 
representations with which mental computations can be performed and consequently no 
longer are connected to any external information (sensory/motor), the meanings of the 
symbols are simply grounded in additional meaningless symbols. Yet they have to be 
about something, if not, one would be simply wandering lost from one meaningless 
definiens to another meaningless definiendum (Hanard, 1990 as cited in Jackson & 
Sharkey, 1996). So somehow these “symbols must be grounded, that is, relate to 
something other than additional symbols” (Glenberg, 2010, p. 587).  
 An alternative approach to cognition, one that views the mind as being both 
embodied and embedded in the world, has steadily gained momentum in the cognitive 
sciences. For Varela, Rosch, and Thompson (1991), cognition takes place “from having a 
body with various sensorimotor capacities … that … are themselves embedded in a more 
encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context” (p. 172-3). Thelen (2000) 
explains how  “cognition depends on the kinds of experiences that come from having a 
body with particular perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked and that 
together form the matrix within which memory, emotion, language, and all other aspects 
of life are meshed” (p. 4). Likewise, Gibbs (2006), provides a lengthy description of 
embodiment in what he calls the “embodiment premise” emphasizing that “... Human 
language and thought emerge from recurring patterns of embodied activity that constrain 
ongoing intelligent behavior. We must not assume cognition to be purely internal, 
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symbolic, computations, and disembodied...” (p. 9). This embodied approach to cognition 
resolves the “symbol-grounding problem” and views higher order cognition as being 
grounded in the modal and action systems of the body.  
 A substantial amount of research confirms the embodied approach to cognition 
(see Barsalou, 2008 or Gibbs, 2006 for a review). A number of studies also provide 
empirical support for the idea that language, too, is grounded in sensory-motor systems 
(Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermuller, 
2004; Pulvermueller, Haerle, & Hummel, 2001), confirming what Gallesse and Lakoff 
(2005) affirmed, “language makes direct use of the same brain structures used in 
perception and action” (p. 473). Much of the current debate though involving embodied 
cognition and language revolves around abstract concepts, as Barsalou (2008) states, 
“Abstract concepts pose a classic challenge for grounded cognition. How can theories 
that focus on modal simulation explain concepts that do not appear modal?” (p. 634). 
Many others have likewise voiced this concern and have proposed a pluralistic approach 
that aims to combine embodied theories with disembodied symbolic theories (Chatterjee, 
2010; Dove, 2011; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008). This falls under the assumption that 
both modes of representation are necessary for cognition, as Machery (2007) frames the 
question, “[t]o what extent do we use reenacted perceptual representations in cognition 
and to what extent do we use amodal representations?” (p. 42). On the other hand, 
Glenberg and colleagues (2008) argue that the motor system is modulated during both 
concrete and abstract language comprehension and that understanding abstract action is 
based on understanding concrete actions. Clearly making a distinction between concrete 
and abstract words though can be rather difficult and controversial (Scorolli et al., 2011), 
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much like the difficulty of distinguishing the literal from the metaphorical (Gibbs, 1994). 
In the next subsection, I address this issue of concreteness and abstraction for it is key to 
resolve in order to better understand how metaphors emerge in language. 
2.2.1 ANALYZING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT 
LANGUAGE 
 
Concrete words are words that one can experience through the senses such as physical 
entities (book, bicycle) while abstract words are considered to be detached from such 
physical references (idea, freedom) (Crystal, 2003). Hale (1988) provides some 
additional distinctions between these two entities; “abstract entities are not in space time 
whereas concrete ones are” ... “abstract entities have only relational properties while 
concrete entities have some intrinsic properties” ... “concrete entities are known by 
observation whereas abstract entities are known in a some other way” (p. 86-87). The 
question in this section is to try and answer what this “other way” is that allows us to 
know abstract entities.  
 Concrete words have been shown to have an advantage over abstract words, 
which is commonly known as the concreteness effect. This cognitive advantage appears 
both in lexical decision tasks, as well as long and short-term memory tasks (Paivio, 
Walsh, & Bons, 1994; Walker & Hulme, 1999). This concreteness effect is often 
attributed to differences in imageability, as developed in Paivio’s (1986) dual coding 
theory, or differences in context availability, as developed by Schwanenflugel and 
colleagues (1988, 1992). I briefly look in more detail at each of these theories below.  
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Imageability: Paivio’s Dual Coding 
Paivio (1986) developed a dual-coding theoretical approach to human cognition that 
suggests there are two independent but interconnected systems, a verbal and nonverbal 
system. The verbal system works on linguistic codes and the nonverbal one works on 
imagery. According to this model, abstract and concrete concepts in language are 
processed similarly, as both use the verbal system, but differ insofar that concrete 
concepts are also associated with imagery and therefore utilize the nonverbal system. So 
the main difference between concrete and abstract words is the degree of imageability of 
the concept. Concrete concepts have rich imagery and this provides the concreteness 
effect. This has been empirically supported in a study where abstract concepts showed 
greater engagement of the verbal system, while concrete concepts showed greater 
engagement of the perceptual system during processing (Wang, Conder, Blitzer, & 
Shinkareva, 2010). From these results, the researchers suggest that this is likely due to 
increase mental imagery of concrete concepts. 
Context Schwanenflugel’s Context Availability Theories   
In contrast, the context availability explanation proposed by Schwanenflugel et al. (1988, 
1992) argues that contexts are easier to imagine for concrete concepts than abstract 
concepts. As these rich and dense interconnections with other semantic concepts become 
available, the concrete concept is easier to retrieve. In other words, abstract concepts have 
less available contextual information in memory, thus causing them to be recalled less 
quickly.  
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 In this subsection, I have outlined different theories that propose different 
processes involved in the understanding of concrete and abstract concepts based on 
imageability or density of contextual support. One shortcoming of these models is that 
they fail to take into account emotional or affective information. While concrete concepts 
may make use of more sensory-motor information, Kousta et al. (2011) suggest that 
abstract concepts make greater use of affective information and propose that “emotion 
plays an important role during language acquisition, providing a bootstrapping 
mechanism for the acquisition of abstract lexical concepts and their labels at early stages” 
(p. 25). Metaphors are frequently used in language to express emotional experiences 
(Fainsilber & Ortony, 1987; Kövecses, 2003) and they “allow us to conceptualize our 
emotions in more sharply defined terms” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 58). So there is a 
tight link between abstract language, the affective system, and metaphor. In this case, 
metaphor is one such bootstrapping mechanism that allows people to abstract. For 
instance, the abstract psychological state of affection is conceptually linked to the 
physical state of warmth and spatial state of closeness. Moreover, it is not just emotional 
experiences that provide a mechanism to abstract, but the sensory and motor systems also 
play a role in abstraction (see Gibbs, 2006; Glenberg et al., 2008: Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999). Therefore appropriate metaphors in natural language often use a concrete item as 
the vehicle to talk about some more abstract topic. I discuss this idea in greater detail in 
the next section.   
2.2.2 THE BODY IN THE MIND: STRONG EMBODIMENT 
To return to the before mentioned theory of embodied cognition, one controversial point 
is the differing views in how to explain abstract concepts. If abstract concepts are 
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completely decoupled from the sensory-motor systems, it then becomes less clear how it 
can be “differentiated from the more traditional approaches it seeks to displace” (Clark, 
1999, p. 348). Using a symbolic approach for abstract concepts would also return the 
“grounding problem”. As a growing range of embodied theories developed, Meteyard 
and colleagues (2012) decided to lay them out on a continuum from secondary 
embodiment where semantic content is independent but associated with sensory-motor 
systems to weak embodiment where semantic content has partial dependence on the 
sensory-motor system to strong embodiment, which asserts that there is complete 
dependence on the sensory-motor system. In this subsection, I address this strong form of 
embodiment because this view provides a theory of how abstraction arises from sensory-
motor experiences by way of metaphor.  
 In the strong view of embodied cognition, abstract entities like concrete ones use 
the same sensory-motor and affective systems to provide structure for mental 
representations. Metaphors are a necessary part of our conceptual system for they provide 
the mapping between the two domains like “affection” (an abstract human emotion) and 
“warmth” (a sensory experience). This mapping develops early and motivates such 
linguistic metaphors as “a warm reception”. For as Marks (1996) states “Even if some 
perceptual metaphors end up being mediated linguistically, their origins appear to be 
wholly in perception itself, starting within perceptual processes before being overlaid and 
dominated by linguistic ones” (p. 59). 
 Strong embodiment has been heavily influenced by the early work of Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) and more recently by Gallese and Lakoff (2005). Labeled the “strong” 
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version for in this framework of embodied cognition, abstract concepts are even viewed 
as deriving from sensory motor experiences. Based partially on Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) 
idea that the body works as our “general medium for having a world” and through the 
primary actions of perceiving and moving about in this world, the body provides the 
building blocks to move from concrete and literal meanings to more abstract and 
figurative meanings.   
The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to 
the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits 
around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary 
actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests 
through them a core of new significance: this is true of motor habits [sic] such as 
dancing. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 146) 
 Mandler (2004) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) provide further insight into how 
this conceptual development may occur among children. First, they learn concrete 
language directly from experientially interacting with their bodies in the world and this 
then proceeds to more complex and abstract language. These “conceptual primitives” are 
combined, mapped, and blended in new ways to extend meaning into abstract domains. 
The idea that metaphors are embodied in our interactions with the world around us is 
heavily influenced by work done in the fields of image schemas and conceptual metaphor 
theory. I look more closely at both of these in the following two parts.  
Image Schemas: The Development of Experiential Structure 
An image schema is an abstract representation that provides structure to our everyday 
experiences. It is dynamic and develops through our reoccurring perceptual and motor 
interactions with the world around us and supplies a certain amount of coherency to these 
experiences. Johnson (1987) argues that these “experiences” should “be understood in a 
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very rich, broad sense as including basic perceptual, motor-program, emotional, 
historical, social and linguistic dimensions” (p. xvi). Lakoff (1987), in turn, elaborates on 
this idea and provides some examples of them: 
Image schemas are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our 
everyday bodily experience: CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, 
BALANCE, and in various orientations and relations: UP -DOWN, FRONT -
BACK, PARTWHOLE, CENTER -PERIPHERY, etc. (p. 267) 
To illustrate how an image schema is thought to work, in this paragraph, I provide some 
examples of the BALACE schema. Balance is something one learns through our bodies 
interacting within the environment and “not by grasping a set of rules” (Johnson, 1987, p. 
74). We learn from a very early age bodily equilibrium and disequilibrium and the need 
to maintain equilibrium. This BALANCE image schema emerges from the earliest stages 
of human development and continues throughout life for it is a pervasive part of the body 
learning to negotiate with the environment. Some examples of this are a baby learning to 
stand or a child learning to ride a bicycle to other experiences such as traversing a ledge 
or trying to stay upright while wading in the ocean. So this image schema is the “point of 
axis around which forces and weights must be distributed so that they counteract or 
balance off one another” (Gibbs & Colston, 1995, p. 350). This kinesthetic experience of 
balance forms this image schema, which can then be extended to more abstract domains 
like economics and politics. For example the word balance itself may be used to talk 
about maintaining a sense of monetary equilibrium as in “to balance the books”, but it 
can also be used in linguistically creative ways. The following is a literal example of a 
person displaying a high level of balance by walking on a tight rope over Niagara Falls. 
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(1) He's going to be walking over Niagara Falls on a tight rope 
(CNN Situation 2012.06.15). 
 Having background knowledge of a tight rope, which is a rope suspended 
between two edges where a person then proceeds to walk across while maintaining one’s 
balance all the while mindful of the risk of losing balance and the foreseeable result of 
injury or even death, can be projected onto more abstract concepts like the precarious 
position of the US economy in 1990.  
(2) First of all, I hope these other fellows are right, however, I think 
the Federal Reserve really is walking a tight rope… (PBS 
Newshour 1990.08.15). 
 Here the Federal Reserve is personified as a person like in example (1) and 
physically crossing a tight rope, which is being in a high risk situation where maintaining 
one’s balance is paramount. Losing balance would not cause physical injury, but rather 
economic turmoil. This image of balancing on a tight rope is multi modal, which means 
that it is not only in language, but can also appear in other modalities like the visual, as in 
pictorial metaphors (Forceville, 1996). The Economist magazine often exploits these 
metaphors in its cover art. On the February 8th, 2014 issue, a man on a unicycle holding 
an umbrella cycles across a tight rope suspended in the sky with the caption “the 
worldwide wobble”. Again this pictorial metaphor is harnessing the image schema of 
BALANCE and the difficulty of maintaining balance while traversing an elevated and 
unstable ground. This can be extended to various other instances where it is difficult to 
maintain one’s balance like crossing a tattered suspension bridge (The Economist, 2010-
02-13). This concept of balance is conceptualized as being in a state of equilibrium where 
the weight is equally distributed resulting in a feeling of stability and composure. While 
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losing balance disrupts this equilibrium leading to instability and the lack of composure 
that can also be found in figurative expressions using such words as “slipped” or 
“tripped”. An external force can also push one over and cause one to lose balance, so in 
the following example, a passenger plane being shot down over Ukraine may provide the 
causal force of sending the region into a disequilibrium or a chaotic state of affairs.  
(3) PJ Crowley: Downed MH17 is tipping point in Ukraine 
(BBC.com, July 18 2014). 
 A tipping point again is being in the state of losing one’s balance and in turn 
falling over. These image schemas are highly important for language acquisition and 
providing structure to everyday experiences interacting in the world, as Mandler (1992) 
stated, “image-schemas provide a level of representation intermediate between perception 
and language that facilitates the process of language acquisition” (p. 587).  
Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
Those working within a Conceptual Metaphor Theory (hereinafter CMT) framework 
argue that metaphor is essentially a matter of thought and only derivatively a matter of 
language and therefore metaphor is more than a rhetorical device, but an important part 
of thought, reason, emotion, and the imagination (Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2006; Lakoff, 
1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Sweetser, 1990).  
 Lakoff (1988) argues that “meaningful conceptual structures arise from two 
sources: (1) from the structured nature of bodily and social experience and (2) from our 
innate capacity to imaginatively project from certain well-structured aspects of bodily 
and interactional experience to abstract conceptual structures” (p. 121) For instance, the 
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bodily experience of carrying a physical weight is projected onto the abstract 
psychological concept of being in a state or situation of difficulty. This often comes about 
due to such circumstances as being in financial trouble. Consider the following lines of 
how someone describes credit card debt: 
(4) But 6 months later, she says, he phoned and said it was over, 
leaving her with a $3,600 apartment lease to pay off, medical 
bills and a heavy load of credit card debt (ABC 20/20 Nov. 21, 
2008). 
In the above example, debt is a “heavy load”, a weight that one carries around. Literally 
this obviously is not true since if debt had any physical form it would most likely be that 
of a single sheet of paper. This weight of debt can be so heavy (as in the more the debt 
the heavier the weight) that it can cause one to sink underneath it.  
(5) Last fall, Jennifer Gonzales, 26, felt as though she was sinking 
under the weight of her debt (Cosmopolitan 2002 Aug Vol. 233, 
Iss. 2; pg. 142). 
This is also a very common visual metaphor that exploits such images as a ball and chain. 
Typically the images portray a human figurine carrying this weight, which presumably is 
significantly heavy for the person is slouched over. Yet weight is not simply used to talk 
about being in some precarious financial situation, it can also be used to talk about 
psychological difficulties, such as pressure, stress, or expectations. This weight similar to 
a pack is carried on one’s shoulders and physically weighing someone down, yet at the 
same time has the possibility of being removed. 
(6) Lin said during his introductory news conference with the Lakers 
on Thursday. "I think that's been a big weight off my shoulders 
and I think that's very important for me as a player” 
(ESPNLosAngeles.com July 24, 2014). 
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There is also the expression “emotional baggage”, which has become such a conventional 
expression that there are countless web sites and self-help material that provide advice to 
those who carry around this weight. Emotional baggage though is more than an idiomatic 
expression for the analogy can be imaginatively and intricately expanded where the 
accumulation of difficulties in life is like carrying around a heavy suitcase where the bag 
actually takes on certain physical properties as something that you can “drag around” and 
“haul” somewhere on a summer vacation. 
(7) The Kellehers of Massachusetts wouldn't begin to know how to 
pack lightly: They're dragging around too much emotional 
baggage. And every summer, they haul it up to Maine to their 
vacation home (Christian Science Monitor June 28, 2011).  
More creatively these negative life experiences can in fact be pieces of clothing that you 
actually try to pack away into this bag and sometimes if there is too many pieces of 
clothing, this bag will actually burst open and scatter around the room. 
(8) It's the emotional baggage I'm hauling around that's causing all 
the trouble. Because every so often, the neatly packed suitcase, 
which is my old marriage, bursts open and the bad memories 
scatter like dirty laundry (Source unknown). 
This emotional baggage can also be extended to have quantifiable characteristics, as in, 
actually weighing 50 lbs. and removing it from one’s back will result in a feeling of 
freedom and lightness. 
(9) They have a sense of well-being, and a sense of relief, and a 
sense of charm because they've just had 50 pounds of emotional 
baggage taken off their shoulders (NPR Fresh Air 12:00 PM EST 
Oct. 12, 2010). 
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 In contrast, the conventionalized idiomatic expression, “kick the bucket” is highly 
constrained. For example one cannot make it passive “the bucket was kicked by him” or 
creatively extend the situation by saying something like “he took the bucket up to his 
summer home and kicked it up there”. Such an idiomatic expression is frozen, highly 
opaque, and most likely arose from some currently unknown historical source and not 
motivated by a conceptual metaphor as in the case of “emotional baggage”. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) began to see that many metaphorical expressions are not simply arbitrary 
in nature, but are clusters that are structured and motivated by a conceptual metaphor, as 
in this case, DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS2. So this metaphor involves understanding 
difficulties in life whether financial or psychological through a semantically distinct 
domain, that of a burden, or in more common vernacular, a physical weight.  
 So in summary, image schemas develop through our perceptual and motor 
interactions with the world around us and provide us with some coherent structure to 
these experiences. While conceptual metaphors utilize these image schemas and project 
this more experiential domain of experience onto a more abstract domain. So images 
schemas, like BALANCE or BURDENS, provide a certain amount of structure to 
understanding abstract and complex concepts like economics and emotional or financial 
difficulties. These image schemas are embodied and therefore are not dependent on 
natural language, but arise through reoccurring interactions with the world. With its 
popularity, CMT has accordingly triggered a number of controversial claims against it 
and has garnered both strong critics and supporters.  
                                                      
 
2 In the field of cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphors are all in caps to distinguish them from instantiations of linguistic metaphors. Moreover with 
a CMT framework, the first term (topic) is called the Target Domain and the second term (vehicle) is called the Source Domain.  
 30 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory: The Controversies & Criticisms  
There is plenty of controversy and contention concerning CMT (Haser, 2005; McGlone, 
2007; Murphy, 1996). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into detail about these 
varying arguments and objections, but one critical point made early on by Murphy (1996) 
is worth noting and his distinction between a weak and a strong version of CMT. In the 
weaker version, metaphors play an important role in influencing and organizing the 
construction of complex abstract concepts (target) by grounding them in concrete 
concepts (source), but are not essential in their conceptual representation. Thus the 
representation of abstract concepts is not necessarily metaphorical and if we extend this 
further, subsequently not grounded in the sensory-motor systems. Murphy (1996) also 
notes that these abstract concepts also need to have some semantic primitives, in a sense, 
it needs to have a certain amount of independent structure in order for the metaphorical 
mapping onto them to actually take place. Haser (2005) makes a similar claim in 
reference to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. 
In CMT, they assert that arguments are systematically correlated to our experiences of 
war, but Haser (2005) insists that there must be some “antecedent conception of what 
arguments are, otherwise the purported ability to experience ‘correlations’ between the 
two domains appears wholly mysterious” (p. 157).  
 Another criticism of CMT is from McGlone (2007), who views it as simply 
having “atmospheric influence” while not faring well “theoretically or empirically” 
(McGlone, 2007, p. 122). All three (Haser, 2005; McGlone, 2007; Murphy, 1996) also 
point out the circularity of conceptual metaphors and the overreliance on linguistic 
evidence ‘‘[. . .] the empirical base for the theory must be expanded beyond linguistic 
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phenomena … there is a circularity here […]” (Murphy, 1996, p. 200) and “[c]learly, the 
conceptual metaphor view must go beyond circular reasoning of this sort and seek 
evidence that is independent of the linguistic evidence’’ (McGlone, 2007, p. 95). Gibbs 
(1996; 2011) responds to many of the criticisms put forth by both McGlone and Murphy, 
most notably the criticism that there is little nonlinguistic evidence to support CMT.  
Conceptual Metaphor Theory: Supporting Evidence 
Despite the criticisms of CMT for using circular reasoning and over-relying on language 
for substantiation, there has been a growing amount of nonlinguistic evidence to support 
CMT. For instance, Boroditsky (2000) and Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) demonstrated 
how the abstract sense of time is grounded in the physical experience of movement 
through space. They asked two groups of participants after each group having been 
prompted to think about motion in different ways the following ambiguous question, 
“Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day is the meeting 
now that it has been rescheduled?” This question is ambiguous for it can be interpreted in 
two different ways depending on how one metaphorically frames the question. One could 
involve an ego-moving metaphor where one metaphorically sees oneself as physically 
moving through space (“I’m approaching 50!”) or on the other hand an object moving 
metaphor where one metaphorically sees time as an object moving towards oneself in 
space (“Another year is quickly approaching”). In the experiment, one group of 
participants were asked to imagine themselves moving towards an object, thus priming an 
ego-moving metaphor situation and the other group was asked to imagine an object 
moving towards them, thus priming an object-moving metaphor. Those in the first group 
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were more likely to answer “Friday” to the above question to which the researchers 
interpreted as the result of being primed to think about an ego-moving metaphor.  
 Özçalışkan (2007) also provides evidence for the embodied nature of conceptual 
metaphors through studying how young children learn motion metaphors. Children go 
through a transitional stage where children (around 4 years old) interpret “the 
metaphorical concept as a physical object and by physically performing the action 
conveyed in the metaphor (e.g., crawl on all fours when asked how time crawls). But at 
age 5, instead of physically performing the action, children start simulating the actions 
imaginatively and create partial reenactments of the action conveyed in the metaphor by 
producing hand gestures in spaces aligned with the target domain of the metaphor” (p. 
165). This illustrates how metaphorical concepts are grounded in sensory-motor 
experiences and through scaffolding are projected from the physical into the abstract.  
 Boot and Pecher (2010) utilizing nonlinguistic materials in their experiments thus 
directly addressing McGlone and Murphy’s criticism of CMT, found that the conceptual 
metaphor SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS employs an asymmetrical conceptual mapping 
from the more concrete domain “closeness” to the more abstract domain “similarity” and 
is “fundamental to the concept of similarity [and] automatic and not due to linguistic 
associations” (p. 952). Additionally, a substantial amount of work with conceptual 
metaphors in the field of experimental and social psychology (Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 
2010; Landau, Robinson, & Meier, 2014) has flourished over the past decade providing 
some additional evidence of how conceptual metaphors play a role in social cognition 
and interpersonal behavior. One of the most commonly cited articles (Zhong & 
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Liljenquist, 2006) presents evidence that shows that when one feels a threat to one’s own 
moral purity it activates a desire to physically cleanse oneself. This research provides 
some non-linguistic evidence to the conceptual metaphor, MORAL PURITY IS 
CLEANLINESS, which supports the metaphorical examples that can be found in 
language as in the following Facebook posting that someone posted after reading about a 
sexual abuse scandal at a school. 
(10) Horrible story … gonna go wash my hands and disinfect my 
mouse (Facebook, 2014).  
 Here even the mouse is contaminated by the story since it is the tool used to scroll 
through the article. Other experimental psychological studies have also found similar 
results with other conceptual domains like physical coldness and social exclusion (as in 
the metaphorical expressions of a “cold shoulder” or a “cold stare”) (Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008) and warmth and friendliness (Williams & Bargh, 2008), anger and 
heat (Wilkowski et al., 2009), time and space (future-front/past-back) (Boroditsky, 2000; 
Weger & Pratt, 2008), power and spatial relationships (up/down) (Schubert, 2005), and 
harboring a secret and physical weight (Slepian, Masicampo, Toosi, & Ambady, 2012; 
Slepian, Masicampo, & Ambady, 2014). Despite the vast amount of nonlinguistic 
evidence supporting CMT (Landau et al., 2010), some researchers have claimed 
difficulties in regards to duplicating these findings (Earp, Everett, Madva, & Hamlin, 
2014; LeBel & Wilbur, 2014). One factor that could have contributed to these less 
reliable findings is that the Earp and colleagues (2014) study used vicarious recollection 
of past ethical and unethical experiences and this exerts weaker moral effects than first 
person direct enactment (Barsalou, 2008; Lee & Schwarz, 2016).  
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2.2.3 SUMMARY OF AN EMBODIED VIEW OF METAPHOR 
In this section, I have provided background on how metaphors emerge in language 
through physical instantiations of the body interacting in the social and cultural world. It 
is through this “embodied action” where cognition takes place. This provides a 
foundation in how to view metaphors arising in language. In summary: 
• Historical views of metaphor often entailed viewing them as a “mark of genius”. 
In contrast, modern approaches view them as unremarkable insofar as they are 
commonplace in everyday language and mostly unconscious. 
• Metaphors are conceptual. Thus they appear in natural language, but also in other 
modes and forms of communication like gestures, images, and music. 
• Metaphors provide the conceptual structure to think of abstract concepts, which 
are inherently grounded in experiential concepts (movement, space, closure, 
weight, etc.).  
Since metaphors are all pervasive in language, the second goal of this section is to 
consider how metaphors arise within individuals. In the following section I first look at 
how children develop metaphorical competence in a first language and then how this 
occurs in a second or foreign language. 
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHORIC COMPETENCE AT THE INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL 
Language typically develops in children during their first year of age. It emerges along 
with other important socio-cognitive skills like joint attention and intention-reading 
(Tomasello, 2003). Yet obviously the first words that a one-year old utters are not 
metaphors. Likewise a second language learner does not simply start producing novel 
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metaphors in a second language immediately in the first day of class. How children and 
second language learners develop the ability to interpret and produce metaphors is 
complex and messy, but in different ways. The following two sections investigate this 
question with the aim of comparing and contrasting how children and second language 
learners develop metaphorical competence in an L1 and an L2.  
2.3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHORIC COMPETENCE IN A FIRST LANGUAGE 
The question that I address in this section is “How do children develop the ability to 
freely and fluently use metaphors in their first language?” Gentner (1988) has argued that 
research into metaphorical competence is “fraught with contradictions” for children have 
been both described as having poor skills and being quite talented at using metaphors. 
Evaluating the empirical findings on the development of metaphorical competence in 
children is complicated and difficult and often involves both conflicting views of what a 
metaphor actually is and how to measure such ability in children. In this section I will 
look at different and competing views about the ontogeny of metaphor and attempt to 
synthesize the research with the aim of providing a foundation for understanding how 
metaphorical competence develops in an L1.  
 One position, rooted in the cognitive stages of development proposed by Piaget, 
views metaphor as emerging later somewhere during middle or late childhood after the 
child has acquired more complex cognitive and linguistics skills (Asch & Nerlove, 1960; 
Cometa & Eson, 1978; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 1964). Yet despite providing 
groundbreaking insight into the developmental processes of children acquiring metaphor, 
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this late onset claim began to be questioned, as more naturalistic approaches were 
developed to assess metaphor (Winner, 1995).  
 This alternative view proposes that metaphorical language appears early and can 
be found even in preschool children (Winner, 1997). In addition, metaphorical 
understanding began to be seen as a far more complex and messy developmental ability 
than previously imagined. For in fact metaphorical understanding may involve three 
different and widely divergent abilities: production, comprehension, and metalinguistic 
awareness (or the ability to explicate and interpret the rationale of the metaphor) (Winner, 
Rosenstiel, & Gardner, 1976). As previously stated, according to this position, in contrast 
to the late-onset view, metaphor production emerges early in development. This position 
also stresses the proclivity of children to play with language. In fact, while doing this, 
they spontaneously produce a substantial number of metaphors (Carlson & Anisfeld, 
1969; Chukovsky, 1968; Gardner, Kircher, Winner, & Perkins, 1975). These playful 
metaphors are often quite different than how adults may use a metaphor such as calling 
an umbrella a “rain roof” (Marschark & Nall, 1985). Yet there are a number of linguistic 
and cognitive developmental changes necessary for a child to acquire an advanced ability 
to use, understand, and interpret metaphors such as: 
• Understanding relational features between two distantly related semantic domains  
• A greater depth of semantic knowledge 
These points will be discussed in more detail in the following parts of this section.  
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From Perceptual to Relational Metaphors: A Continuum Towards Complexity 
Minimally for a child to have the capacity to understand or produce a metaphor, the child 
needs to be able to perceive similarities between the topic and vehicle concepts, as well 
as, being able to conceive one thing, as if it were the other (Winner, McCarthy, & 
Gardner, 1980). Young children have been shown to be able to perceive similar 
relationships between entities in differing semantic domains (Gentner, 1977). Winner et 
al. (1980) argue that the capacity to perceive similarity between concepts is really the 
heart of learning and is likely present at birth and continues to develop with age.  For 
example in an early study, Carlson and Anisfeld (1969) cite a 2 year old child saying, 
“I’m a big waterfall” when sliding down the front of his father. They observed that this 
child also appeared to be aware of this semantic extension and deviation of meaning, as a 
possible example of an early form of verbal humor. This “deviation of meaning” is an 
important element in metaphorical development. For a metaphor intentionally violates a 
conceptual boundary and this conscious incongruence drives the metaphor. For instance, 
“Mary is a doctor” does not violate any conceptual boundary for a woman may belong to 
the category of a doctor, but an example like “Mary is a mouse” would, since obviously a 
woman does not fit into the category of a mouse. This deliberate bringing together of two 
sufficiently distant concepts, so that the domains appear to be incongruent, but at the 
same time share some similar properties, is a necessary condition for a metaphor (Kittay, 
1987). Although these playful examples of language often used by children (e.g., “hair is 
spaghetti” see Billow, 1975) may appear on the surface to be a metaphor, but perhaps the 
child is simply overextending language due to a lack of vocabulary.  
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 Adults also naturally use metaphors as a means to “fill the gap” in language and 
overextend the usage of words to include new and novel usages. Of course for adults the 
constraint is often due to a lack of vocabulary in the language, while for children the 
overextension may simply be the child’s own lack of vocabulary knowledge. The point 
though is the controversy on whether or not these overextensions of words are truly 
metaphorical or not. In order to better understand how children acquire the ability to use 
metaphor, it is necessary to first look at symbolic play.  
 An important aspect in the development of metaphorical competence in young 
children is the use of symbolic play. Knowles and Moon (2006) discuss how “very young 
children are capable of accessing imaginary worlds—they follow stories, and understand 
what it means to pretend and play”, to which they feel, “this ability to deal with the 
unreal is an early form of figurative competence” (p. 62-3). This early form of figurative 
language use (as young as 2 years old) is often viewed as the ability for these young 
children to perceive similarities between objects and not the result of “linguistic 
accident”, but a deliberate and spontaneous metaphor (Billow, 1981). So the earliest form 
of metaphorical ability in children is this nascent capability to understand and produce 
metaphors based on similarity features such as calling a ball a bomb because of their 
comparable shapes and at the same time, the child is fully aware of this similarity and the 
deviation (Billow, 1981; Vosniadou, 1987).  
 This first stage of metaphor development involves feature-based similarities 
(shape, size, color, etc.), as noted above, and this developmental process then proceeds to 
a second stage that involves greater complexity and includes analogical and metaphorical 
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cross-domain mappings, which relies more on relational structure (Gentner, 1988; 
Vosniadou, 1987; Winner et al., 1976). Young children have a keen propensity to 
understand feature-based similarities between objects, but understanding relational 
structural mapping improves with age. Gentner (1988) makes a distinction between 
attributional (mere appearance e.g. “a snake is like a hose”) and relational metaphors (“a 
tire is like a shoe”) and shows that adults have a preference for relational metaphors, as 
well as, judging them to be more apt and focusing more on their relational structure. In 
her study, she shows that children have a great propensity to produce and comprehend 
attributional metaphors, but relational metaphors increases steadily with age, to which 
she calls this a “relational shift in metaphorical development”. In another study, Nippold, 
Leonard, and Kail (1984) used nominal metaphors, which follow the traditional A is B 
format (“the bird was a rainbow flying in the sky” presumably meaning “the bird was 
colorful”) and proportional metaphors, which contain two topics and two vehicles using 
an analogical relationship (“the bird’s nest was a piggybank that had no coins” 
presumably meaning “the bird’s nest had no eggs”) to examine the comprehensibility of 
these two contrasting metaphor types for children. In their study, they showed that 
analogical metaphors are significantly more difficult for children to understand. In this 
same study, they also demonstrated that children improve performance on metaphor tasks 
with age (between 7 and 9 years old).  
 In short, children at a young age have a strong propensity to use metaphors that 
are often based on perceptual similarities between two objects. As the child develops, the 
child goes through a “relational shift” and can begin to go beyond mere appearances and 
perceptual attributes and proceed to see functional similarities. A shoe and a tire, though 
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perceptually do not look alike, share the functional relationship of things used to move 
across some location in space. Another important aspect of the development of 
metaphorical competence in children that coincides with this relational shift is the 
development of general semantic knowledge.  
First Semantic Knowledge, Then Metaphor  
Despite evidence that supports a relational shift in the development of metaphorical 
competence in children, it has also been found that domain knowledge may actually 
override this. For instance, a number of studies that controlled the domain knowledge 
showed that even young children could make relational connections between the topic 
(target) and vehicle (source). These can be abstract concepts, as well as, psychological 
ones (Broderick, 1991; Nippold, Leonard, & Kail, 1984; Waggoner & Palermo, 1989).  
 For a child to understand a metaphor, the child needs to have a certain level of 
linguistic skill, yet this is also obviously true for literal language. Moreover a child needs 
to have sufficient knowledge of the topic or that which is being talked about in the 
metaphor. Keil (1986) proposed the importance of increasing knowledge in a conceptual 
domain for the development of metaphorical understanding and especially in regards to 
the child’s knowledge of the topic domain (Vosniadou, 1987). Waggoner and Palermo 
(1989) suggest “the development of metaphor comprehension rests heavily on the child's 
acquiring the knowledge that will make it possible to relate the tenor (topic) and vehicle 
in any particular metaphor” (p. 160 italics are mine). It is obviously difficult to produce 
and especially interpret relational structure of a metaphor without sufficient domain 
knowledge of the topic and vehicle. While attributional metaphors or those based on 
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perceived similarity do not rely as much on domain specific knowledge, but more 
perceptual recognition.  
Synthesizing the Contradictions in the Literature 
The contradictions found in the literature on the development of metaphor in children are 
not as contradictory as they may seem, but vary due to a number of reasons:  
• The type and difficulty of the metaphorical task (attributional, predicative, cross 
domain mapping, analogical, etc.) 
• The required response (verbal, pictorial, multiple choice/understanding, 
production, explication, etc.) 
• The required domain specific knowledge in order to perform the task  
 Metaphorical competence appears to proceed along a continuum from simpler 
feature-based similarities to relational structure mappings. Likewise children first 
produce metaphors, then understood them, and finally they can explicate the structure and 
meaning behind them. The following figure diagrams this continuum and explains each 
stage.  
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Figure 2.1: The continuum towards metaphoric competence in children 
 
 It should be noted here that while children may develop through these stages in a 
generalizable way, individual differences do exist. These differences may involve the 
propensity to produce metaphors (especially novel ones), the elaboration and detail in 
interpreting a metaphor, and aesthetic evaluation of metaphors. In this thesis since all the 
subjects are adults, they will have all achieved a certain level of metaphorical competence 
in their L1. Yet individuals will differ in this competence and I am interested in seeing if 
these differences then are also projected onto a second language. In order to do this, I also 
need to consider metaphorical competence in a foreign language and various constraints 
that foreign language learners may encounter when developing this ability.  
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2.3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHORIC COMPETENCE IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
The setting of this research study was in Japan where English is viewed as a foreign 
language. Accordingly, I will use the term foreign language here and not second 
language. Foreign language learning usually implies that the foreign language is taught 
within the walls of a classroom and students have minimal exposure to it outside in the 
so-called “real world”. Despite the spread of English, as a lingua franca, it is still 
considerably foreign within rural northern Japan, where this research took place, and one 
will unlikely come across English in everyday life.  
 Acquiring metaphorical competence in a foreign language is a challenging and 
slow process, accompanied by misunderstandings (Littlemore, 2001b). Typically when 
learning a foreign language, the individual learns the forms of this new language, but has 
little opportunity to acquire the conceptual structures associated with these forms, which 
as a result, these learners may sound “un-natural” or “non-native like” (Kecskes & Papp, 
2000). This is comparable to what Danesi (1992, 1995) has argued about, as he insists on 
the need to develop learners’ “conceptual fluency”. He argues that foreign language 
learners’ lack of metaphorical competence causes them to sound overly literal and despite 
years of study fail to ever achieve native-like fluency.  
Developing Metaphorical Competence in an L2 
To become metaphorically competent in a foreign language, one needs to understand how 
that language encodes its concepts, as well as being exposed to the conventional 
linguistic metaphors that are instantiations of that conceptual structure. For example, it 
has been shown that Malay-speaking learners of English found figurative language in the 
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L2 to be easiest when the expressions had an equivalent linguistic form and conceptual 
structure in their L1 (Chartelis-Black, 2002). Other research has also found similar 
findings (Deignan, Gabrys, & Solska, 1997), which indicate that similarity of conceptual 
structure and linguistic form facilitates the processing and comprehension of the 
figurative language among foreign language learners.  
 Yet there are a number of variables that arise when considering multi-word 
figurative expressions between two different languages. For instance, the two languages 
could share the same linguistic form (i.e., “to pull someone’s legs” appears both in 
English and Japanese3), but have different figurative meanings. Azuma (2012) has shown 
this to be one of the riskiest types of metaphorical language, namely due to the first 
language imposing its meaning onto the expression in the second language, which 
happens to share equivalent linguistic form. In order to demonstrate the range of possible 
linguistic and conceptual overlap between languages, Tables 2.1-2.4 provide a number of 
examples with Japanese and English figurative use of HAND (“手” te). In situations 
when these two languages both share an equivalent linguistic form and conceptual 
structure (as in Table 2.1), one could conjecture that this would not cause much difficulty 
in learning. In contrast, Tables 2.2 – 2.4 demonstrate numerous other ways that languages 
may appear similar and different in the use of figurative expressions based on linguistic 
form and conceptual structure.  
 
                                                      
 
3 In Japanese, it means to hold someone back or get in the way of someone. This likely refers to the physical state of actually pulling someone’s leg and 
preventing that person from advancing in some endeavor. 
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TABLE 2.1: EQUIVALENT LINGUISTIC FORM AND CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE USING HAND 
Japanese Literal Translation English  Conceptual Basis 
手を貸してくれ 
(te wo 
kashitekure) 
Hand lend give Lend me a hand HAND IS WORK 
 
TABLE 2.2: DIFFERENT LINGUISTIC FORM BUT EQUIVALENT CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE USING 
HAND 
 
TABLE 2.3: EQUIVALENT CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE – NO LINGUISTIC EQUIVALENT IN ENGLISH 
USING HAND 
Japanese Literal Translation English  Conceptual Basis 
手を加える 
(te o kuwaeru) 
Hand add Add something HAND IS WORK 
 
TABLE 2.4: DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE – NO LINGUISTIC EQUIVALENT IN ENGLISH 
USING HAND 
Japanese Literal Translation English  Conceptual Basis 
手を切る 
(te wo kiru) 
Hand cut Break off a relationship  HAND IS 
RELATIONSHIP 手を組む 
(te wo kumu) 
Hand link, lock  Cooperate with 
手がない 
(te ga nai) 
Hand exists-not No other way HAND IS WAY, METHOD 
 Of course this example is an exceptional case where a single linguistic element, 
(“手” te) HAND, has an extensive array of conceptual structures and linguistic forms and 
some of these in Japanese overlap with the English and yet a number of them fail to 
overlap. The point here is that to acquire metaphoric competence in a foreign language 
requires extensive exposure to the language and understanding of these differences. For 
instance, if an English speaker applies an L1 conceptual structure (HAND IS WORK) to 
a new and unknown figurative expression in Japanese (L2) like (“手がない” te ga nai), 
Japanese Literal Translation English  Conceptual Basis 
手が足らない 
(te ga taranai) 
Hand enough-not 
 
Short-handed 
HAND IS WORK 
手に負えない 
(te ni oenai) 
Hand deal with-not Out of hand; 
uncontrollable 
HAND IS ABILITY TO 
CONTROL 
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this could obviously lead to confusion and misinterpreting the meaning of the expression 
(* no workers) instead of the correct meaning (no other way).  
 Although it is important to note here that becoming more aware of the underlying 
conceptual structures across different languages does not necessarily result in one being 
able to freely use the linguistic instantiations related to these conceptual structures 
(Chartelis-Black, 2000). For it is not always clear and can be rather arbitrary and 
unpredictable just how information from the conceptual structure ends up taking one 
specific linguistic code and not another (Deignan et al., 1997, p. 354; Holme, 2004, p. 
97). Moreover, a number of figurative expressions also utilize language that has strong 
cultural traits or nuances and without this cultural knowledge interpretation is fraught 
with problems and guesswork (Azuma, 2012).  
 Since metaphor and figurative language more generally is an important part of 
language, broadening its instruction in the FL classroom has the potential to enhance 
learners’ communicative proficiency (Johnson, 1996). Consequently, foreign language 
educators began to explore ways to integrate metaphor into the classroom in greater depth 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Low, 1988). In the next subsection, I elaborate on some of these 
approaches to teaching metaphor in the classroom.   
A Teaching Framework for Metaphors: A Focus on Conventionality  
Early methods used for teaching metaphor to foreign language learners often relied on 
memorizing long lists of phrases, which some happened to be metaphorical, or using a 
“polysemy method” that explored the multiple ways a single item like the word “foot” 
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could be extended in meaning (Low, 1988). More recently, research on teaching 
figurative language in a foreign language classroom revolves around the teaching of two 
main linguistic forms: phrasal verbs (Lindstromberg, 1996; Rudzka-Ostyn, 2003; Yasuda, 
2010) and idioms (Boers & Demecheleer, 2001; Cooper, 1999; Deignan et al., 1997; 
Irujo, 1986; Lazar, 2003). 
 Low (1988) suggested one possible way to improve teaching materials is to 
include analytical discussions that could provide insight into the underlying structure and 
internal consistency of metaphors. Using such an explanatory framework to discuss with 
learners the underlying patterns connecting metaphorical expressions together became 
more and more widely used in foreign language classrooms. This seems to be especially 
prevalent in English for Specific Purposes, particularly in regards to economics 
(Chartelis-Black, 2000; Henderson, 2000; White, 2003). Others have looked to improve 
foreign language learners’ fluency with metaphors by enhancing their awareness of the 
conceptual structure motivating the metaphor (Boers, 2000a, 2000b; Deignan, Gabrys, & 
Solska, 1997). This awareness raising technique aims to improve learners’ metalinguistic 
and reflective skills by having them think more deeply about the language and the 
organizational structure that binds certain expressions together. This is what Jakobson 
(1956) referred to as “speaking of language” for the learner overtly considers the nature 
of the linguistic code. Boers (2000b) suggests that awareness raising techniques that 
organize vocabulary along metaphorical themes may facilitate the retention of unfamiliar 
figurative expressions for foreign language learners. It has also been suggested to use 
etymological elaboration, especially for transparent idioms, as an awareness raising 
technique, whereby the student and teacher retrace the source in order to figure out the 
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metaphorical meaning of the expression (Boers, Demecheleer, & Eychmans, 2004). 
Recognizing the importance of metaphor in foreign language learning and overall 
communicative competence has even influenced the direction of English language 
textbooks (Lazar, 2003).  
 In short, the goals of the teaching methods outlined above are to expand students’ 
multiword lexical knowledge, provide organizational structure to figurative linguistic 
expressions, and mark possible differences between the conceptual structure between the 
L1 and L2. It should be noted that the figurative expressions typically taught in a 
classroom are conventional, idiomatic, and standard and seldom are exploratory or those 
that seek out new and unknown possible combinatory patterns between two concepts. On 
the other hand, as previously mentioned in the earlier section, children develop 
metaphorical competence in an L1 through symbolic play and using highly playful 
language, L2 learners often depend on explicit instruction and memorizing conventional 
forms of language. 
 Despite the importance of play in language learning and more generally in every 
day language use, not only for children but also for adults (Cook, 2000; Lantolf, 1997; 
Tarone, 2000), foreign language instruction has just begun to examine the importance and 
pedagogical value of language play in the classroom (Cekaite & Aronsson, 2005; Waring, 
2013). On the semantic level, playfulness with language often involves combining units 
of meaning in a manner that creates a new way of seeing the world (Cook, 1997, p. 228), 
which is really the basis of creative metaphors. One may assume that the lack of exposure 
and opportunity to playfully use language may inhibit foreign language learners from 
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attempting to produce their own creative metaphors in the L2. This may be true, but in 
this thesis, the participants were encouraged to be creative and not to worry about being 
“right” or “wrong”, which is a factor when dealing with conventional and idiomatic 
examples of metaphorical language where prior knowledge of the linguistic code is 
paramount. In contrast, producing creative metaphors relies less on one’s linguistic 
ability with the target language and more on a general cognitive ability of combining 
distantly related concepts together in novel and meaningful ways. 
2.3.3 CREATIVE METAPHORIC COMPETENCE: A POSSIBLE COGNITIVE PROCESS  
 
One of the goals of this thesis is to examine whether or not creative metaphoric 
competence appears in both an L1 to an L2. If it appears in both languages, one could 
interpret this as suggesting the possibility that creative metaphoric competence is an 
individual difference and taps a cognitive process that is considerably different than the 
linguistic process to produce conventional metaphors, which relies heavily on memory 
retrieval of formulaic language. The cognitive processes whereby novel ideas emerge is a 
key part of understanding creativity (Ward, 2001) and creative metaphors offer a glimpse 
into such a process. Ward, Smith, and Vaid (1997) discuss the mental processes most 
relevant to creativity and give credence to three overlapping processes: conceptual 
combination, metaphor, and analogy.   
 Conceptual combination is blending together or synthesizing two or more 
concepts in order to create a new idea, whereby in this combinatorial process a new 
conceptual structure emerges. Like metaphors, some are deemed as highly conventional 
like the combination of “soccer” and “mom” to create “soccer mom”. In contrast, others 
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may seem less familiar and novel like “idea salesman”, which then may require a process 
of mental synthesis and analogical transfer to comprehend (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992, 
p. 98). Creative metaphors are a form of conceptual combination and as described in 
more detail in the next chapter, they can also be modeled as extensive structural 
mappings between two domains much like an analogy (Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff, & 
Boronat, 2001). Analogy is to think about relational patterns and is at the heart of human 
cognition, as well as being, the basis of “creative mental leaps” (Holyoak & Thagard, 
1995). Similarly “metaphor uses many of the same mental processes as analogical 
thinking” (Holyoak et al., 1995, p. 220).  
 Traditional examples of metaphor often follow the “X is Y” format (e.g., The 
surgeon is a butcher); yet such examples of metaphor have fallen out of fashion recently 
for being “inauthentic” and lacking verifiable use in a corpus. Yet as I have been pointing 
out throughout this chapter, my aim is not to look at authentic examples of metaphor in 
everyday language, but instead examine how individuals attempt to produce creative 
metaphors when prompted in an experimental setting. Nominal metaphors often fall 
under the label of a species to species example of a metaphor whereby the two distinct 
elements may on the surface appear dissimilar, but are in fact connected by belonging to 
the same genus, as described by Aristotle in the Poetics (1961). A nominal metaphor is 
when one noun gets substituted for another noun such as the following example: 
(11) Language is still the most important weapon in the class struggle 
in England (San Francisco Chronicle, 1991). 
So the noun, weapon, is used to refer to another noun that is semantically distant from it, 
in this case, language. The difficulty though is clearly and succinctly stating how these 
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two species may be part of a larger genus. Are they species of the genus of things that are 
strong and powerful or things that are used to defend oneself in times of conflict? The 
above example can also work as an analogy (a : b :: c : d)  for as a language is to a 
speaker of it, so to a weapons is to a soldier. Those people who continue to speak the 
local language are in fact soldiers struggling in this class warfare in England. So the 
aptness of the metaphor is being able to discover this genus connecting the two and then 
exploring relations that could be transferred from the source onto the target. To sum up, 
beyond the constraints of linguistic knowledge, generating and interpreting creative 
metaphors in an L1 or L2 requires a certain cognitive ability that utilizes both 
combinatorial reasoning and analogical thought.  
2.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 
In summary, I have shown that metaphor first develops in language through our 
embodied experiences interacting with the world around us. These sensory-motor and 
emotional interactions provide mental structure that then can be extended into abstract 
realms of experience. This embodied foundation of language is not unique to only the 
first language, but also has been found to be active in a second language (Dudschig, de la 
Vega, & Kaup, 2014). In addition, I have described the learning path of children, as they 
acquire metaphoric competence in an L1. This path to proficiency is dependent on 
domain specific knowledge. Moreover, children, generally speaking, use metaphors that 
share feature based similarities at first and then proceed through a “relational shift” 
whereby they increasingly use relational metaphors. Finally I have discussed metaphoric 
competence in an L2 and how research in this field involves teaching metaphorical 
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language to the L2 learners, which mostly entails conventional idiomatic and multiword 
expressions. In contrast, research in this thesis was less concerned with L2 learners’ 
knowledge of such linguistic codes and more so with their ability to creatively come up 
with new and unfamiliar metaphors. It has been put forth in this chapter that this process 
involves combinatorial reasoning whereby concepts are combined in novel ways and 
analogical reasoning whereby relational patters are explored between the two concepts.  
Much of the recent work with metaphor favors conventional metaphors or those 
found in corpora. This is especially true in the field of second language studies, which 
have predominantly looked at ways to teach metaphoric language by enhancing learners’ 
awareness of the conceptual structure motivating them (e.g., Boers, 2000b) or to look at 
metaphor and its relation to lexical competence in the L2 (Azuma, 2004). The main focus 
of these approaches is to better understand the developmental processes of learners’ 
metaphoric competence in the L2 and various factors that may influence this from 
vocabulary knowledge to metacognitive strategies. In contrast, this study approached this 
topic quite differently by trying to minimize one’s linguistic and conventional knowledge 
of metaphoric structure and focus narrowly on the novel and creative use of metaphors, 
which is the true power of them (Macarthur, 2014). 
 To conclude this chapter, as previously indicated, research has shown that the 
processing of metaphor does not necessarily take more effort or time than processing 
literal language. Instead, differences in processing of language may be more related to the 
matter of salience of the language (or what is most on one’s mind) and this could be 
either a literal or metaphoric rendering of the language (Giora, 2003). However, this 
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research aimed to address what Giora (2003) calls the “`other side` of salience – the issue 
of novelty and creativity” (p. 176). In this chapter, I have provided a review of the 
literature on some early approaches to metaphor and then introduced a contemporary 
view of metaphor and finally described the process of metaphoric development at the 
individual level in both an L1 and L2. In the next chapter, using three contemporary 
approaches to metaphor, I aim to show how metaphor needs to be viewed as being 
pluralistic. This allows me then to develop a theoretical foundation to discuss and 
measure creative metaphoric competence at the individual level. 
 
 Chapter 3 Differentiating Creative from Conventional Metaphors 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, I discussed how metaphors emerge in language and the development of 
metaphoric competence in an L1 and L2. Metaphors are an important and ubiquitous part 
of language (Paprotté & Dirven, 1985) and as mentioned in the previous chapter, this 
growing awareness of the importance of metaphor has resulted in a considerable amount 
of research that addresses metaphor from a cognitive linguistic and foreign language 
learning perspective (Holme, 2004; Littlemore, 2009; Robinson & Ellis, 2008). Research 
addressing this issue of metaphor in language learning ranges from pointing out the 
importance of them for overall competency with the language (Littlemore & Low, 2006a) 
to assessing various methods of bringing them into the classroom (Boers, 2000b; 
Deignan, Gabrys, & Solska, 1997). Despite this rising interest in metaphors in foreign 
language learning, there is a scarce amount of research that looks at metaphoric 
competence between a first and second language (see Littlemore, 2010). One of the aims 
of this thesis is to look specifically at this and examine whether or not individuals 
produce creative metaphors in both an L1 and an L2.  
 In this thesis, I have been using the term, creative metaphoric competence, which 
is the ability to bring two concepts from distantly related domains of knowledge together 
in a new and novel way, while at the same time establishing meaningful relationships 
between them. It is hypothesized in this thesis that creative metaphoric competence is an 
ordinary cognitive skill that everyone has though varying in degree and should show up 
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in both languages. In order to investigate this cognitive ability between languages, first it 
is critical to clearly distinguish between creative and conventional metaphors. Creative 
metaphors, though obviously not as common as conventional metaphors, still play a 
prominent role in language, as Glucksberg (1989) estimates that people use 1.8 novel and 
4.1 frozen figurative expressions per minute of discourse. Pollio and colleagues (1977) 
estimate that “most English speakers utter about 10 million novel metaphors per lifetime 
... this works out to about 3,000 novel metaphors per week” (p. 140). Creative metaphors 
often involve the feature of surprise and the unfamiliar, as compared to frozen metaphors, 
which are sometimes labeled “dead” and “inactive” metaphors and can lexically be 
regarded as homonyms or polysemes (Goatly, 2011) for the metaphorical meaning may 
even be more salient than the literal meaning.  
 In this chapter, I show that conventional metaphors are processed much like literal 
language and reflect the depth and breadth of vocabulary knowledge the individual has 
rather than the cognitive ability of creative metaphoric competence. Conventional 
metaphors are processed automatically and likely are stored in the mental lexicon. On the 
other hand, creative metaphors are processed differently than conventional ones, take 
more time to process, and involve combinatorial processes that recruit greater amount of 
bilateral neural activity in the brain. Though creative metaphoric competence is a natural 
ability that all humans share, as Gentner and Wolff (1997) succinctly say, “people readily 
link unlike ideas” (p. 331), yet like many other cognitive skills, people will differ in their 
inclination and ability to explore new combinatorial relationships among these “unlike 
ideas”.  
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 There are three main sections in this chapter. In the first section, I discuss three 
contemporary views of metaphor: Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), Graded Salience 
Hypothesis (GSH), and the Career of Metaphor Hypothesis (CofM). These provide a 
theoretical foundation to distinguish creative and conventional metaphors. Then, in the 
second section, I review the literature on creative metaphors and the brain and the recent 
interest in exploring what neuroanatomical regions are active during metaphor tasks. This 
provides further support to the necessity of differentiating metaphors based on their 
conventionality. Finally in the third section, I construct a framework that distinguishes 
creative and conventional metaphors as a guide for the research that follows in this thesis 
and examine ways to measure and assess creative metaphoric competence as an 
individual difference. 
3.2 DIFFERENTIATING CREATIVE FROM CONVENTIONAL METAPHORS: THREE 
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS 
The distinction between creativity and anomaly can be tenuous for the two are often 
closely linked together. Noam Chomsky astutely crafted the following sentence (12) to 
show that language knowledge is not bound by statistical properties, but rather through 
deductive reasoning and innate knowledge (Crain & Thornton, 1998). His goal was to 
show that sentence structure could be studied independently of meaning and thus 
favoring the more abstract pure laws of syntax. 
(12) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously (Chomsky, 1953). 
This sentence has become one of the most quoted lines by Chomsky, probably not for the 
reasons he wrote it, but due to the numerous attempts to provide meaning to it. Why 
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would such an intuitively anomalous sentence (at least to Chomsky) incite so much 
interest? Niemeier (1998) showed, while investigating the metonymic extension of color 
terms, that the above sentence is not semantically empty, as Chomsky presumed, but 
instead it exposes a part of our everyday conceptual strategies. It is precisely these 
conceptual strategies that enable one to extend “green ideas” to “young, fresh and not 
well-developed ideas” (Niemeier, 1998). Metaphors (or figurative language in general) 
often provide the creative extension to make sense of an anomaly. For instance, Pollio 
and Burns (1977) in a study that specifically asked subjects to interpret mechanically 
generated anomalous sentences, similar to the one written by Chomsky, found 82% of 
their subjects actually provided an acceptable interpretation and 60% of them did so by 
way of metaphor. This suggests that speakers of a language potentially can interpret any 
grammatically well-constructed sentence despite it being intuitively anomalous at first 
and this may be based on individual differences and their ability to creatively play with 
metaphors. This combinatory ability of connecting two seemingly unconnected semantic 
domains together is what I. A. Richards considers the power of the mind in the 
Philosophy of Rhetoric for “[t]he mind is a connecting organ, it works only by 
connecting and it can connect any two things in an indefinitely large number of different 
ways” (Richards, 1936, p. 125). 
 Aristotle indicated that to “make good metaphors implies an eye for 
resemblances” (Poetics 22: 1458b; cited in Mahon, 1999, p. 72). I assume here what he 
meant by “good metaphors” are ones that are creative and aesthetically pleasing. Though 
I would not go so far as to say that it is a “mark of genius”, as Aristotle did, but rather 
view it as a uniquely human combinatorial ability, which is key to intelligence and 
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creating new systems of knowledge (Spelke, 2003). Yet having this “eye for 
resemblances” assumes that there are individual differences that influence one’s ability to 
produce and interpret creative metaphors. In order to disentangle the more conventional 
entrenched metaphors that are part of our everyday common language and these creative 
metaphors, I address three contemporary views of metaphor in the following subsections. 
The goal is to find some distinguishing features that allow me to propose that not all 
metaphors are the same and cannot be clumped together into one “homogenous category” 
of figurative language. Instead metaphors lie along a continuum from the more 
conventional ones that are likely stored in the mental lexicon to novel metaphors (Pynte, 
Besson, Robichon, & Poli, 1996). 
3.2.1 CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY 
According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) as introduced in Chapter 2, metaphor 
is more than a rhetorical device, but an important part of thought, reason, emotion, and 
the imagination (Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2006; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 
Sweetser, 1990). CMT holds to the premise that “our ordinary conceptual system, in 
terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980, p. 3). Underlying and motivating much of our everyday expressions are 
a wide array of conceptual metaphors such as the one elaborated on in Chapter 2 (i.e., 
BURDENS ARE WEIGHT). This metaphor provides a certain amount of conceptual 
structure to our understanding of financial debt, which feels like carrying a heavy load 
and the “weight” of this debt has a “crushing” heaviness that can impede movement 
forward. Linguistic metaphors then provide the data for these conceptual metaphors as in 
the example below: 
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(13) Wall Street' s bulls ignored the crushing weight of debt on the 
economy and the signs of a protracted recession (TIME 1992/01/13). 
So in these examples, the source domain, a physical weight, gets projected onto the target 
domain, a burden or difficulty, and thereby causing one to conceptualize difficulties in 
terms of being weighed down by some heavy object. This difficulty does not necessarily 
have to be a financial difficulty, but can include psychological states as in the 
conventional idiomatic expression, “emotional baggage”. These examples are all rather 
conventional expressions found in everyday language and to most people probably do not 
represent a creative metaphor. Much of the research in CMT deals with metaphors that 
are so entrenched in the conceptual structure of the mind that they are unconscious, 
automatic, and not very poignant for research on creativity. Again my aim in this study is 
to reduce the focus on language and increase the focus on the combinatorial process of 
creative metaphoric competence. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 53) do provide some 
insight into how imaginative or creative metaphors may surface in language: 
• Instances where a conventional metaphor is extended in a new way 
• Instances of unused parts of a conventional metaphor 
• Instances of a novel metaphor that creates a new conceptual system 
 In a later book, Lakoff and Turner (1989), further elaborate on how one may 
develop creative metaphors (poetic metaphors to use their term) by going beyond the 
ordinary or conventional use of everyday language. Again this would require one of the 
following: 
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• Extending the boundaries of these conventional metaphors to include elements 
that are not already mapped  
• Elaborating on them by imaginatively using unused parts of the metaphor 
• Combining metaphors in new and unexpected ways  
All of these instances are more or less reiterations of what they had previously stated. In 
this latter case, they use the word “poetic thought” and “poetic metaphor”, which might 
cause confusion and lead some to think that these creative metaphorical ways to extend 
ordinary language are exclusively for poets and not used in everyday conversations. 
Carter (1999, 2004) who has worked extensively with CANCODE corpus investigating 
linguistic play and creativity in everyday language remarks that much of verbal play in 
everyday spoken discourse reflects literary properties and some of the most common ones 
are: speakers displacing fixed expressions like idioms and formulaic phrases and 
metaphorical extensions (1999, p. 211).  
 According to CMT, there are two primary ways to create novel metaphors. The 
first is by way of elaborating or extending an already existing conceptual metaphor. This 
can be done by using elements of the vehicle in new and unexpected ways or using 
unused elements of the vehicle. The following are instances of elaborations and 
extensions of the conceptual metaphor, THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS: 
(14) “These facts are the bricks and mortar of my theory.” 
(15) “His theory has thousands of little rooms and long, winding 
corridors” (Lakoff & Turner, 1980, p. 53).  
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 Secondly one can create an entirely new conceptual mapping between a topic and 
a new vehicle that has not yet been commonly established. This is deemed as being very 
powerful for “[n]ew metaphors have the power to create a new reality” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980, p. 145). This happens when a new metaphor enters into the fabric of our 
conceptual system and allows us to see something in a new and different way. Take for 
instance the conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS A COMPUTER (MACHINE). 
Obviously this metaphor is no longer novel, but it was not that long ago for this metaphor 
did not exist until machines and computers came into existence and we started to interact 
with them in our daily lives. Gigerenzar and Goldstein (1996) trace this metaphorical 
development calling it a “tools-to-theories heuristic” where the development of new tools 
(computers) leads to the discovery of new theories (as in theories of the mind). They refer 
to the work of Newell and Simon (1972) and their information-processing model of the 
mind, though taking some time to be accepted, has had a large impact in the cognitive 
psychological literature as terms such as “encoding, storage, retrieval, executive 
processes, algorithms, and computational cost” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, p. 138) 
are frequently used to speak about cognition nowadays.  
 This metaphor can be further elaborated on by way of analogy. The mind is to the 
brain as computer software is to the hardware of the computer (Block, 1995). This 
metaphor has now infiltrated so deeply into our conceptual system and provides insight 
into how we understand the mind that it is difficult to think of the mind without thinking 
of it as a computational device. This metaphor is constantly being extended and 
elaborated on in new and creative ways, as culture can in turn be seen as the “software of 
the mind” (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010) for it provides individuals within 
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society a program of how to behave and interact. Yet not all might agree with this 
metaphor and in contrast develop a new one that views culture quite differently such as 
culture being “networks of knowledge” (Hong, 2009). Here culture links people together 
just as computer networks link people together. Though both can be viewed as creative in 
their own way, they both are imaginative elaborations or extensions of the same 
metaphor.  
Digging Deeper into Creative Metaphors 
How does one go about interpreting a creative metaphor? Interpreting a creative 
metaphor obviously requires different cognitive and linguistic abilities than simply 
judging a novel metaphor as meaningful or not. In addition, the aptness of the creative 
metaphor and the type of metaphor it is may influence the amount of relational 
complexity that can be explicated from it. In the example, “the river is a snake”, though 
meaningful, it does not provide much in terms of inferential structure between the two 
concepts, but rather is meaningful simply based on appearance similarity. In contrast, 
below is an example of a creative metaphor. It follows the typical “X is Y” format and 
allows for the development of a complex structure between the two domains. 
(16) The therapy was an archeological dig (Cardillo et al., 2012). 
 First these disparate concepts, an archeological dig and therapy, are semantically 
distant, yet meaningful. For example, therapy deals with the mind and the psychological 
condition of an individual, so a highly abstract concept. It includes a patient to therapist 
relationship that entails the act of communication and the patient reflecting on one’s past 
in order to better understand one’s current situation. While an archeological dig deals 
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with the physical excavation of earth in order to discover some artifacts or other physical 
remnants. It includes an archeologist to ancient culture relationship that entails the act of 
uncovering and digging in the hope of finding some relics that may help modern culture 
better understand this historical culture. So the metaphor projects from a more physically 
experiential domain to that of a more abstract domain.  
 According to CMT, this would be an example of a poetic metaphor that uses 
previously unused parts of a conceptual metaphor. For instance, the conceptual metaphor, 
KNOWING IS SEEING, is prominent in this example, as well as, THE PAST IS 
BEHIND/BURIED and correspondingly to reflect on the past or recall a memory, which 
is a common activity in therapy involves going back in time or to dig up some past event. 
The predicate metaphor “dig” that metaphorically means “to look into the past” would on 
most accounts be considered a conventional metaphor.  
(17) 30-minute lifestyle therapy sessions. Michaels asked each woman to 
dig deep for answers (Prevention Nov 2011, Cohen, Bari Nan). 
 An “archeological dig” involves a type of digging that actually is trying to 
uncover buried historical artifacts and, so in short, is a creative use of an unused part of a 
conceptual metaphor and is not creating a “new reality” of how to view therapy, but 
expanding on a conceptual framework that we already possess. Moreover the 
correspondences between these two semantic domains are rich and provide a number of 
mappings (see Table 3.1). 
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TABLE 3.1: MAPPING FOR “THERAPY IS AN ARCHEOLOGICAL DIG” (BIRDSELL, 2017) 
Source: Archeological Dig Mappings Target: Therapy 
Archeologist → Therapist 
Archeological Site → Therapist’s office 
Ancient Culture → Patient 
Object: Ancient relics → Past Memories 
Means: Dig, unearth → Communicate 
Goal: Discover more about this ancient 
culture 
→ Goal: Discover more about the 
individual 
 The interesting thing about this metaphor is, what does the patient in the therapy 
domain map onto in the archeological domain? Logically it would seem that the patient 
should map onto another individual such as the archeologist’s apprentice or a student, but 
this would not make sense in the metaphor. Rather illogically what makes more sense is 
that the patient in fact maps onto the concept of “culture”. The mind of the patient in 
one’s current state is a modern culture. Each individual has a rich, unique, and historical 
past similar to past cultures. Inside the mind are memories and likewise inside the earth 
are remnants of a historical past. These remnants are shards, broken fragments of 
earthenware, and in contrast, memories are also fragmentary. The therapist provides 
assistance by helping the patient recall these memories about one’s past and then discuss 
them and provide some insight into his/her life with the goal of self-discovery. Likewise 
the archeologist digs for ancient relics that may provide some insight into that ancient 
culture with the goal of discovery. It is these types of creative metaphors that are open 
enough to interpretation, while at the same time rely on established conceptual structure 
that guide in this interpretive task.  
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Summary of Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
CMT provides important insight into creative metaphors and how often they are 
imaginative elaborations on more familiar conceptual metaphors. Some might cause a 
restructuring of our conceptual system, but more frequently are linguistic extensions that 
help us see something in a new and unexpected way. Despite the surprise that creative 
metaphors have, at the same time, they appear to make sense for the relations between the 
two domains fit. In the next section, I will look at a theory that describes metaphors 
existing along a continuum from novel to highly conventional. In this theory metaphors 
are viewed as having a career and as they become more familiar to the language 
community, this in turn, influences the way they are processed.  
3.2.2 THE CAREER OF METAPHOR THEORY 
 
In the Career of Metaphor Theory (henceforth CofM), Bowdle and Gentner (1999, 2005) 
argue that metaphors are “pluralistic” and clearly differentiate between the processing of 
novel and conventional metaphors. They consider metaphors “as a species of analogy” 
(2005, pp. 196, 198, 208) that progress through a conventionalization process.  First 
novel metaphors are understood as figurative comparisons, though differing from the 
traditional comparison models that rely on a simple feature mapping process. Then as this 
aligned system between the two semantic domains becomes more strongly activated, a 
common metaphoric category for the target and base concepts is established. CofM is 
considered a hybrid model for it seeks to combine comparison and categorization models 
together, each though responsible for processing metaphors at a different stage in the life 
of the metaphor. In the following subsections, I first look at the categorization model, 
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then look more specifically at the hybridity of the CofM, and finally address the 
anagogical system of structure mapping that occurs during the processing of novel 
metaphors.  
Metaphor as “class-inclusion” Assertions 
To begin a discussion about the CofM, it is necessary to first take a look at the work done 
by Glucksberg and colleagues (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1993; Glucksberg, 2003) and their 
category membership model of metaphors. According to categorization models, 
metaphors establish class-inclusion relations between two distant concepts. For example 
in the following metaphor “life is a lottery”, the target concept of the metaphor (life) is 
assigned to an ad hoc category that the base (or source) concept of the metaphor (lottery) 
refers to and is a prototypical exemplar for this category (e.g., something that is won by 
chance, luck, not fair) (see Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990). The target concept then inherits 
some of these features. So in categorization models of metaphors, the target concept is 
subordinate to the base concept and not on the same level of abstraction (Gentner, 
Bowdle, Wolff, & Boronat, 2001). While the category assertion comes from the base, it 
interacts with certain modifiable dimensions that are part of the target (life), and in the 
above example, this could involve such things as birth and upbringing, family, degree of 
wealth, and so on. It is this interaction between the category and these dimensions that 
leads to the interpretation of the metaphor (Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997). 
Gluckberg (2003) maintains that this process of attribute categorization can be applied to 
both novel and conventional metaphors. He suggests that the more apt metaphor will be 
processed through this attribute categorization while less apt metaphors may not, so it is 
not about conventionality, but about the aptness of the metaphor. 
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The Hybrid Model: From Comparison to Categorization 
In contrast, according to CofM, Gentner and colleagues (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; 
Gentner et al., 2001) assert that metaphors progress along a continuum as they 
increasingly become conventionalized in language, so in essence, they follow along a 
career path of escalating prominence and this in turn changes how they are represented 
and processed. As a novel metaphor loses its novelty, it goes from being processed as a 
comparison to that of a categorical assertion (as in Glucksberg’s model). It is important to 
note here that CofM makes a clear distinction between novel and conventional 
metaphors. Gentner and colleagues view that metaphors are represented and processed 
differently, as they firmly state, “the proposal that metaphor is a species of categorization 
... is fundamentally wrong for novel metaphors” (Gentner et al., 2001, p. 233).  
 Distinguishing between conventional and novel metaphors is a key element in the 
evolutionary life of a metaphor according to the CofM hypothesis and this in turn will 
have an impact on the processing speed of these two different types of metaphors. In the 
previous chapter, I talked about the differences between the traditional and contemporarty 
view of metaphor processing. Again, the traditional view (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979) 
provides unconditional priority to the literal interpretation and then once a rule violation 
has occured, a metaphor interpretation is triggered, resulting in a sequential process. In 
this view, metaphor interpretation is more difficult and takes more time to process. The 
contemporary view (Gibbs, 1994; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Keysar, 1989) maintains 
that metaphoric language is processed directly and does not require additional effort or 
time. Therefore both literal and nonliteral language are automatic and obligatory. Yet this 
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contemporary view assumes that all metaphors are the same and fails to take into account 
differences in processing times between conventional and novel metaphors.  
 Blasko and Connine (1993) conducted a study that examined the comprehension 
of metaphors varying in familiarity and found that the figurative meaning of high-familiar 
metaphors are readily available, but not so for low-familiar metaphors. Though for low-
familiar metaphors, the aptness rating played a significant role in the figurative 
activation. So for high-familiar metaphors, the direct-access or contemporary view of 
metaphor is applicable, yet apparently not as relevant for novel and less-familiar 
metaphors. Gregory and Mergler (1990) also confirmed the distinction that processing 
novel or more abstract metaphors requires additional processing. Blank (1988) suspects 
that this distinction is due to the likelihood that ordinary and highly conventional 
metaphors probably exist as lexical entries or as lexicalized metaphors. Gentner and 
Wolff (1997) explain that the differences in processing time between such conventional 
and novel metaphors is due to the fact that the bases in the more conventional metaphors 
have already abstracted a metaphorical sense, yet for the novel metaphors this 
metaphorical sense needs to be derived via alignment.  
Metaphor and Analogy: Structure Mapping Theory 
Kintsch (2008) likewise claims that not all metpahors are the same and depending on the 
type of metaphor the mind will accordingly process it in a variety of ways. “The simplest 
metaphors are processed in the same way as literal statements, while more complex 
metaphors require analogical reasoning” (p. 129). Similarly, according to CofM, 
“metaphor is like an analogy” (Gentner et al., 2001) where many metaphors though not 
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all are comparisons based on systems of shared relations between two semantic domains, 
especially present in the classical nominal metaphors that follow the “X is Y” format. 
These relational metaphors can be contrasted with attributional metaphors that are simply 
formed based on appearance similarity, as in the previous example, “the river is a snake”. 
Gentner and colleagues (Gentner,1983; Gentner & Markman, 1997) developed a 
structure-mapping theory for the interpretation of metaphors. According to this theory, 
interpreting metaphors progress through two stages: alignment and projection.  
 The structure-mapping process (Gentner & Wolff, 1997), in contrast to CMT, 
does not view the comprehension of metaphors as being only asymmetrical. Rather an 
initial stage occurs that is role-neutral between the two representations, entailing a 
symmetrical structure alignment. Wolff and Gentner (2000, 2011) in a number of studies 
that used forward and reversed metaphors (Some suburbs are parasites / Some parasites 
are suburbs) found that the difference in comprehensibility between them increased with 
processing time. This they interpreted as an initial (neutral) alignment, which then 
afterwards was followed by a directional inference process. This directional processing is 
guided by the initial alignment where inferences from the base are then projected onto the 
target (Wolff & Gentner, 2011).  
 Alignment requires looking for relational structure that has both one-to-one 
correspondence and parallel connectivity between elements in the base (vehicle) and the 
topic (Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989). For example in the following metaphor 
“Memories are falling leaves”, predicates are matched (i.e., the relations forget and fall) 
then the elements in the topic (memories, mind, forgotten memories) and the base (falling 
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leaves, tree, scattered leaves) are placed in correspondence as follows: falling leaves → 
memories, a tree → the mind, forgotten memories → scattered leaves. Each has a one-to-
one correspondence and there are many other possible correspondences that could be 
aligned. This structural alignment matches and highlights the similarities between these 
two relational spaces. Once the alignment emerges it guides the following stage in the 
process of comprehension called inferential projection. This projection involves choosing 
a preferred interpretation something similar to the following, “from our experiences in 
life, we have accumulated many memories, but these memories are fleeting and with the 
passage of time they will soon be forgotten.” In novel metaphors, “the target concept is 
structurally aligned with the literal base concept” (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005, p. 199). 
 According to CofM this is a very different process of metaphor comprehension 
than if one encountered a highly conventional metaphor like “Wikipedia is a goldmine of 
information”. Here goldmine has two closely related and linked senses or a dual reference 
(see Glucksberg, 2001), “a place where gold is mined” and “a source of wealth”. 
Wikipedia is then seen as a member of this superordinate metaphorical category, “a 
source of wealth for information”. Bowdle and Gentner (2005) summarize the differences 
between the comparison and categorization models for the processing of novel and 
conventional metaphors respectively as the following, “novel metaphors invite sense 
creation, but conventional metaphors invite sense retrieval” (p. 199). This is a key 
difference, the idea of “creation” and “retrieval” as distinguishing between novel and 
conventional metaphors that I further elaborate on in section 3.3 about the brain, salience, 
and novelty. 
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Conventionality and Aptness 
Some have questioned the strength of the CofM theory pointing out that aptness has a 
more reliable effect on metaphorical processing than conventionality (Jones & Estes, 
2006). Conventionality refers to the strength of the relationship between the vehicle and 
its corresponding figurative meaning, so in the previous example (life is a lottery) 
“lottery” is not as conventional as “journey”. The more conventional a metaphor 
becomes, the more clichéd it may sound, as in “life is a journey”. Aptness on the other 
hand is not about conventionality or novelty, but about the vehicle having a salient 
property for attribution, in addition, this property needs to be relevant to the topic (Jones 
& Estes, 2006). It is unquestionable that for novel and conventional metaphors aptness 
plays an important role in comprehension and also may influence the career of the 
metaphor. For instance, more apt novel metaphors will more likely proceed along the 
path towards conventionalization while less apt ones likely will fade out quickly. When 
looking at metaphor production, it is important to consider not only novelty and 
originality of the metaphor, but also the aptness of this connection. Novelty without 
aptness is closer to an anomaly and aptness without novelty is a conventional metaphor.  
Summary of the Career of Metaphor Hypothesis 
In short, CofM views metaphors existing along a continuum. On the one side are novel 
metaphors and on the other side of this continuum are highly conventional and familiar 
metaphors. The latter relies more on linguistic knowledge and the former relies more on 
higher-order cognitive processes, as well as, linguistic knowledge (see Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1: The movement from creative to conventional metaphors in the CofM theory 
 In this study, I compare a first and second language and risk misinterpreting the 
data in the foreign language. For foreign language learners, who have not yet acquired the 
necessary linguistic codes, might not be able to even understand the language in the 
metaphor production tasks or have the sufficient language necessary to complete them in 
the L2. In a first language this could be attributed to a motivational or cognitive 
breakdown (since linguistic knowledge is a general assumption), but in a foreign 
language (where linguistic knowledge is more unascertained) interpreting the data as a 
breakdown at the cognitive or motivational level would be a gross misinterpretation for in 
fact it is a breakdown at the linguistic level (e.g., unfamiliar vocabulary in the metaphor 
tasks or lack of linguistic knowledge to complete the tasks). Therefore in this study it is 
crucial to design tasks that rely less on one’s linguistic knowledge of conventional 
expressions and more on one’s ability to produce creative metaphors from highly 
simplified prompts.   
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  Vocabulary knowledge is important in developing semantic relationships in an 
L2; this includes both the amount (breadth) and quality (depth). It is hypothesized that 
there is a threshold level for creative metaphoric competence in a foreign language. 
Creative metaphoric competence requires some minimal linguistic knowledge in the 
target language, but once one has that level, additional vocabulary knowledge will not 
have any relationship in increasing one’s ability to produce creative metaphors (similar to 
the threshold theory in creativity research and the relationship between IQ and creativity) 
(Getzels & Jackson, 1962).  
 In the next section, I will address another important topic in regards to novelty 
and this has to do with salience. This approach to metaphor comprehension strongly 
challenges the traditional literal/nonliteral dichotomy and instead stresses the importance 
of salience rather than figurativeness, as determining the ease and speed of 
comprehension.   
3.2.3 GRADED SALIENCE HYPOTHESIS 
The Graded Salience Hypothesis (henceforth GSH) (Giora, 1997, 2003) is an approach to 
language processing that puts privileged status on salient meanings. These “coded 
meanings” are “foremost on our minds due to conventionality, frequency, familiarity, or 
prototypicality – are accessed faster than and reach sufficient levels of activation before 
less salient ones” (Giora, 2003, p. 10). So the literal or metaphorical nature of the 
expression is irrelevant for the salience of the expression has the greatest effect on the 
process of using and comprehending language. In consequence, the conflict between a 
multi-stage or direct-access processing model of metaphors would become indistinct for 
 74 
it would not be about a literal/nonliteral division, but about the degree of salience the 
expression has regardless of how figurative it might be. Moreover contextual information 
may have predictive and a facilitating effect on language comprehension, nonetheless it 
runs in parallel to lexical information and although it may speed up the processing of the 
language, it does not interact with lexical processing (Giora, 2003).  
Optimal Innovation 
As far as processing metaphorical language, according to GSH (Giora, 2003), differences 
will occur between familiar and unfamiliar metaphors. Unfamiliar or novel and creative 
metaphors take more time to process and are more susceptible to contextual effects. As 
previously stated, GSH considers salience to be what is foremost “on our minds”, then 
novelty could be considered what is “out of our minds”. Giora (2003) and Giora and 
colleagues (Giora et al., 2004) formulated and developed the Optimal Innovation 
Hypothesis, which suggests that novelty, too, is a matter of graded innovativeness. For 
“optimal” innovation, there naturally needs to be novelty, but in this novelty one also has 
to be able to recognize the familiar. Novelty arises more from “de-automatizing salient 
meanings than by inventing entirely new ones” (Giora, 2003, pp. 179-180). Novel 
language is not completely novel, but has elements of the salient and familiar within it, as 
well as novelty, and this provides the pleasure in innovative language (Giora et al., 2004). 
 The Optimal Innovation Hypothesis provides an alternative explanation to two 
dominant theories of language and aesthetics. On the one hand are fluency theorists who 
predict that people have a preference and a greater positive attitude towards easier to read 
text and familiar language (Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Zajonc, 1968). The early work by 
 75 
Zajonc (1968) prompted a substantial amount of research on the relationship between 
cognition and affect. Zajonc (1968) found that the positive valence one applies to an 
unknown stimuli (e.g., faces, ideographs, words) is based on frequency and simple 
“mere-exposure” can in turn increase this valence and this exposure does not have to be 
conscious exposure, but can also be subliminal (Zajonc, 2001).  
 In this view, when there is high fluency in the processing of an object, this will in 
turn automatically elicit a positive affect and consequently a more positive aesthetic 
response (Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003; Reber, Schwarz, & 
Winkielman, 2004). These cognitive feelings of positive valence appear in facial 
expressions activating the smiling muscle when reading word triads that had high 
conceptual fluency (Topolinski, Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009). Topolinski and 
colleagues (2009) used triads that had either hidden semantic coherence (e.g., SALT 
DEEP FOAM) or incoherence (e.g., DREAM BALL BOOK). The coherent triads were 
viewed as having high conceptual fluency due to the possibility of a remote association 
(e.g., SEA). This connection between high fluency and a positive affective reaction is due 
to the belief that the fluency signal is hedonically marked (Winkielman et al., 2003). In 
this framework, prototypes are also viewed as being highly attractive (Winkielman, 
Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006). In short, this approach to novelty, grounded in 
the biological, infers that humans have a natural tendency to avoid the unknown, which 
could be potentially threatening and harmful (Zajonc, 1998). According to this view, 
“[n]ovelty is thus commonly associated with uncertainty and with conflict—states that 
are more likely to produce negative than positive affect” (Zajonc, 1968, p. 21).  
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 In sharp contrast are researchers like Berlyne (1960), who view exploration and 
curiosity to be essential features of human nature and consequently novel stimulus will be 
preferred over the familiar. In one experiment, he showed that participants’ rated scores 
of “pleasingness” and “interestingness” correspondingly increased with the novelty of the 
stimuli (Berlyne, 1970). The incongruity and novelty of a metaphor induces a sense or 
need to resolve this incongruity by way of a “conceptual resolution” of the disparate 
elements (Paivio & Walsh, 1993). As for this thesis, it is likewise suggested that a 
creative metaphor that is “optimally” novel will deviate from the familiar, triggering a 
sense of exploration and curiosity, and consequently affecting one’s sense of pleasure and 
interest in the linguistic stimuli.   
 In a similar argument, the Russian Formalists emphasized the notion of making 
things “strange” (ostranenie). For instance, Shklovsky (1998) viewed perception as a 
process of automatization (or habituation) and this provides the “greatest economy of 
perceptive effort” (p. 15) and therefore art or creativity, in general, is to make things 
“unfamiliar” or more difficult because this defamiliarization increases the length of 
perception and this process “is an aesthetic end in itself” (p. 16). Likewise, the Czech 
Structuralists (Mukařovský, 1964) used a concept referred to as foregrounding 
(aktualisace). “Foregrounding is the opposite of automatization, that is, the 
deautomatization of an act ... automatization schematizes an event; foregrounding means 
the violation of the scheme” (Mukařovský, 1964, p. 19 as cited in Miall & Kuiken, 1994, 
p. 390). Miall and Kuiken (1994) used these theories to propose “that the novelty of an 
unusual linguistic variation is defamiliarizing, defamiliarization evokes feelings, and 
feelings guide ‘refamiliarizing” interpretative efforts” (p. 392). This defamiliarization and 
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deautomatization process, commonly found in creative metaphors, captures the readers 
attention, enhances interest in the text, increasing the cognitive workload and this slows 
down the cognitive processes allowing for an increased level of feelings to emerge.  
 According to the Optimal Innovation Hypothesis, which is more of a blend 
between these two opposing views, states that within this novelty and the departure from 
the ordinary, an element of familiarity must be recoverable in order for it to be “optimal” 
and most pleasing. Finding this salient feature in a creative metaphor is what has been 
argued as “a sense of strong personal aesthetic delight” that “derives from the 
phenomenon that can be termed order out of chaos” (Davis & Hersh, 1981, p. 172). 
 Creative metaphors naturally involve originality, novelty, and newness, as well as, 
being meaningful, as in, having apt relations between the two domains, but they also 
invoke the positive emotions of pleasure and interest. In Figure 3.2, using Giora’s (2003) 
Optimal Innovation Hypothesis and a modification of The Wundt Curve that Berlyne 
(1970) used, I show the arousal potential of creative metaphors. Creative metaphors are 
those that are optimally innovative, which means that they allow “the recognition of the 
familiar in the novel” (Giora, Fein, Kotler, & Shuval, 2015, p. 142). They also have the 
highest hedonic value and as a result should be viewed as being most pleasant and 
preferred over ones that are very familiar and conventional or those that are completely 
new and original (i.e., those that do not allow for the recoverability of the familiar). 
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Figure 3.2: The hedonic value of metaphors and arousal potential based on the Optimal 
Innovation Hypothesis (Giora, 2003) and the Wundt curve (Berlyne, 1970) 
 
Summary of Graded Salience Hypothesis 
GSH adds two parts to this thesis. First, it constrains creative metaphors under the 
optimal innovative hypothesis, which suggests that creative metaphors not only need to 
be original and new, but also allow for the recoverability of the familiar within this 
novelty. Secondly, it accentuates the importance of aesthetics in judging a creative 
metaphor. This will be further discussed in the last section of this chapter on ways to 
measure creative metaphoric competence. In the next section, I further elaborate on how 
novel and conventional metaphors differ at the anatomical level in how they are 
processed in the brain.   
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3.3 DIFFERENTIATING CREATIVE FROM CONVENTIONAL METAPHORS: THE 
BRAIN 
The neuropsychology of metaphor provides further support to distinguish at the neural 
level how conventional and creative metaphors are processed differently. Again to 
reiterate the goal of this chapter is to provide a working framework to be able to talk 
about creative metaphoric competence, as something that is distinct from an overall 
metaphoric competence. In this regard, it is important to restrict the term to the 
combinatorial ability of bringing together two distantly related semantic fields together in 
a novel way that at the same time has certain apt relations. It is the unexpectedness of 
finding meaning within this novel combination that has the power to “still excite the 
imagination” (Brooks & Warren, 1979, p. 436). In contrast, conventional metaphors are 
habitual and automatic, entrenched within an established semantic network. The 
following section looks at the neural basis of metaphor processing and how this provides 
further support to the theories previously discussed (in particular CofM and GSH). 
3.3.1 LANGUAGE AND THE BRAIN: THE LEFT HEMISPHERE 
For most neurotypical individuals (especially right-handers) the left hemisphere 
(henceforth LH) in such traditional areas as the Broca and Wernicke areas and the 
angular gyrus have important functions for language processing. Broca in the late 19th 
century was the first who discovered a region in the left hemisphere of the brain (that 
subsequently was named after him) that if damaged would result in a disorder of spoken 
language (aphasia), though if damaged in the same area on the right side, language would 
remain intact (Geschwind, 1972). This LH lateralization of language has been 
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documented to be the case where 97 out of 100 people with permanent language 
disorders have damage on the left side (Geschwind, 1972). The LH is the dominant area 
for language processing for it “finely codes” information and “strongly activates small 
and focused semantic fields” that is related to the relevant and literal meaning while 
suppressing other irrelevant meanings (Jung-Beeman, 2005, p. 514). This allows one to 
process language with speed by maintaining a narrow focus. The LH is also “more suited 
for comprehending sentences because it uses grammatical information and sentence 
constraint to integrate sentence meaning” (Kacinik & Chiarello, 2007, p. 189). The LH is 
undoubtedly crucial for language comprehension, yet in contrast, what role the RH plays 
has been considerably more controversial and inconsistent.  
 Understanding how language processing works at the neural level usually 
involves two different types of techniques; looking at patients with lesions (from a stroke, 
accident, etc.) or using some form of brain imaging device (PET, fMRI, etc.). Early 
research that sparked great interest in the RH as the preferred substrate for metaphor 
processing came from Winner and Gardner (1977). They questioned the over-simplified 
view of the LH as the “language” hemisphere and the RH as the “aesthetic” hemisphere. 
From their study they concluded that an “intact left hemisphere does not of itself ensure 
adequate comprehension of all linguistic messages” (p. 725) and that the interaction 
between each hemisphere contributes to fully adequate linguistic and aesthetic 
functioning. They also highlighted the possibility that the RH is especially necessary for 
the mapping of figurative language. This has led to a tremendous amount of interest and 
research about the role of the different hemispheres in language comprehension and in 
the next subsection I explore how the RH is involved in the processing of metaphors.   
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3.3.2 LANGUAGE AND THE BRAIN: THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE 
In this section, I start with an early study that provided evidence to support the RH 
involvement in processing novel metaphors and then introduce some studies that 
contradict and question this involvement. I then follow this up with more recent studies 
that again insist that the RH is involved, especially in comprehending novel metaphors. I 
argue that most of these contradictory findings are likely based on the task and the 
novelty of the metaphors used in the studies.  
 Bottini and colleagues (1994) made an early contribution to the growing view that 
the RH is involved in metaphorical processing. They used a PET (positron emissions 
tomography) image scanner and showed that the distance between the two semantic 
domains of a metaphor, as well as the unusualness or newness of the semantic relations 
recruits areas of the RH. In this study, six participants performed a metaphorical sentence 
task (e.g., “The investors were squirrels collecting nuts”), a literal sentence task (e.g., 
“The old man has a branch as a walking-stick”), and a lexical-decision task while 
investigating cerebral activity and found not only activation in the LH, but also in a 
number of areas in the RH for the metaphor sentence tasks. More specifically, they 
observed significant activation in the following areas of the right hemisphere: prefrontal 
region (BA8/46), middle temporal gyrus (BA21), precuneus (BA31), and the anterior and 
posterior cingulate (BA32/31) (see Figure 3.3 & 3.4 to view the locations of these regions 
in the brain). They concluded that the frontal lobe was used to retrieve episodic memory 
and the precuneus, which has previously been associated with memory-related imagery 
(Fletcher et al., 1995), also likely had a role with long-term memory. This suggests that 
metaphor requires greater working memory resources than the corresponding literal 
 82 
sentences. Heightened activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been shown 
to occur in tasks that require attention and effortful thought (Davis et al., 2000). 
Moreover, as apparent in the above examples, they used novel metaphor stimuli, to which 
they suggest the RH involvement has a role in dealing with complex language. Despite 
the success of this study in showing the activation of the RH for metaphor processing, not 
all subsequent studies since then have been so conclusive. There is still a considerable 
amount of controversy around the functional architecture of metaphors and whether or 
not the RH is necessary for metaphor comprehension. 
Figure 3.3: The lateral view of the brain with Brodmann areas marked by number. The colors 
represent function (i.e., blue-green of 17, 18, 19 represent the visual cortices; pink of 3, 1, 2, 5, 
and 40 are somatosensory areas; blue of 6 and 4 are motor areas; the yellow are for cognition, and 
so on).  
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Figure 3.4: The medial view of the brain with Brodmann areas marked by number. A number of 
the regions correspond to regions found in Figure 3.3 like the back visual cortices.  
 In contrast to the above findings, a number of studies have found a lack of 
evidence for a RH involvement in the processing of metaphors (Eviatar & Just, 2006; Lee 
& Dapretto, 2006). Although it should be noted, these studies primarily used 
conventional metaphors in their research. One important finding from these studies is that 
conventional metaphors are accessed much like any other lexical items and are likely 
retrieved from a mental lexicon. In contrast to these studies that primarily used 
conventional metaphors, Rapp and colleagues (2004) using simple novel metaphors (e.g., 
“the lovers words are harp sounds” as compared to “the lovers words are lies” for literal) 
also reported only LH involvement. They suggest, “the right hemisphere theory of 
metaphor comprehension needs to be critically reevaluated” (p. 401). They do note that 
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the conflicting results between those who have found RH involvement and those who 
have not might be due to differences in the complexity of the tasks involved in the 
different studies. In another study (Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2007), 
participants simply had to judge whether or not a sentence had a metaphoric or literal 
content. Again they found no significant laterality effects between the metaphorical and 
literal sentences. They suggest that RH involvement might be based not on the 
figurativeness of the sentence, but on “salience, novelty, or semantic distance” (p. 147).  
 Many of the studies within neuroimaging research have attempted to distinguish 
conventional from novel metaphors by using the theoretical grounds of GSH and/or 
CofM for the experiments. Looking at the neural correlates of metaphor processing and 
the role of the RH, Mashal and colleagues (2005; 2007) provide strong evidence for RH 
involvement. Through analyzing fMRI data, they concluded that the right homologue of 
Wernicke’s area (BA22/42) has a unique role in the processing of novel metaphors, as 
compared to conventional metaphors. In addition, Mashal & Faust (2009) demonstrated 
that as an individual is repeatedly exposed to novel metaphors, there is a shift in 
hemispheric involvement from the RH to the LH. In a similar study, Cardillo et al. (2012) 
showed involvement of “the right hemisphere in the processing of novel, low salience 
figurative meanings”, but instead of a lateral shift from the RH to the LH as the metaphor 
becomes more conventionalized, there is rather a “decrease neural load within semantic 
networks” (p. 3212). This they interpreted as giving credence to the CofM theory and the 
proposal that as a metaphor becomes more familiar, the processing of it shifts from 
comparison to categorization and this “entails a honing of the neural networks within a 
region as opposed to across regions” (p. 3219). In still another study, using sentences as 
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the metaphor task, Schmidt and colleagues (2007) also found strong RH involvement in 
the processing of metaphors. They attributed this not to a metaphor/literal dichotomy, but 
to the degree of semantic relatedness. They also endorse the idea that RH involvement 
may not be solely based on salience or familiarity, but also on complexity and aptness of 
the metaphor.  
 Since the research in this thesis was conducted in both English and Japanese, it is 
significant to note that the studies reported here have not only been in English, but in an 
assortment of languages; German (Rapp et al., 2004; 2007), Hebrew (Mashal et al., 2005; 
2007; 2009), and Italian (Bambini, Gentili, Ricciardi, Bertinetto, & Pietrini, 2011). Other 
languages have also been studied using fMRI. Ahrens et al. (2007) looked at the 
processing of conventional and anomalous metaphors in Mandarin Chinese and found 
bilateral activation and RH recruitment for anomalous metaphors. They conclude and 
suggest, “[n]o longer can conventional and novel metaphors be grouped together into a 
‘metaphor’ group as compared with literal expressions” (p. 169). Neuroimaging and 
metaphor processing has also been investigated in Japanese. Shibata and colleagues 
(2007a) found weak evidence for RH involvement, but did find that metaphor 
comprehension involved different neural mechanisms for semantic processing, as 
compared to literal comprehension. In another study, using a metaphoricity judgment task 
based on three types of “A is B” copula sentences; metaphorical (e.g., 教育絵は階段だ 
“education is a staircase”, literal (e.g., ピアノは楽器だ “A piano is an instrument”), and 
anomalous (e.g., 温泉は英語だ “A hot spring is English”), they showed higher 
activation of RH involvement in the comprehension of metaphors, in contrast to literal 
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sentences, especially in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (BA47) (Shibata, Abe, Terao, & 
Miyamoto, 2007b).  
 Attempts have been made to gather data from all these different studies and 
analyze them in a meta-analysis. Bohrn and colleagues (2012) performed a quantitative 
analysis of neuroimaging studies that looked at figurative language processing and 
specifically those that looked at the role of the RH. They did not find any RH advantage 
for figurative language processing, but when analyzed contrasting novel and conventional 
metaphors, they report “robust RH activation” (p. 2681). This bilateral activation was 
primarily in two RH clusters, the right IFG (BA45) and the right anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) (BA32). The IFG has been shown as being involved in connecting distantly 
related semantic concepts together in analogical reasoning tasks (Green et al., 2009), 
ideation generation tasks (Mihov et al., 2010), and divergent thinking tasks (Goel & 
Vartanian, 2005). Since novel metaphors also link distantly related concepts together in 
new and appropriate ways, require ideation and divergent thinking, it can be ascertained 
that novel metaphors likely result in similar increased activation in the IFG.   
 In a more recent study, Yang (2014) also conducted a meta-analysis of fMRI 
studies that looked at the role of the RH in metaphor comprehension. She concludes that 
there are three factors that modulate RH involvement in metaphor processing, as 
compared to literal comprehension. They are conventionality, contextual complexity, and 
task demand. Since novel metaphors cannot be retrieved from the mental lexicon, the 
figurative meaning has to be inferred and created and this often involves recruiting 
broader semantic networks in order to interpret the meaning.  
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 Finally in a critical look at the neural basis of metaphor, Schmidt and colleagues 
(2010) call to attention the need to “go beyond simple laterality” and propose some 
important considerations for these inconsistent results. They suggest that it is essential to 
pay more attention to novelty and consider the effect of the lexical (e.g., nouns, verbs, 
adjectives) choice of the task. That is to say, there are many factors that play a role in 
activating greater RH involvement in the processing of figurative language, but for the 
purposes of this study, the point of this section is to highlight the fact that novelty plays a 
role in this and therefore creative metaphors, as presented in the studies above, are 
processed differently than literal and conventional expressions and require more 
cognitive effort and bilateral activation. In order to provide a general overview of the 
lateralization differences in language processing, a theory called coarse-semantic coding 
theory (CSC) (Jung-Beeman, 2005), is described in greater detail in the following 
subsection. 
3.3.3 THE BILATERAL BRAIN AND CREATIVE METAPHORS: COARSE SEMANTIC 
CODING THEORY 
As indicated in the start of this section, the LH is the presumed hemisphere for language 
processing. Figurative language processing shares many of these areas, but also recruits 
parts of the RH, especially in the case of novel metaphors. Jung-Beeman (2005) asserts in 
his CSC theory that both hemispheres are actively involved, though each with a different 
role, as word meanings are organized in different ways in each hemisphere. The LH is for 
“rapid interpretations and tight links”, this occurs quickly, but focuses on a more narrow 
number of related concepts and does not spread far from these. In contrast, Jung-Beeman 
(2005) argues that the RH performs, what he calls, coarser-semantic coding, which is for 
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the “maintenance of broader meaning activation and recognition of distant relations” (p. 
517), so it is more “diffuse” and activates more distantly related lexical-semantic 
networks. Since metaphors capitalize on distant semantic relations between words, he 
notes that this is especially true in the case of “metaphors that are more novel, more 
creative, and less salient” (p. 515).  
 Faust and Kenett (2014) call this fine and coarse semantic coding between the 
hemispheres as a “rigidity-chaos semantic continuum”, where the LH is rigid and rule-
based and the RH is chaotic and over-flexible. The rigidity of the LH is crucial for 
efficiently processing language. In contrast, creative language (like metaphor) involves 
rule-violations and interrupts dominant semantic relations, so it involves chaos – the 
unknown, the unexpected, and the disruption of the conventional. According to their view 
of creativity, rigidity and chaos have to be integrated together and find some balance for 
creativity naturally involves novelty, but it also has to be appropriate and in the case of a 
novel metaphor, the relations have to be apt. This is very similar to the Optimal 
Innovative Hypothesis that argues the most pleasing of creative language involves the 
recoverability of the familiar within the novel. Many researchers now are beginning to 
accept this idea of bilateral activation and “hemispheric cooperation in creative and 
metaphoric language processing” (Faust & Kenett, 2014, p. 3).  
3.3.4 SUMMARY OF THE BRAIN AND CREATIVE METAPHORS 
In conclusion to this section, neuroimaging studies have clearly distinguished between 
conventional and novel metaphors at the neural level. However it should be emphasized 
that it might not simply be a measure of figurativeness, but more about novelty and 
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complexity, as Giora (2007, p. 113) states, it is about “singling out not the figurative but 
the innovative—that which gives everyday speech ‘an unfamiliar air’”. Non-salient (non-
coded, novel) meanings must be searched for and not retrieved from a mental lexicon 
(salient, coded). In novel and anomalous metaphors, there is a semantic violation and 
according to the CofM theory, this requires one to first symmetrically align relations 
between the two concepts and then asymmetrically project inferential meaning from the 
base to the target. This “mental linkage” increases the neural load on the semantic 
processing system (Cardillo et al., 2012) and individual differences may play an 
important role both in interpreting the relations in novel metaphors and producing novel 
metaphors.  
 It should be noted here that these studies focused on a single first language and to 
my knowledge there have not been any neuroanatomical studies that address novel 
processing of metaphors in a second language. What would happen if a researcher looked 
at the same individuals performing the same novel metaphor tasks, but one being 
completed in an L1 and the other in an L2? It is suggested in this thesis that the same 
neural substrates would be active in both languages.  
3.4 A FRAMEWORK FOR DIFFERENTIATING CREATIVE METAPHORS 
In the previous sections, I outlined different theoretical claims that differentiate novel and 
creative metaphors from conventional ones. CMT describes novel metaphors as 
imaginative extensions or elaborations on existing conceptual structures. In some 
instances novel metaphors actually create new conceptual structures between two 
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distantly related semantic domains, which has the power to reshape the way we view the 
world. The CofM theory describes the path a metaphor takes from being novel to 
becoming more conventional in language. Initially novel metaphors require the individual 
to align the relational structures in a consistent way between elements in the target and 
source domains. From this aligned structure inferences can be made about the metaphor. 
Yet as the metaphor becomes more conventional in language, this comparison process 
turns towards a categorization process. Through repeated figurative use, the source 
concept in the metaphor establishes an abstract metaphorical category to which the target 
concept is now included in. The third one, GSH insists that the processing of language is 
not dependent on the language being metaphorical or literal, but on how salient the 
language is. As language becomes more familiar, conventional, and frequent, it becomes 
more salient and this is true for both literal and metaphorical language. The Optimal 
Innovation Hypothesis substantiates that the most pleasing language rarely is the creation 
of something completely new and novel or something from nothing, as in ex nihilo, but 
rather combining familiar concepts in new, surprising and unexpected ways where the 
familiar can still be recovered within the novel. I also addressed novel metaphors from a 
neurological perspective. A number of studies suggest that when one first encounters a 
novel metaphor, more neural activation occurs and the brain recruits the RH to actively 
connect these coarser and distant semantic networks.  Figure 3.5 provides an illustrated 
summary of a proposed model to distinguish creative metaphors and the process of 
conventionalization.     
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Figure 3.5: Proposed model of creative metaphor processing and the process of 
conventionalization 
 The following are some important points to summarize the arguments put forth in 
the first part of this chapter: 
• Metaphors are both creative and conventional and both are common in everyday 
language.  
• A theory of metaphor must clearly distinguish between creative and conventional 
metaphors for they are processed differently.  
• Creative metaphors take more time and effort to interpret. 
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• Creative metaphors recruit and involve areas in both the right and left 
hemispheres. 
• Creative metaphors often derive from existing conceptual structures though 
sometimes will actually create new conceptual connections. 
• Conventional metaphors are processed much like any other highly salient 
language: automatic and directly and not as a result of some processing 
breakdown.  
• Conventional metaphors are likely stored in the mental lexicon and are retrieved 
much like any other ordinary language.  
 Differentiating creative and conventional metaphors and focusing only on creative 
metaphors allows me to assess the combinatorial ability found in creative metaphors at an 
individual level, as compared to assessing the lexical retrieval ability of conventional 
metaphors. Making this distinction enables me to look at the correlation of creative 
metaphoric competence between an L1 and L2. It is suggested in this thesis that creative 
metaphoric competence is an individual difference and should be found in both 
languages. Now that I have established how creative metaphors differ from conventional 
ones, in the final section of this chapter, I look at how one can measure such creativity in 
an experimental setting. 
3.5 WAYS TO MEASURE CREATIVE METAPHORIC COMPETENCE  
In the previous section, I distinguished creative metaphoric competence as the process of 
producing and interpreting novel metaphors, as compared to the more common and 
familiar metaphors found in everyday language. My interest in this topic developed from 
teaching metaphors in the foreign language classroom. I realized while reviewing 
students’ responses to a number of classroom exercises that they varied greatly in 
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creativity. That is to say, some students responded in novel and surprising ways while 
others responded in very predictable ways. It could be presumed that these differences 
were the results of differences in the overall English competences among the students. On 
the other hand, they could also have been the result of an individual difference. Therefore 
from this experience, I became interested in seeing whether or not these same differences 
would also be found if the students were asked to do a similar exercise in their L1. At the 
same time, I was informally experimenting in my classroom with a number of tasks used 
in creativity research, which included poems, drawings, and divergent thinking (this will 
be discussed in more detail in the following chapter). I began to wonder what kind of 
relationships creative metaphoric competence might have with these types of tasks 
commonly used to measure creativity. One issue, as can be seen in the first part of this 
chapter, was to develop a way to measure creative metaphoric competence, as something 
separate than having a wide linguistic knowledge of many conventional metaphorical 
expressions or possessing a great wealth of vocabulary knowledge.  
 I recognize that to use metaphors in a foreign language, vocabulary knowledge is 
essential (Azuma, 2004), but this is typically the case for conventional expressions. In 
regards to creative metaphors, one does not simply retrieve stored multiword chunks of 
language, but one needs to actively seek out combinatorial possibilties. As Black (1962) 
stated, “‘dictionary definitions’ may be unnecessary for the comprehension of metaphor” 
(cited in Gardner & Winner, 1978, p. 31). In fact, earlier studies have shown the 
connection between language ability and metaphor to be lacking both among children 
(Johnson, 1989, 1991) and with adult university students (Johnson & Rosano, 1993) to 
which these researchers suggest “metaphor interpretation may be more a conceptual than 
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a linguistic task” (1993, p. 169). It is argued here that this is especially true when the 
research further distinguishes creative metaphoric competence from a more general 
metaphoric competence.  
3.5.1 FLUENCY, COMPETENCE, AND CLARIFYING TERMINOLOGY 
I decided to use the term creative metaphoric competence, as a way to distinguish my 
aims in this research from the various other terms used in the literature that talk about 
one’s knowledge and ability to understand and use metaphors like  “conceptual fluency”, 
“figurative competence” or  “metaphoric competence”. Much of the early work on 
metaphoric competence approached it developmentally by tracing the course of how 
children acquire this cognitive ability (Gardner & Winner, 1978), as discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2. Interest in how children acquire this metaphoric competence in an L1 
led to many researchers exploring how second language learners also acquire such 
competence in an L2, for it is often asserted that “the true sign of proficiency […] is the 
ability to metaphorize in the new language” (Danesi, 1992, p. 193). Conceptual fluency 
(as previously discussed in the Chapter 2) is the awareness of how a language encodes 
the conceptual concepts and the subcategory, metaphoric fluency, is the ability to use 
these structures in everyday metaphorical language. In a later revision, Danesi (2008) 
further elaborates on the idea of conceptual fluency by not restricting it only to 
metaphors, but as the underlying knowledge of the conceptual system for all semantic 
meaning in that language. Conceptual fluency is now “the ability to give appropriate 
structural form to all kinds of meanings, literal and non-literal that constitute the semantic 
system of the SL (second language)” (p. 233 italics are mine). Furthermore he explains it 
is “the ability to navigate source domains in the SL during discourse programming” (p. 
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237). Despite being a helpful term that emphasizes the importance of conceptual thinking 
in language learning, it is an extremely broad construct and provides little in describing 
how one might actually measure such a thing as conceptual fluency. Also it seems that 
conceptual fluency here refers to the broad historical, cultural, and conceptual knowledge 
of the target culture. In my research, creative metaphoric competence is more narrowly 
focused and looks at the individual and the combinatorial cognitive ability to link unlike 
ideas together and be able to interpret such linked couplings.  
 Another commonly used term is “figurative competence”. Levorato and Cacciari 
(1992) developed the concept of “figurative competence” by describing it as containing 
the following set of coordinated abilities:   
• The ability to understand the dominant, peripheral and additional related 
meanings of a word 
• The ability to suspend a purely literal-referential strategy 
• The ability to use contextual information in order to construct a coherent semantic 
representation and to integrate it with the lexical and semantic information carried 
by the figurative expression 
• The ability to create and understand the figurative uses of a word, a sentence or a 
given domain as well as to retrieve the conceptual structures involved (p. 416-
417) 
Again many of these descriptions are rather problematic for my research and attempt to 
design a way to measure creative metaphoric competence. For instance (2) assumes that a 
literal-referential strategy is a priority and needs to be suspended, which is problematic 
considering the linguistic processing models that I have previously discussed, especially 
GSH. Also in this research the participants are explicitly informed to use metaphorical 
 96 
and creative language when completing the tasks, so it can be assumed that they will 
suspend their “literal-referential strategy”, if such a thing exists. In addition (3) assumes 
that the metaphor will appear in some discourse and thus have supportive context, but the 
tasks in this research will mainly use decontextualized linguistic tasks since they may 
uncover more closely the “cognitive attributes of the subject” (Johnson & Rosano, 1993, 
p. 160). Despite these issues with the above description of figurative competence, it does 
provide some insight into the important ability of being aware of peripheral and 
associable meanings of words (less salient meanings) and then being able to retrieve the 
necessary conceptual structures in order to produce or interpret an appropriate figurative 
use of these words.  
 Low (1988) developed the term “metaphoric competence” and later Littlemore 
and Low (2006) described in detail this term and demonstrated that it is a key component 
in Bachman’s (1990) communicative competence model contributing to all areas such as: 
grammatical, textual, illocutionary, sociolinguistic, and strategic competencies. Again 
this provides a very broad and theoretical approach with the aim of pointing out to 
educators and language teachers the importance of a learners’ metaphoric competence in 
order to communicate effectively in the target language. This view of “metaphoric 
competence” is more concerned with the “socially interactive function” (Littlemore & 
Low, 2006, p. 79) of metaphor and so again beyond the scope of this research. In 
contrast, creative metaphoric competence, as used in this research, is specifically focused 
on how one is able to produce and interpret novel metaphors. 
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3.5.2 DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR A CREATIVE METAPHOR ASSESSMENT TOOL 
The goal of this subsection is to consider ways to develop a valid set of tasks in order to 
measure, creative metaphoric competence, that can provide suitable data for analysis and 
consequently insight into whether or not this ability projects onto both an L1 and an L2. 
If this does occur, then scores on these creative metaphoric competence tasks between the 
languages should be minimal, which would suggest that this competency is an individual 
difference and could also potentially be applied to other modes of expressions, such as, 
music, dance, and art. In order to structure an instrument to measure this cognitive ability, 
I relied on various facets that have been identified that are key in measuring this 
competenc from a previous study: (1) the ability to produce an original metaphor; (2) the 
ability to find meaning in a metaphor; and (3) the fluency of producing many metaphors 
(Littlemore, 2001a). Below, I describe in more detail these various facets and provide 
further description how they were applied in this research.  
 As shown in the first part of this chapter, different cognitive processes are 
recruited during the processing of novel metaphors and as the novelty wears off, these 
once novel metaphors become more salient, as they become more familiar, conventional, 
and frequently used. This may happen more readily than previously thought (Goldstein, 
Arzouan, & Faust, 2012) and may simply involve, as the Career of Metaphor theory 
(CofM) suggests, an initial comparison in which the individual attempts to interpret the 
semantic link between two seemingly unrelated words in a novel metaphor. Then after 
encountering this metaphor again, this semantic link can be automatically retrieved. 
Interestingly, a meaningfulness judgment task (where the individual simply judges the 
aptness of the metaphor) did not produce the same results, as one that required the 
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participants to interpret the meaning of the metaphor (see Goldstein et al., 2012). So 
judging the metaphoricity of a novel metaphor and trying to actually interpret and find 
the meaningful links in it are two clearly different cognitive tasks. Moreover producing a 
novel metaphor can also be viewed as a different cognitive task from interpreting one. 
This begs the question whether or not creative metaphoric competence can actually be 
considered a unitary process for there are many constraints to consider, especially in the 
task choice (Pickens & Pollio, 1979).  
 Creative metaphoric competence involves a number of different cognitive 
processes. In this study, I concentrate on the production of creative metaphors and 
subsequent interpretations of them. In order for a metaphor to be judged as being 
creative, as mentioned at the start of this chapter, it needs to be both novel and 
meaningful. Novelty refers to it being new, original, and unique. A metaphor is viewed as 
being meaningful when an individual is able to interpret it. That is to say, one is able to 
explain the appropriate relations between the two concepts and elaborate on them. 
Furthermore when assessing the overall aptness of a metaphor, it is important to consider 
two features (1) the remoteness of the topic and vehicle, which means the semantic 
distance between the two concepts and (2) the appropriateness of the vehicle, which 
refers to it having certain attributional relations that can be mapped onto the topic. If the 
semantic distance is minimal, the metaphoric nature of the expression diminishes (as in 
the metaphor, College is a library), as Poincaré (1913) carefully stated, combinations that 
are “most fertile will often be those formed of elements drawn from domains which are 
far apart” (p. 386). Yet even if the semantic distance is great, if the relations are minimal 
(as in the metaphor, College is a spoon), the chances of finding it comprehensible, and 
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thus apt, are greatly reduced. In consequence, the inability to recover meaning from the 
metaphor also causes one to find it less pleasing. So a creative metaphor is also 
aesthetically pleasant, which refers to the overall emotional response to the linguistic 
stimulus. Is it interesting? Is it surprising? Therefore the relations between the two 
concepts that form a creative metaphor are (1) appropriate; (2) remote; and (3) 
aesthetically pleasing. 
In short creative metaphoric competence is part of the conceptual system that 
“encompasses recognition, categorization, and analogy-making, and its central feature is 
the fluid application of one’s existing concepts to new situations” (Mitchell, 1993, p. 3). 
Now that I have developed a framework that outlines the key facets of creative 
metaphoric competence, it is now important to consider actual tasks that could be used to 
measure this ability.  
Developing Tasks to Assess Creative Metaphoric Competence 
Designing tasks to measure metaphoric competence is similar to a typical vocabulary test 
with the goal of confining and constraining the subject to respond with the appropriate 
and norm-fitting responses. These responses likely have a correct answer and therefore 
are measuring the subjects’ linguistic knowledge of so-called “dead metaphors” or 
common idiomatic expressions that fill everyday language. They might also involve more 
logical or deductive thinking like solving a puzzle or unraveling a riddle. For example, in 
a study (experiments 2 and 3) by Chiappe and Chiappe (2007), they presented their 
subjects with a fill-in-the-blank metaphor task that was comprised of 24 figurative 
statements along with a property description attributed to the topic (e.g., “Some lectures 
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are _____”; Property: Boring and put you to sleep). The experiment was to assess 
metaphor generation, but in a conventional sense for the property description really 
guided the subjects (providing a clue or a hint) and suppressed the multitude of possible 
responses (i.e., the creative ones). They also instructed the participants to answer, “I don’t 
know” if they could not think of a vehicle to complete the metaphor.  
 In order to look more specifically at the creative production of metaphors, I 
developed a set of tasks using an open-ended response format, which did not prompt the 
participants to respond with a single correct answer and therefore multiple responses by 
the participants were possible for each given task. In the following paragraphs, I review 
past literature that aimed to measure the creative side of metaphor production with the 
goal of generating a framework in how to best design the set of creative metaphor 
production tasks for my main study.   
 One of the more common ways in the literature to assess metaphoric competence 
(in an open-ended way) is to use a task that requires the participants to complete a 
sentence or story that primes them to use some sort of metaphor in order to do this. These 
types of tasks aim to measure novel metaphor production in the participants and therefore 
they are a good possibility for my research in order to measure creative metaphor 
competence at the individual level. For instance in an early study, Gardner et al. (1975) 
devised eighteen very short stories that asked the subjects (4 to 19 year olds in an L1) to 
complete the ending to the story. Each story was designed according to three different 
models; (1) a simple declarative sentence (e.g., “He looks as gigantic as....”); (2) 
providing additional context to that declarative sentence (e.g., “We're glad to have you at 
 101 
this party for our son. Look at that boy standing over there. He looks as gigantic as...”); 
(3) and providing additional context to that declarative sentence that primes the subjects 
to use a metaphor (e.g. “Things don't have to be huge in size to look that way. Look at 
that boy standing over there. He looks as gigantic as....”) (see p.127-28). Each story 
featured a different simile topic that consisted of an adjective (e.g., “gigantic” for the 
above story), so the participants had to come up with some responses that fit into the ad 
hoc category, “things that are very large”. This could, in a conventional sense, include a 
skyscraper and less conventional sense a double-decker cone (according to Gardner et al., 
1975). Others have also adapted this type of approach with L2 subjects (Littlemore, 2010; 
Trosborg, 1985). For instance, Littlemore (2010) devised sixteen short incomplete 
sentences that primed the subjects to complete them with a metaphor (e.g., “The lake was 
a shining ........ at the bottom of the valley”).  
 In a slightly different approach to assessing creative metaphor production, De 
Barros and colleagues (2011) used a Metaphor Creation Test that consisted of nine items 
that prompt participants to produce novel metaphors by requiring them to provide the 
vehicle to a metaphorical idea (e.g., “The camel is the ........ of the desert.”). Another 
metaphor assessment technique used a swap tactic, whereby the participants were shown 
a conventional expression and had to come up with other more “metaphorical” (novel) 
ways to express it. For instance, Benedek and colleagues (2014) presented participants 
with a short phrase that contained a noun and an adjective (e.g., “The lamp is glowing”), 
the participants then were asked to be creative and come up with a novel, but appropriate 
metaphor that conveys the same meaning as the adjective (e.g., “supernova”).  
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 In still another format designed to test novel metaphor production that is relatively 
more open-ended, Silvia and Beaty (2012) asked participants to respond with a metaphor 
to two different prompts that involved past emotional experiences. Metaphors are a 
common tool to express the emotions and increasing the intensity of such emotions has 
been shown to produce more novel than conventional metaphors (Fainsilber & Ortony, 
1987). Silvia and Beaty (2012) provided the following two situational prompts to prime 
the subjects to feel the emotions of boredom and disgust:  (1) “Think of the most boring 
high-school or college class that you’ve ever had. What was it like to sit through?” and 
(2) “Think about the most disgusting thing you ever ate or drank. What was it like to eat 
or drink it?”. To get the subjects started, they provided various stems that prompted 
figurative thinking (simile/metaphor) such as, “Being in that class was like .....” or “That 
class was ......”. These examples above are the numerous examples from previous studies 
that used some form of a linguistic prompt to encourage the participants to create a novel 
metaphor.   
 In the literature, there have been a number of different ways to try and get the 
subjects in the research to produce a novel metaphor. When designing a creative 
metaphor production task that prompts the subjects to respond with a metaphor, there are 
a couple of things to consider such as: deciding on the amount of contextual support to 
provide and selecting the grammatical feature (noun, adjective, verb) to use. It is also 
important to consider the metaphoricity of the topic chosen for the prompt. For example 
in the above task that uses “camel” as the topic, which then requires the subject to come 
up with the vehicle, one has to consider how open-ended is this topic? How many 
possible ways could a camel be linked to some other semantic field? Would the 
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respondents generally use the ad hoc category “things that provide transportation in a 
dessert” as a response (e.g., car, bus or more specifically BMW, Mercedes)? Moreover 
when working with adjectives as the metaphor prompt, such as “gigantic”, determining 
the novelty of the response can be rather precarious – what is more novel or less 
conventional; a skyscraper or a double-decker cone?  
Since these metaphor tasks are aimed at measuring creativity, they discernably are 
more complicated to objectively measure than conventional metaphor tasks that aim at 
assessing the correct or incorrect response. In the next section, I focus on some different 
ways that researchers have addressed this issue, which usually entails using a group of 
raters to score the metaphors through the use of a criterion scale.  
3.6 SCORING CREATIVE METAPHOR PRODUCTION 
Judging the novelty or conventionality of a metaphor is obviously not an “absolute 
judgment”. Though in general as Pollio and Pollio (1979) mentioned “frozen figures can 
be defined as those non-literal instances that have become clichéd in the language [...] 
Novel figures, on the other hand, represent new linguistic creations developed in a given 
situation which the rater had never (or rarely) encountered in that context before” (p. 
114). To remove the overly subjective position of the researcher and a single opinion 
dictating the novelty of a response, several judges are often recruited for this purpose. In 
the field of creativity research, Amabile (1983, 1996) developed a technique called the 
“Consensual Technique for Creativity Assessment” (CAT) (this will be discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter on creativity). This technique can also be applied to verbal 
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creativity, as in, judging the creativity of a metaphor. She insists that to use this technique 
there are three requirements for the task: first the task needs to produce a clearly 
observable product (in this case a creative metaphor), secondly the task needs to permit 
room for novelty (not restricting the subjects’ response or compelling them to respond in 
a conventional way), and thirdly the demands of the task should not require a specialized 
skill that is not somewhat evenly developed among all the participants (1996, p. 41). A 
creative metaphor production task meets all these needs. It should be noted here that in 
Japan, English is a required course in junior and senior high school; so all the participants 
should have a somewhat uniform academic backgrounds in their experiences learning 
English. Amabile (1996) suggests that the most important criterion for using this 
technique is inter-rater reliability, which again I address in greater detail in the next 
chapter.  
 Obtaining good reliability likely results from clearly telling the judges how to 
score the different tasks. Previous studies have typically used a 4 or 5 category approach 
to score the metaphor responses. For instance, Gardner et al. (1975) scored the responses 
on the basis of one of the following categories: L (literal), C (conventional), A 
(appropriate) or I (inappropriate). Two outside judges conducted this scoring. Trosborg 
(1985) used a very similar method of coding, which she assigned the responses to one of 
the following categories: L (literal), C (conventional), N (novel), and I (inappropriate). 
The only difference was she swapped the term “novel” for “appropriate”. She also used a 
fifth “unanswered” category when the participant failed to provide any response. Using a 
similar approach, Littlemore (2001a, 2010) organized these categories along a scale from 
4 (novel metaphor), 3 (conventional), 2 (literal), and 1 (inappropriate) and the higher the 
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score the participant received, the greater the preference for novelty the participant had 
(2001a, p. 469). These examples are all straight forward and focus on the novelty 
dimension in the subjects’ responses to a metaphor prompt. Others have extended this 
type of scale to include other factor like remoteness, cleverness, and novelty as part of a 
single holistic creative score (Beaty & Silvia, 2013). For instance, Beaty and Silvia 
(2013) gave each metaphor a score based on a 5-point creativity scale anchored by 1 (not 
at all creative) to 5 (very creative) and the raters were provided the following instructions 
to help in assessing them:  
• Novelty reflects the originality of the response. Consider the following questions: 
Was the metaphor original? Was it merely a cliché or dead metaphor? 
• Remoteness reflects the conceptual distance of the metaphor. Consider the 
following question:  Was the vehicle conceptually distant?  
• Cleverness reflects the degree to which the response was surprising in some way: 
Was the metaphor interesting? Was the metaphor perceptive? Did the metaphor 
make you laugh, think more deeply or see something in new way? (adapted from 
Beaty & Silvia, 2013; and Silvia and Beaty, 2012) 
In their study, responses that received low scores typically contained some conventional 
expression. For example, in a metaphor prompt that primed the participants to describe a 
boring class, low scores included the following: “watching paint dry” or “watching grass 
grow.” In contrast, those that received a higher score tended to be more clever and less 
conventional such as, “Trying to stay awake during that class was like trying not to get 
seconds at an all-you-can-eat buffet” (Silvia & Beaty, 2012). So in summary, using a 
CAT to assess the creativity of the creative metaphor responses is a viable method of 
scoring and has been used in a number of previous studies in the fields of applied 
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linguistics and psychology. The major concern is determining the criteria for the range of 
scores and finding and selecting the group evaluators to assist in this process. 
3.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3  
In the first part of this chapter, I reviewed three influential theories in metaphor research 
and recent studies of metaphor and the brain and used these theories to develop a way to 
distinguish and lay out metaphor along a continuum from the highly conventional to the 
creative. This allowed me to analyze creative metaphoric competence as a distinct 
cognitive ability, separate from the ability to produce and comprehend common and 
familiar metaphors in language.  
 In the second part of this chapter, I then provided the literature background to 
previous research that aimed to measure metaphoric competence. I discussed various 
methods to measure this construct in productive tasks from using nominal metaphors that 
ask the participants to fill in the vehicle to more context dependent tasks that require the 
participants to complete a sentence. I also examined different ways to score the responses 
to these tasks. Since these novel metaphor production tasks are creative in nature, the 
scoring techniques may overlap with those found in the creativity research that will be 
addressed in the next chapter. These often rely on using a group of judges to assess the 
product. The main issue here is designing a clear and easy to follow criterion for these 
judges to use with the aim of getting high reliability in the scores between the judges.  
 Metaphor or figurative language more broadly is often considered a key part of 
everyday creativity (Carter, 2004). One question this study poses is the following: could 
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such creative metaphor tasks provide researchers a more valid and reliable method to 
measure verbal creativity than some of the more popular tests commonly used like the 
divergent thinking (Torrance, 2008) or remote association tests (Mednick, 1968)? In the 
next chapter, I look in depth at this individual difference, creativity, which as a construct 
has dramatically changed in perception through history. Runco and Albert (2010) discuss 
how creativity in the earlier pre-Chrisitan age was associated with madness and frenzied 
inspiration that actually reappeared during the Romanticism period of the 19th century. In 
fact, originality, which is an essential part of our contemporary concept of creativity, was 
not an early attribute of it (Runco, 1988), but rather creativity could be seen in the effort 
to match or mimic ideal forms (Runco & Albert, 2010). It was not until the mid 19th 
century when the classical themes such as a beauty in creativity were replaced with 
novelty, as the criterion of creative worth (Dudek, 1999). More recently educators, 
business leaders, and other figures in society have called for the need to enhance 
creativity within the educational system (see European Commission, 2008; Tan, 2000). 
Therefore this study aims to further enhance our understanding of verbal creativity and 
the creative process of combining distantly related concepts together. It also aims to shed 
some light on how this could be an individual difference that relates to one’s disposition 
or proneness to seek out the novel and unique. This ability is an important characteristic 
for creativity. 
 In the next chapter I provide a brief background on research into creativity and 
then look at creativity from a multifaceted perspective that includes the creative product, 
person, process, and past creative achievements. The goal here is to address how creative 
metaphoric competence relates to these other dimensions of creativity.
 Chapter 4 Approaching Creativity Using a Multifaceted Approach 
In the previous chapter it was argued that creative metaphoric competence is an 
individual difference and this difference should appear in both the L1 and L2. As Blasko 
and Kazmerski (2006, p. 267) state “researchers often make the simplifying assumption 
in cognitive science that adults without obvious dysfunction are basically alike, this 
assumption is likely to fail in the domain of figurative language”. Therefore the first aim 
of this study was to investigate this difference by looking at a set of creative metaphor 
tasks in two different languages. 
 The second aim of this thesis was to explore how metaphors are “an everyday 
example of creative cognition in action,” (Glucksberg et al., 1997, p. 327) and I 
investigated the relationships between this competence to produce and interpret creative 
metaphors in an L1 and L2 and creativity, as a multifaceted construct. A few studies have 
analyzed the relationship between an individual difference like analogical reasoning or 
fluid intelligence and various metaphor tasks. For instance, Trick and Katz (1986) found 
a relationship between individuals that scored high on an analogical reasoning test and 
the appreciation and understanding of metaphors from highly dissimilar domains. Using 
another individual difference, Blasko (1999) looked at the role of higher working 
memory and found those with this ability produced richer interpretations of metaphors 
and suggest, “individual differences play a role in metaphor comprehension and 
interpretation” (p. 1681). Chiappe and Chiappe (2007) also found that subjects who 
scored higher on a working memory task produced better metaphor interpretations 
(scored on a 3-point scale by two raters). Others have investigated how fluid intelligence 
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contributes to creative metaphor quality (Silvia & Beaty, 2012). In another study by 
Beaty and Sivia (2013), using several factors that measure intelligence, it was shown that 
creative metaphors draw on a different set of cognitive abilities, namely those that rely on 
executive processes, as compared to conventional metaphors, which mainly draw from 
acquired vocabulary knowledge. What this suggests, as the above quote mentions, 
individual differences have an influence on metaphor production and interpretation tasks. 
As far as I know, research that directly looks at the relationship between creativity and 
the ability to produce and interpret novel metaphors has not been researched and this 
study aims to fill this gap.  
 Creativity, like metaphor is another concept that carries with it a heavy weight of 
historical and contentious meaning. Since the 1950s, after Guilford (1950) famously 
addressed the American Psychological Association and urged the need for more research 
that aims to explore creativity, research in the field has flourished and grown profusely. 
However at the same time, there have been many challenges and obstacles to this 
advancement, most notably, the fragmentariness of the field (Hennessey & Amabile, 
2010).  
 The extensive literature on creativity sheds light on the perceived importance that 
it has for society, work, and education, but also provides a window into the complexity of 
this construct. This complexity has led some to analyze creativity from differing 
perspectives, often using some contraction or abbreviation like the “4 P’s” (person, place, 
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process, press4) (Rhodes, 1961), which has been extended to include two more, potential 
and persuasion, so it is now the “6 P’s” (see Runco, 2003, 2007; Simonton, 1990). While 
Glăveanu (2013) more recently has attempted to rewrite these P’s based on a contextual 
and dynamic approach to creativity with five A’s (actor, action, artifact, audience, 
affordances). While others distinguish between little-c (everyday) and Big-c (eminent) 
creativity, which also has more recently been expanded to a four C model, including the 
likes of a mini-c and a Pro-c (professional expertise) (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009). The 
intent of this thesis was not to go into detail about the fragmentary nature of this field, but 
rather to look at a constructive way to approach creativity, as an individual difference, in 
order to develop instruments to measure it.  
To begin talking about creativity, it is important to first provide a definition of 
this term and then look at different ways to approach it. A contemporary and widely 
agreed upon definition of creativity assumes that it has to have the feature of novelty and 
innovativeness and at the same time being of some use or being appropriate within some 
context. Plucker and colleagues (2004) provide a concise and discerning definition for 
this term as follows:  
Creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process, and environment by which 
an individual or group produces a perceptible product that is both novel and 
useful as defined within a social context (p. 90). 
 
So creativity can operate both at an individual or group level, but for the purposes of this 
research, I limited my approach to only the individual level. It requires some perceptible 
                                                      
 
4 Press here is probably a poor choice for it refers more to society and the evaluators or judges who decide and deem something as creative 
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product; this very broadly means something tangible like a sketch, a collage or a poem 
and so on or something more abstract like an idea. Finally this creative product also needs 
to be deemed within a social context as having both novelty and usefulness. Novelty 
refers to newness and originality or “have a certain stated uncommonness in the 
particular group being studied” (Barron, 1955, p. 478). The idea of usefulness is typically 
judged by a group of individuals at a specific point in time to which they evaluate the 
product as being satisfying, acceptable, and appropriate (Amabile, 1996; Stein, 1953). 
This approach views creativity as something that can be recognized, observed, 
appreciated, and often agreed upon independently by a group of people (Amabile, 1996; 
Barron, 1965). Therefore in this study, creativity is defined as the use of the imagination 
to produce something that is original and novel, but still meaningful. In addition, 
creativity should elicit high levels of satisfaction from the interpreters due to it being 
“optimally innovative” (Giora, 2003) whereby one is able to recover meaning, or 
familiarity, within the novelty. 
 The idea that one can actually measure creativity has often been clouded with 
doubt and suspicion for creativity has been viewed as the “disordering of all the senses”5 
or considered the “impenetrable aspect of human existence” (Rothernberg & Hausman, 
1976, p. 3) and carries with it a myth that it is something immeasurable (Khatena, 1982). 
Creativity like a novel metaphor harnesses the idea of “surprise” through seeing 
something in a new light, through creating connections between seemingly disparate 
things and “upsetting expectations” (Anderson, 1964). Yet at the same time, it is now 
                                                      
 
5 Arthur Rimbaud 
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considered a construct that can be measured. For it appears that most agree that creativity 
is likely not a unitary construct, but rather made up of multiple components (Amabile, 
1996; Batey & Furnham, 2006), so it is best to approach it in a multifaceted way. In this 
regard it is best to use “multiple tests of the different criteria of creativity” in order to “try 
and capture its many nuances” (Furnham, Batey, Anand, & Manfield, 2008, p. 1061 
italics in the original). Using multiple criteria provides a more comprehensive assessment 
of the multifaceted nature of creativity (Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001). To provide background 
on why I chose the specific tasks I used to measure creativity in this thesis and how I 
developed them, I first provide a review in this chapter of how creativity has been 
operationalized in the past. Typically this has involved conducting divergent thinking 
tasks; exploring the creative person; observing past creative achievements; analyzing 
self-ratings of one’s creativity; and actually creating some tangible product, which then is 
scored by a group of independent evaluators for creativity. I cover each one of these in 
the following sections.  
4.1 DIVERGENT THINKING AND THE MULTIPLE USES OF A BRICK 
Divergent thinking (hereinafter DT) is part of the psychometric tradition of studying 
creativity. Guilford (1968) viewed creative people as having skills that are different than 
those exhibited in a typical IQ test. One of the aims of the psychometric approach is to 
provide discriminant validity or to show that creativity is distinct from other 
competencies like IQ. It is generally believed that there is a threshold in regards to 
general ability, which suggests that below a certain level, IQ is strongly related to 
creativity, but above that level the two indices are completely independent (Kozbelt, 
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Beghetto, & Runco, 2010; Runco & Albert, 1986). IQ tests typically require the 
individual to respond to a set of questions that require convergent thinking for it requires 
one to provide the conventional or correct answer. In contrast, creativity is believed to 
rely more on DT, or the ability to produce a number of ideas to which some may be novel 
and unconventional. Although it should be noted that creativity also requires convergent 
thinking and in fact, it is the combination of the two – divergent thinking produces the 
novel ideas, but it is convergent thinking that evaluates the usefulness and 
appropriateness of these novel ideas (Cropley, 2006).  
 Nonetheless a number of DT tests have been developed with the aim of measuring 
creativity such as Guiford’s Structure of the Intellect (SOI) DT production test, Wallach 
and Kogan’s (1965) Creativity Test (WKCT) and Getzels and Jackson’s (1962) 
Creativity Tests (GJCT). Yet it was Torrance’s (1966, 1990b, 2008) Test of Creative 
Thinking (TTCT) that became the standard and benchmark way to measure creativity by 
way of DT tasks. This test has achieved wide recognition and international and cross-
cultural use (Ferrando, Ferrándiz, Bermejo, Sánchez, Parra, & Prieto, 2007; Kim, 2006; 
Saeki, Fan, & Dusen, 2001). However with the popularity and wide use of this single 
form of assessing creativity, the TTCT and DT ended up often being conflated with 
creativity, which has caused DT to lose much of its appeal and to be strongly criticized. It 
is important to note that DT simply “estimates the potential for creative problem solving” 
(Runco, 1999, p. 403) and should not be considered to be synonymous with creativity 
(Runco, 2008), but rather a crucial step in the creative process.  
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4.1.1 WHAT IS DIVERGENT THINKING? 
DT abilities refer to having high levels of (1) ideational fluency, or the ability to come up 
with many ideas to a problem; (2) novelty, or the ability to come up with many unique 
and original ideas; and (3) flexibility, or the ability to produce many types of ideas. 
Divergent thinking tests “require individuals to produce several responses to a specific 
prompt, in sharp contrast to most standardized tests of achievement or ability that require 
one correct answer” (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999, p. 38). DT tasks require the individual to 
cognitively be lead in multiple directions in order to produce various responses to an 
open-ended question or ill-defined problem (Runco, 1999). For instance, one of the most 
popular DT tasks is the “unusual uses” task, which asks participants to find creative uses 
for an everyday object like a plastic bottle (e.g., bowling pin, cut to make a flower pot, 
watering can, a toy for a child, put many together and make a floating device, etc.). 
 Typically DT tests rely on both images and language, referred to as figural and 
verbal activities of the test. For instance, the “unusual uses” task is a verbal activity. The 
TTCT likewise has a Verbal form, which is comprised of seven activities, and a Figural 
form, comprised of three activities. Table 4.1 provides an outline of these activities. 
TABLE 4.1: TTCT TEST ACTIVITIES (THIS TABLE IS DEVELOPED FROM KAUFMAN, PLUCKER, & 
BAER, 2008 P. 26-27)  
Verbal Form – Ask-and-Guess Section Activities Description 
1. Asking The participant views a picture and then asks as many questions as possible about it. 
2. Guessing Causes 
The participant views a picture and then lists 
possible causes that led to the action shown in 
the picture. 
3. Guessing Consequences 
The participant views a picture and then lists 
possible consequences resulting from the 
action shown in the picture. 
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Verbal Form – Self-contained Section Activities  
4. Product Improvement The participant lists possible ways to creatively improve a product (e.g. a stuffed animal) 
5. Unusual Uses 
The participant is asked to list unusual and 
alternative uses for a common everyday object 
(e.g. cardboard box). 
6. Unusual Questions 
(Has been removed from the test) 
The participant views an ordinary object (e.g. 
cardboard box) and then lists as many 
questions as possible about it.  
7. Just Suppose 
The participant is asked to “just suppose” an 
improbably situation and then list things that 
would happen (e.g. humans could breathe 
underwater) 
 
Figural Form   
1. Picture Construction  The participant is given basic shapes and asked to expand on it to create a picture. 
2. Picture Completion  The participant is provided an incomplete picture and is asked to complete it and provide a title. 
3. Lines / Circles 
 The participant is asked to modify and create as 
many pictures as possible from a different 
series of lines (form A) and circles (form B). 
 
 Obviously the figural and verbal tests use different modalities (imagery and 
written language), they are also viewed as measuring different DT abilities for there is 
little correlation (r = 0.06) between the two tests (Torrance, 1990a as cited in Cramond, 
Matthews-Morgan, Bandalos, & Zuo, 2005 p. 284). When dealing with convergent 
thinking tests, or more traditional IQ tests, scoring is more straightforward for there are 
right and wrong answers, while looking at the above examples such as the “unsual uses” 
verbal task and “lines / circles” figural task, scoring seems a lot more equivocal. In the 
following subsection, I explore some ways to assess such tasks in more detail.  
4.1.2 MEASURING DIVERGENT THINKING 
 
DT typically focuses on four scoring criteria: fluency (the number of responses); 
originality (the uniqueness of the response); flexibility (categorical uniqueness of the 
responses); and elaboration (the extension of ideas in the response). It should be noted 
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that elaboration is less commonly used in the literature due to its difficulty of assessment 
especially for untrained evaluators (Cramond et. al., 2005). Scoring DT tests can be a 
rather complicated and time consuming process and may actually require specific training 
(e.g., for the TTCT tests).  
 Measuring fluency is rather straightforward and simply requires summing the total 
responses to the specific task. For instance in the “unusual uses” task (e.g., brick), if the 
respondent provides seven different uses for a brick, this individual receives a score of 7 
for the fluency part. As for originality, the assessor looks at how statistically unique the 
responses are and provides a score. For instance, if the participant provides a unique 
answer (an answer nobody else provided) – the individual receives a “1” score and for all 
non-unique answers a “0” (Silva et al., 2008). So this follows the simple norm, “people 
receive points for statistically uncommon responses, and these points are summed” (Silva 
et al., 2008, p. 69). Others have used a more technical approach by creating a 
comprehensive pool of responses, thus showing the number of respondents who gave 
each idea (Plucker, Runco, & Lim, 2006). Then a group of judges identify the uniqueness 
of the ideas by using this pooled resource. Having this resource to guide their scores, the 
judges’ scores for originality are very reliable (reliability coefficients ranging from 0.70 
to 0.90). Flexibility looks at categorical variability in the responses. So again in the 
example of “unusual uses” for an everyday object like a brick, the respondent provides 
the following three examples: “to hit someone with”, “use as a weapon”, and “throw it at 
a robber” all are categorically similar, compared with “use as a paperweight” or “use it to 
keep your door open”.  On the other hand, as for the figural (or non-verbal) tests, these 
often use five subscales, three of them are the same as the ones on the verbal section as 
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mentioned above: fluency, originality, and elaboration. In addition they use two more 
scales: abstractedness of title and resistance to premature closure.  
 DT tests have often been criticized for conflating creativity with DT. For instance, 
researchers frequently publish results that suggest they have measured creativity, but in 
fact, they had only used a DT task in the experiment. It is necessary to view these tests as 
a component to measuring creativity, but not necessarily measuring creativity itself. 
Other problems with DT tests revolve around the scoring of them. Silva and colleagues 
(2008) outline the following three problems related to the scoring of DT tests and suggest 
a subjective scoring method: 
• The contaminating effect that fluency has on originality scores. This confounding 
of fluency and originality is obvious in that any increase in the number of 
responses (fluency) directly will increase the chances of generating an original 
response. What happens then is quantity and quality become mildly distinct and in 
some cases undistinguishable.  
• Uniqueness is not necessarily creative. On DT tests, responses are scored for 
originality (statistical uniqueness), but the appropriateness of these responses is 
not considered. This allows for bizarre and random responses to be evaluated as 
“unique” responses. 
• Sample size and uniqueness scoring, the larger the size causes a decrease in 
uniqueness. In small samples, respondents naturally have a much higher chance of 
having a unique response, which proportionally decreases with additional 
participants. 
A subjective scoring method could eliminate these problems, especially one that uses a 
consensual assessment technique (which is discusses in more detail in 4.4 of this 
chapter). For instance, when using judges to assess creativity, the uniqueness of the 
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response has to be considered in relation to its usefulness or appropriateness. The main 
difference between these two scoring methods is that traditional DT scoring relies more 
on a quantifiable objective score (regardless of the response being creative or 
meaningful) and the subjective scoring method relies on an agreed upon common view 
held by a group of judges who determine the creativity of the responses. I go into more 
detail in the next subsection about some of the empirical support for DT tests, but also 
some of the limitations in using them. 
4.1.3 DIVERGENT THINKING TASKS: AN EFFECTIVE, BUT INCOMPLETE LOOK AT THE 
CREATIVE PROCESS 
 
Instruments to measure DT have survived in various formats for over 40 years and over 
this time have enjoyed a substantial amount of success. For instance, Plucker (1999) 
found positive correlations between TTCT and adult creative achievement (r = 0.60), 
which is much higher than those found between IQ and creative achievement (r = 0.19), 
which provides some evidence of discriminant validity. In another recent study using 
Brazilian subjects, though definitely not as strong as correlations as those found in the 
Plucker’s study, Wechsler (2006) found a significant relationship between figural and 
verbal indicators using a DT test with creative achievement. Other studies have also 
substantiated the validity of DT tests by looking at the relationship of the DT scores and 
scores based on real-life problem solving issues. For instance, Davidovitch and 
Milgram’s (2006) found a strong correlation (r = 0.64, p < 0.0001) between DT scores 
and teacher effectiveness. This latter construct was measured with a 5-item instrument 
that described problems in education and for the participants to generate as many possible 
solutions to them. Yet this instrument, itself, appears to be a type of DT test, which 
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requires ideation and the ability to come up with multiple solutions to a problem. In 
contrast, a so-called “real world” example of teacher effectiveness could have been used 
in this study such as using a student questionnaire or peer assessment. These forms of 
data collection more likely represent teacher effectiveness over time, in multiple contexts, 
and one that has been socially determined than coming up with possible solutions to a 
problem. 
 Despite these positive correlations and successful research projects that have used 
DT tests as the main instrument, there is still much controversy about the usefulness of 
them in being able to predict real-world creativity (Sawyer, 2006; Zeng et al., 2011). DT 
tests have fallen under numerous attacks that often show the limitations of the practical 
value of them. For instance, Zeng and colleagues (2011) bring up an important issue of 
construct validity in DT tests. For as shown in this chapter, DT tests mainly score for 
originality and ideational fluency, but fail to address the “appropriateness” and 
“usefulness” part in the definition of creativity. In addition, DT tests often allude to being 
a good instrument for measuring the creative process, but again it falls short here, too. 
The creative process involves four steps: analysis, ideation, evaluation, and 
implementation. DT tests really only measures the ideational part (Zeng et al., 2011). 
Besides DT test’s overreliance on a narrow part of the creative process, others have even 
suggested that convergent thinking may prove to play just as large a role as divergent 
thinking for creativity (Basadur, Runco, & Vega, 2000; Cropley, 2006).  
 Nonetheless, DT tests are helpful in providing insight into part of the creative 
process (ideational fluency and originality of thought) and creative potential of the 
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individual. In this study, I developed two figural tasks from previous DT tests that aimed 
to measure the non-verbal side of ideational thought. I did not include any verbal DT 
tasks mainly because the participants already had to complete a large number of verbal 
tasks, in the way of the metaphor instruments developed in this study. As previously 
stated, when seeking to measure the multidimensional nature of creativity, it is important 
not only to rely on DT tests, but to use several instruments such as past creative 
achievements, personality, and creative production (Cropley, 2000; Furnham, Batey, 
Anand, & Manfield, 2008; Kim, 2006).  
4.2 PAST CREATIVE ACHIEVEMENT AND EVERYDAY CREATIVITY 
One way to measure the variance of creativity among individuals is to develop a creative 
achievement inventory. Such an instrument asks participants to reflect on and indicate 
past achievements in varying domains of experience, so these are often considered 
biographical self-reports that typically follow a questionnaire format. There is some 
evidence that supports this idea that creative people are aware of their own creativity 
(Barron & Harrington, 1981). Carson, Peterson, and Higgins (2005) developed a self-
rating inventory called The Creativity Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) and 
categorized such creative activities into 10 differing domains that then could be divided 
into two distinct dimensions: “Arts” and “Sciences”. For instance in the “Arts” dimension 
there are such domains as drama, writing, humor, music, visual arts, and dance. There are 
8 items within each domain that are weighed from “0” to “7” based on the level of 
creativity for each item (e.g., “I play one or more musical instruments proficiently” is “1” 
while “Recordings of my composition have been sold publicly” is “6” and “0” applies to 
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those who have no talent in this domain). One issue with the CAQ is that many of the 
items on it do not seem to be highly applicable for university students, but rather for 
older, more experienced and influential creative people or measuring what is known as 
“Big C”. For this study, I am mostly interested in little-c creativity, or everyday 
creativity, viewing it as a normally distributed cognitive trait that everyone has to some 
degree (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992). In addition, as Richards (2010) suggests 
“Everyday creativity can be seen as the ground from which (a later and) more publicly 
celebrated accomplishment can grow” (p. 193).  
 Other researchers have also tried to go beyond the “arts” and “sciences” dual 
focus dimensions of creativity and include more of this “everyday creativity” by 
including other items like “interaction”, which addresses such topics as teaching, playing 
with kids, leadership, and handling money issues (Kaufman, Cole, & Baer, 2009; 
Kaufman, Waterstreet, Ailabouni, Whitcomb, Roe, & Riggs, 2009). Hocevar (1980), who 
was actually one of the first to develop such an inventory to measure this everyday 
creativity, developed what he called the “Creativity Behavior Inventory” (CBI). This 
approach to assessing creativity relies on the belief that “past behavior is generally the 
best predictor of future behavior” (Hocevar, 1981, p. 459). Dollinger (2003) later further 
developed this original inventory. More recently, Batey (2007) developed his own more 
compact version called “The Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviors” (BICB), 
which is made up of 34 items. The items on this inventory seem more applicable to the 
participants in this thesis.  For instance, the participants are simply asked to put an “X” in 
the corresponding box if he/she has been involved in such an activity in the past 12 
months, which results in a simple binary 0/1 score for each item. Some examples of these 
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activities are; “Drawn a cartoon”, “Made someone a present”, and “Delivered a speech”, 
but the inventory also includes social creativity like leadership and mentoring. The BICB 
has been used in a number of recent studies providing empirical support for reliability 
and validity (Batey & Furnham, 2008; Batey, Furnham, & Safiullina, 2010; Furnham, 
Batey, Anand, & Manfield, 2008; Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, & O’Connor, 2009). 
Table 4.2 provides a more detailed look at some of these studies.  
TABLE 4.2: RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE BICB 
Study Using the BICB Reliability a Validity (Correlation to creativity) 
Furnham, Batey, Anand, and 
Manfield, 2008 0.74 
Divergent Thinking Fluency (r = 33**) 
Openness to Experience6 (r = .38**) 
Extraversion (r = .34**) 
Batey and Furnham, 2008) 0.78 Creative Personality Scale
7 (r = .34**) 
Batey, Furnham, and 
Safiullina, 2010 0.78 
Divergent Thinking Fluency (r = 0.21*) 
Openness to Experience (r = 0.33**) 
a Measured using Cronbach’s alpha 
r = Pearsons inter-correlations between BICB and various measures of creativity  
** Significant to p < 0.01   
* Significant to p < 0.05   
 
Silva and colleagues (2012) also in their assessment of creativity with self-report scales 
found that the BICB had a solid factor structure and internal consistency. Using such a 
questionnaire follows the belief that past creative behavior is predictive of future creative 
behavior and thus is commonly used in creativity research. In this study, adapting a 
number of items from the before mentioned biographical self-reports, I developed a 
                                                      
 
6 Openness to Experience and Extraversion are personality traits part of the Five Factor Model of personality. Openness is an especially common marker 
of a creative personality. I will discuss this more in the next section of this chapter. 
7 This was measured by using a famous though slightly outdated measure of the creative personality that uses a creative adjective check list where 
participants check adjectives they believe apply to their personality (Gough, 1979).  
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Japanese version of a Past Creative Achievement Questionnaire. I describe this form in 
greater depth in the following chapter.  
 The next section moves from past creative achievements to the creative person 
and addresses the strong relationship between the personality trait, openness to 
experiences, and various creativity measures.  
4.3 PERSONALITY TRAITS AND CREATIVITY 
Personality is something that distinguishes differences between people and refers to the 
relatively enduring and consistent set of behaviors, feelings, and thoughts that 
characterize an individual (Feist & Feist, 2009). Personality descriptions use trait words 
as the natural units to describe an individual’s personality and were first introduced by 
Allport (1937) and later developed by Cattell (1965, 1979) and Esysenck (1970). The 
discovery and development of research into personality traits materialized from the 
lexical hypothesis, which proposes that all the important personality traits appear within 
the lexical units of the different natural languages in the world. Allport and Odbert (1936) 
used Webster’s dictionary and browsed through the pages looking for words that 
described people and found nearly 18,000 words and roughly 4,500 of them actually 
described people’s personalities. Grouping these words together by synonyms and using 
semantic reduction steps, Cattell (1943) was able to organize these thousands of words 
into a more manageable set of variables to describe individual differences. Most of these 
clusters of personality traits were bipolar or consisted of two extremes and by the end he 
had 171 clusters that were condensed into 35 trait variables (e.g., Rigid – Adaptable 
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Silent, introspective – Talkative) (Cattell, 1947). Through the use of factor analytic 
studies of peer ratings of college students, he concluded, “the greater part of variance in 
the personality sphere can be accounted for by about 12 factors” (Cattell, 1947, p. 217). 
Eventually Cattell et al. (1970, 1993) developed an assessment with 16 primary factors 
and 5 global factors, which resulted in what is known as The Sixteen Personality Factor 
Questionnaire - 16PF. The following are the 16 factors: warmth, reasoning, emotional 
stability, dominance, liveliness, rule – consciousness, social boldness, sensitivity, 
vigilance, abstractedness, privateness, apprehension, openness to change, self-reliance, 
perfectionism, and tension. Below are the five global factors accompanied by the 16 
personality factors that correlate with them either positively (+) or negatively (–): 
• Extraversion (warmth +, liveliness +, social boldness +, privateness –, self-reliance –) 
• Anxiety (emotional stability –, vigilance +, apprehension +, tension +) 
• Self-Control (liveliness –, rule-consciousness +, abstractedness –, perfectionism +) 
• Independence (dominance +, social boldness +, vigilance +, openness to change +) 
• Tough-Mindedness (warmth –, sensitivity –, abstractedness –, openness to change +) 
 Yet many questioned the complexity of Cattell’s model, as Tupes and Christal 
(1961) found “five relatively strong and recurrent factors and nothing more of any 
consequence” (p. 245) and soon the number five and a five-factor model began to appear 
in a number of studies (Norman, 1963; Borgatta, 1964). Tupes and Christal subsequently 
labeled these five recurrent factors as: (a) Surgency, (b) Agreeableness, (c) 
Dependability, (d) Emotional Stability, and (e) Culture. The expansion and evolution of 
this five-factor model continued over the next couple decades. Despite the fact that most 
researchers agreed upon the number five, the names given to label them continued to be 
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disputed, especially in regards to the last factor (e) Culture. The first factor typically 
began to be called Extraversion, which was likely taken from Eysenck’s model that took 
a narrower approach to personality and proposed three superfactors consisting of: 
Neuroticism (stability/instability), Extraversion (introversion), and Psychoticism 
(aggressiveness) (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). The second factor also sometimes called 
“likeability” (Borgatta, 1964), but Agreeableness remained the most common label. The 
third label nowadays is often called Conscientiousness (Norman, 1963; Costa & McCrae, 
1985). The fourth label is often referred to with the bipolar label of Emotional Stability –  
Neoroticism. Finally the fifth label has been variously interpreted and called Intellect 
(Digman & Inouye, 1986; Goldberg, 1981); Intelligence (Borgatta, 1964) and finally 
Openness (Costa & McCrae, 1985). It is this final one that appears to have been the most 
widely accepted label and will be used in this thesis. In the 1980s and 90s Costa and 
McCrae (1985, 1992) used this five-factor model and designed a personality inventory 
called the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI) and an ensuing revised version (NEO-
PI-R). This model is often appropriately labeled the Big Five (Goldberg, 1990).  
 As a note, many of the personality inventories are proprietary instruments and 
thus restrictive for use in research. A public-domain website called the International 
Personality Item Pool (IPIP) provides online access to personality inventories that have 
been developed, refined and maintained by researchers and is in the public domain, so 
accessible and continually being updated (see Goldberg et al., 2006 or http://ipip.ori.org 
for more information).  
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4.3.1 PERSONALITY: THE BIG FIVE 
The Five-Factor Model (FFM) contends that from all the different ways to describe 
personality in ordinary language there are five dimensions that integrate these traits 
together (Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1997). This means that by way of 
factor analysis, five factors emerge from a variety of personality tests that aim to measure 
various personality constructs. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992) is one of the most widely used inventories for the FFM and consists of the 
following personality factors: 
• (O) Openness to Experience (curiousity, unconventionality versus a preference for the 
familiar) 
• (C) Conscientiousness (orderliness, discipline versus sloppiness, laziness, and unreliability) 
• (E) Extraversion (talkativeness, outgoingness versus shyness, quietness, and passivity) 
• (A) Agreeableness (kindness and gentleness versus rudeness and harshness) 
• (N) Neuroticism (moodiness, anxiety, and touchiness versus relaxedness) 
Each factor is based on the sum of responses on six subscales sometimes called facets. 
For example, the facets for Openness are the following: 
• Fantasy (vivid imagination) 
• Aesthetics (interest and appreciation for art, poetry, music and beauty) 
• Ideas (intellectual curiosity) 
• Actions (willingness to try new things and a preference for novelty and variety over familiarity) 
• Feelings (awareness and valuing of one’s emotions) 
• Values (questioning conventional norms and open to unconventional principles)  
(Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1997) 
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 The power of using measures of personality in research is that they often have 
predictability for real world outcomes (Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006). For example, 
Consciensciousness has been shown to be a significant predictor of academic success 
(Goff & Ackerman, 1992) and moderately predicts job related performance (Judge, 
Jackson, Shaw, Scott, & Rich, 2007). In contrast, Neuroticism has been shown to 
negatively affect performance on a math task (Schneider, 2004) and susceptibility to 
various mental disorders like depression and anxiety disorder (Hettema, Prescott, & 
Kendler, 2004). In regards to creativity, which is the main theme of this study, Openness 
to Experience deserves the most attention. This trait has consistently been shown to be 
positively related to creative potential (see Batey & Furnham, 2006). Individuals who 
score high on this trait have a proclivity to seek out new experiences and possess a 
curiosity and desire to explore the unfamiliar and a willingness to engage in the new, so 
discernibly a key personality trait for creativity. In the following part I look in more detail 
at various studies that have provided empirical evidence for this relationship between 
openness and creativitiy. 
Openness and Creativity 
Creativity is a latent trait that relies on the combination of numerous variables like the 
social, the cognitive, and personality. In regards to personality, Openness to Experience is 
a crucial trait for creativity and can predict creativity using a wide range of 
measurements. Table 4.3 lists a number of studies that have found positive correlations 
between this personality trait and a number of instruments used to measure the many 
difference facets of creativity.  
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TABLE 4.3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE AND VARIOUS CREATIVITY 
INSTRUMENTS 
Study Strength of relationship Creativity instrument 
McCrae (1987) 
r = 0.37 p < 0.01 
(Younger group of men) 
r = 0.42 p < 0.01 
(Older group of men) 
Divergent Thinking Test 
King, Walker, and 
Broyles (1996) 
 
r = 0.38 p < 0.01 
 
r = 0.47 p < 0.01 
TTCT (Torrance, 1990b) - verbal 
section of the test 
 
Creative Accomplishments (i.e., a list 
of accomplishments in visual arts, 
performance activities, writing, etc.) 
 
Chamorro Premuzic 
and Reichenbacher 
(2008) 
r = 0.55  p < 0.01 
(Stress inducing by threat 
of evaluation) 
r = 0.53 p < 0.01 
(Calm inducing by no 
evaluation) 
Divergent Thinking Test (verbal 
fluency and creative problem solving)  
Wolfradt and Pretz 
(2001) 
 
β = 0.19, p < 0.05 
 
β = 0.22, p < 0.05 
Creative writing task about a picture 
(consensually assessed by 2 blind 
raters on a 5-point scale) 
Creative hobby scale from high (e.g., 
painting, playing an instrument) to low 
(e.g., watching TV, reading) 
Furnham, Zhang, and 
Chamorro-Premuzic 
(2005) 
 
r = 0.31, p < 0.01 
β = 0.32, p < 0.01 
The Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Barron 
& Welsh, 1952) as a measure of 
creativity 
Silva et al. (2009) 
 
r = 0.63, p < 0.05 
 
r = 0.66, p = .05 
 
Creative Behavior Inventory 
(Dollinger, 2007)  
Global creativity 
Hughes, Furnham, and 
Batey (2013) 
 
β = 0.56, p < 0.01 Self-estimated Creativity 
r = measures the correlation between two variables  
β = standardized regression coefficient and measures how strongly the predictor variable (i.e., 
openness to experience) influences the criterion variable (i.e., scores on the creative writing task) 
 The consensus in all of these studies is that Openness can perhaps be 
conceptualized as a proxy measure of creativity (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2007). The close 
and consistent relationship Openness has to a wide range of creative instruments that 
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measure creative potential (divergent thinking), creative products (written stories) and 
creative achievement (self rated questionnaires of past experiences) provides substantial 
evidence that it is a valid tool to measure the creative personality. As some creative 
measurements like the divergent thinking tasks might point towards an individual’s 
creative potential, openness to experience is really the catalyst that leads to creative 
explorations (McCrae, 1987).  
Big 5: Across Languages and Cultures 
McCrae & Costa (1999) claim that these five traits are endogenous traits that have 
biological origins and thus universally shared. In addition, they have been researched and 
observed in a range of different languages and across numerous cultures (McCrae & 
Terracciano, 2005; Yamagata et al., 2006). So this personality model appears to be valid 
cross-culturally. For instance in Japan, a number of Big Five scales have been translated 
and validated over the past two decades under such names as the Big Five Scale (BFS) 
(Wada, 1996); the Big Five (Murakami & Murakami, 1999) and the NEO-PI-R 
(Shimonaka et al., 1998). Below are the 5 factors with the corresponding Japanese, some 
of the factors (similar to what occurred in English as previously mentioned) have varying 
names depending on the source (e.g., Conscientiousness: 勤勉性 [kinbennsei] and 誠実
性 [seijitsusei]), for the sake of simplicity I use the 5 factors based on NEO-PI-R 
(Shimonaka et al., 1998): 
• 開放性 [kaihousei] (Openness) 
• 誠実性 [seijitsusei] (Conscientiousness) 
• 外向性 [gaikousei] (Extroversion) 
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• 協調性 [kyouchousei] (Agreeableness) 
• 神経症傾向 [shinkeishou keikou] (Neuroticism) 
These scales are commonly used in Japan (Namikawa et al., 2012) and for this thesis I 
rely mostly on the NEO-PI-R items (Shomonaka et al., 1998). In this study, I developed a 
unique Five-Factor Model of the creative personality. I describe how I developed this in 
more detail in the following chapter. 
4.3.2 THE CREATIVE PERSONALITY: BEYOND THE BIG FIVE 
In the previous section, I presented the close relationship Openness has to various 
measures of creativity, but there are also other personality traits that are equally important 
for creativity that are not included in the Five Factor model. In this section, I explore a 
number of other variables indicative to an overall creative person. This is not an 
exhaustive taxonomy, but still thorough and expansive and goes beyond Openness. The 
ones that I focus on here are: Self-Efficacy, Persistence, Intrinsic Motivation, Curiosity, 
and Tolerance of Ambiguity. In Chapter 5, I describe how I used these factors in an 
exploratory study from which I developed a creative personality instrument that was used 
in this thesis in order to measure the multifaceted nature of the creative person.  
Self-Efficacy 
The construct, self-efficacy, developed from the work of Bandura (1977, 1997), refers to 
the belief that one has the capabilities to do a certain behavior, which then in turn affects 
activity choice, the amount of effort exerted in doing it, and the persistence in doing it in 
the face of difficulties. Bandura and Locke (2003) suggest, “a resilient sense of efficacy 
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provides the necessary staying power in the arduous pursuit of innovation and 
excellence” (p. 97). From Bandura’s (1997) broad self-efficacy construct, Tierney and 
Farmer (2002) developed a variant construct of this and called it, creative self-efficacy. 
This, they refer to as “the belief one has the ability to produce creative outcomes” 
(Tierney & Farmer, 2002, p. 1138). Creative self-efficacy is often applied to work-related 
research and the judgment one holds towards having the capacity to do one’s job 
creatively. Empirical research shows that creative self-efficacy acts as a mediator 
between creative potential and creative achievement (Choi, 2004; Schack, 1989; Tierney 
& Farmer, 2002) and may actually be a necessary precursor of creative effort (Tierney & 
Farmer, 2002).  
 Apart from work done with creative self-efficacy in job related environments, 
others have also looked at it from an educational perspective. For instance, Choi’s (2004) 
study with undergraduate students, creative self-efficacy was positively significantly 
related to creative performance (as measured by instructors rating students’ classroom-
based creative performances) and creative ability (as measured from a five-item self-
reported assessment of creativity-relevant skills) (β = 0.34, p = 0.001, and β = 0.30, p = 
0.001, respectively). Other studies have also found similar positive relationships such as 
teachers’ ratings of creative expression (i.e., expressing ideas that are novel and 
appropriate for the given task) in science and students’ creative self-efficacy in science (β 
 = 0.16, p = 0.01) (Beghetto, Kaufman, & Baxter, 2011). 
 To measure creative self-efficacy, a variety of items have been developed and 
administered in different situations. Karwowski and colleagues (2013) used a scale 
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labeled the Short Scale of Creative Self (SSCS), which is composed of 11 items and six 
are used to measure creative self-efficacy such as: (3) I know I can efficiently solve even 
complicated problems; (4) I trust my creative abilities; (9) I am good at proposing 
original solutions to problems (p. 222). In another study, seeking to measure this 
construct with middle and secondary school students, Beghetto (2006) used the following 
three items: (1) I am good at coming up with new ideas, (2) I have a lot of good ideas, 
and (3) I have a good imagination (p. 450). In addition, Choi (2004) used a four-item 
measure for creative self-efficacy and provided the following two examples: (1) I feel 
confident that I can introduce new ideas to the class in a convincing manner and (2) I feel 
nervous when I present different views to classmates (reverse coded) (p.193). Lastly 
Beghetto and colleagues (2011) developed a very specific creative self-efficacy scale for 
a Science class using such items as: (1) I am good at coming up with new ideas during 
science class; (3) I have a lot of good ideas during science class; (4) I am good at coming 
up with my own science experiments (p. 8). What the literature implies from the above 
examples is that when developing items to measure creative self-efficacy, it is important 
to consider the specificity or generalizability of self-efficacy. Specific self-efficacy 
“operates selectively across different activity domains and under different situational 
demands” (Bandura, 1997, p.42), while viewed as a generalized trait consists of viewing 
it as “one’s overall estimate of one’s ability” (Eden & Zuk, 1995, p. 629). Self-efficacy is 
an important individual difference for it provides the individual with the belief that one 
has the potential and capabilities to engage in some creative activity. So self-efficacy can 
influence one’s willingness to engage in a behavior and it potentially acts as a catalyst for 
the generation of some creative product. The second item that I address in this section is 
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persistence, which provides the patience and endurance to overcome the various 
impediments that one often faces when doing something creative.  
Persistence 
For Eysenck (1995), creative achievement depends on a number of factors converging 
together such as: cognitive abilities, which involves having knowledge and technical 
skills; environmental variables, which may include education and the socio-economic 
environment; and personality traits like motivation, confidence, originality, and 
persistence (p.38). It is persistence that sustains one’s involvement in the activity, 
prevents premature closure when confronted by an obstacle or hardship, and maintains 
the intensity and effort in order to reach some directed goal. In fact, persistence is one of 
the key observable features of any goal-directed behavior (Gollwitzer, Parks-Stamm, 
Jaudas, & Sheeran, 2008). In studies that consisted of interviewing highly creative 
people, the researchers found that perseverance was a consistent personality trait of these 
individuals (Adelson, 2003; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). 
 This willingness to expend effort is characteristic of the creative individual 
(Cropley, 1997, p. 236) and this drive and exertion, even in the face of difficulty, is 
essential for creative discovery. This perseverance in childhood is more predictive of 
success than IQ or domain specific ability (Winner, 1996, p. 293). This word, persistence, 
though has many faces like grit (Duckworth et al., 2007), tenacity, and gambare. Ganbaru 
(a Japanese word 頑張る), which literally means “work hard”, “try hard”, “make an 
effort” or to “persevere with something” is considered the key to successful school life in 
Japan, more so than being original (Taylor et al., 1997). 
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 Nijstad and colleagues (2010) developed a dual pathway model of creativity in 
which they argue that creative problems solving, which results in the generation of 
original and appropriate ideas, proceeds through two pathways, cognitive flexibility and 
cognitive persistence. They describe cognitive persistence as “the degree of sustained and 
focused task-directed cognitive effort” (p. 42).  
 In order to measure such cognitive effort, Lufi & Cohen (1987) developed a 40-
item true/false response scale for determining persistence in the academic field. Items on 
this scale include: 
• I often do not complete many activities I begin. (reverse) 
• I usually persist in what I am doing.  
• I usually give up easily when I do not success. (reverse) 
• I do not stop my work even if it is very difficult.  
In their study, they provide further support for the idea that persistence is significantly 
correlated with internal locus of control (Lufi & Cohen, 1987; Mischel, Zeiss, & Zeiss, 
1974). People tend to persist more in an activity when they feel that they are in control. 
On the other hand, when the control is seen as being external or controlled by others, 
people tend to persist less. So persistence is closely linked to motivation and goal directed 
behavior, which I discuss in the next section.  
Motivation 
Motivation within a framework of creativity research usually focuses on distinguishing 
between what has become known as intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, as put forth in 
self-determination theory (SDT) (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000). An 
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intrinsically motivated individual performs a task not for some outcome or reward, but 
simply from the satisfaction, stimulation, and sense of accomplishment from doing the 
activity or doing an activity for its own sake (Deci & Ryan, 1985). An extrinsically 
motivated individual is controlled by an incentive or reward, so the behavior is directed 
not out of a sense of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) and fascination with the task, but by 
some external force. Amabile (1983, 1996) has shown that even if individuals have traits 
and abilities that are conducive for creativity, without intrinsic motivation, any such 
creative achievement will unlikely come to fruition. On the other hand, extrinsic 
motivation and the expectation of an award is believed to play a detrimental role by 
reducing intrinsic motivation and actually undermining creativity for it makes the 
individual less likely to take a risk and playfully explore the task (Hennessey & Amabile, 
1998; Tegano, Moran, & Sawyers, 1991). Yet this is rather contentious for a number of 
studies have also pointed out that extrinsic motivation (along with intrinsic motivation) 
has an incremental effect on creativity (Eisenberger, & Cameron, 1996; Eisenberger & 
Rhoades, 2001; Choi, 2004).  
 Nonetheless intrinsic motivation is an important facet for creativity and has a 
mediating effect on it by encouraging exploration and persistence of the task (Prabhu, 
Sutton, & Sauser, 2008). Positive correlations have been reported between intrinsic 
motivation and various creativity measurements like creativity self-beliefs (Prabhu et al., 
2008) and a creative product (Chen et al., 2006). Amabile and colleagues (1994) 
developed a Work Preference Inventory to measure intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
The intrinsic motivation scale is a 15-item inventory that uses a 4-point Likert scale with 
a range from “never or almost never true of me” to “always or almost always true of me”. 
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These items seek to measure key features of intrinsic motivation such as: autonomy, 
competence, task absorption, curiosity, and interest (Amabile et al., 1994). Below are 
some sample items that appear in this inventory that look at intrinsic motivation: 
• I enjoy trying to solve complex problems. 
• No matter what the outcome of a project, I am satisfied if I feel I gained a new 
experience. 
In their study (Amabile et al., 1994), they found overwhelming empirical evidence that 
intrinsic motivation correlated positively with creativity using a wide range of 
measurement to assess creativity such as several writing measures and one artistic 
measure. Chen and colleagues (2006) also used this above Work Preference Inventory to 
measure intrinsic motivation in their study. They found good internal consistency 
between the measures (Cronbach α = 0.70 for the intrinsic motivation scale, Cronbach α 
=0.77 for the extrinsic motivation). Similarly, they found that intrinsic motivation had 
strong correlation (r = 0.37, p < .01) for verbal creativity, which was measured with a 
story and poem writing task. In another study (Prabhu et al., 2008) that used the same 
inventory to measure intrinsic motivation, they also found strong correlations between 
intrinsic motivation and creativity (r = 0.39, p < 0.01), as well as, Openness to 
Experience (r = 0.35, p < 0.01). 
 Valerand and colleagues (1992) developed their own Academic Motivation Scale 
based on SDT. This is a 28-item instrument that measures amotivation, various forms of 
extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation. They classified three different types of 
intrinsic motivation as follows: intrinsic motivation to know (IM-K), which involves 
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exploration, curiosity, desire to learn, and pleasure of acquiring new knowledge (e.g., I 
am studying at university simply because I enjoy learning new things); intrinsic 
motivation towards accomplishments (IM-A), which involves in engaging in an activity 
for the pleasure and satisfaction of mastering or becoming more competent at something 
(e.g., I feel a sense of accomplishment when I grasp a difficult construct in a lesson); and 
intrinsic motivation to experience stimulation (IM-S), which involves engaging in 
experiences for the stimulation that it provides, this can include joy, pleasure, excitement, 
or a sense of flow (e.g., I often am absorbed in my studies and lose track of time). So this 
provides some structure to intrinsic motivation, as something that involves the desire to 
know new things; the desire to become competent and the satisfying experience derived 
from accomplishing something difficult and complex; and the seeking out of new and 
novel experiences and the heightened sense of feeling a “high” sensation in doing so. The 
advantage of having high intrinsic motivation is what Amabile (1996) has called the 
“Intrinsic Motivation Principle of Creativity” and therefore it is a key trait when 
assessing the creative personality. In the next section, I look at curiosity, which is highly 
related to intrinsic motivation and that thirst to know and experience the unfamiliar. 
Curiosity 
Curiosity plays an important part in cognitive development and the overall advancement 
of civilization (Berlyne, 1978). Early views towards curiosity viewed it as the “appetite 
for knowledge” or “thirst for knowledge” (see Loewenstein, 1994) and so it is an 
approach-oriented, as compared to an avoidance-oriented, motivational state (Arnold, 
1910) that involves a passion and desire to know. A more current view of curiosity 
defines it as “the recognition, pursuit, and intense desire to explore novel, challenging, 
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and uncertain events” (Kashidan & Silvia, 2009, p.368). Furthermore Litman and 
Spielberger (2003, p. 75) suggest that it is, “a desire to acquire new [information and] 
knowledge and new sensory experience that motivates exploratory behavior”. Berlyne 
(1954) suggested curiosity be viewed according to two differing dimensions, “epistemic” 
(knowledge), which is a “drive to know”, and “perceptual” (sensory), which is a “drive to 
experience and feel” (p. 187). In addition to distinguishing between, knowledge seeking 
and sensation seeking differences in curiosity, curiosity can also be divided between state 
and trait curiosity. State is the response to a particular event, stimuli, or situation that 
involves novelty and complexity. Trait curiosity is the more broad individual difference 
that differentiates the capacity individuals have in exploratory and novel seeking 
behavior.  
 There are a number of instruments that aim to measure curiosity. One of the 
earlier ones is called the Melbourne Curiosity Inventory (MCI; Naylor, 1981). In this 
instrument, there are 20 items that measure state (C-state) and 20 items that measure trait 
(C-trait) curiosity on a 4-point Likert scale. The state scale, since it deals with curiosity in 
a particular situation, needs to be administered in the context of some activity (e.g., a 
foreign language class). One item on the C-trait scale reads, “I am curious about things”, 
which is a more general capacity to experience curiosity. In contrast, the C-state scale 
slightly modifies the previous item and reads, “I feel curious about what is happening” 
referring to the current activity or situation. For the purposes of this thesis since I was 
looking at individual differences, I only concentrated on trait curiosity.  
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 Litman and Spielberger (2003) developed a curiosity scale with 56 items, 40 for 
epistemic (EC) and 16 for perceptual curiosity (PC) (the 16 PC items were developed by 
Collins, 1996). Subjects respond using a 4-point Likert scale on how they “generally 
feel” ranging from 1 (almost never), 2 (sometimes), 3 (often), to 4 (almost always). Some 
of these items are as follows: 
• Enjoy exploring new ideas (EC) 
• Enjoy learning about subjects which are unfamiliar (EC) 
• Interested in discovering how things work (EC) 
• I like to listen to new and unusual kinds of music (PC) 
 
Kashdan and colleagues (2004) developed a curiosity inventory called the Curiosity and 
Exploration Inventory (CEI) with two dimensions: “exploration (appetitive strivings for 
novelty and challenge) and absorption (full engagement in specific activities)” (p. 291). A 
7-point Likert scale with descriptors from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) was used in their study. An example of an “Exploration” 
item is as follows: “I frequently find myself looking for new opportunities to grow as a 
person (e.g., information, people, resources)” and an example of an “Absorption” item is: 
“When I am participating in an activity, I tend to get so involved that I lose track of 
time”.  
 Curiosity plays an important role in academic achievement and creativity since it 
involves exploring the unknown or the novel. One possibility for this is that curiosity 
increases activity in memory areas of the brain, as assessed by fMRI, and consequently 
may enhance memory (Kang et al., 2009). Later they confirmed this hypothesis in a 
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behavioral study that showed those who showed higher amounts of curiosity in an initial 
session had better recall 1 to 2 weeks later. Curiosity and effort have also been shown to 
have an equal impact, as intelligence, on academic performance (Stumm, Hell, & 
Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011). Since curiosity plays an active role in intellectual 
development and the desire to explore and engage with the novel, it is paramount for 
creativity. Curiosity is the tendency to try and make sense of the world and resolve 
incongruities (Loewenstein, 1994, p. 82). Novel metaphors violate expectations and are 
incongruous in their nature, so it could be assumed that curiosity, as an individual 
difference, could play a role in the exploratory behavior of producing and interpreting 
novel and unconventional metaphors, as well. This leads to the final construct in this 
section, tolerance of ambiguity, or the preference and attraction towards the uncertain.  
Tolerance of Ambiguity 
Tolerance of ambiguity (AT) refers to the capacity to withstand or “tolerate” ambiguous 
situations that often involve novelty and contradictions and lack structure. Those who are 
intolerant find such situations as a source of psychological discomfort, while those who 
are tolerant find them desirable and interesting. Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) began research 
into the construct of tolerance of ambiguity as an “emotional and perceptual personality 
variable” and many others have continued to pursue this topic (Budner, 1962; 
MacDonald, 1970; Norton, 1975). Norton (1975) provides a comprehensive list of items 
that cause psychological discomfort for someone who is intolerant of ambiguity such as 
“vague, incomplete, fragmented, multiple, probable, unstructured, uncertain, inconsistent, 
contrary, contradictory, or unclear meanings” (p. 608). Feist (1999) in his review of 
dispositional characteristics of creative scientists and artists revealed that they had the 
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tendency for high levels of tolerance for ambiguity along with other characteristics like 
energy, autonomy, and openness. In fact tolerance of ambiguity consistently shows up in 
a wide range of studies as a trait of creative people (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Feist, 
1998; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988). Situations that involve creative thinking often are 
ambiguous in nature for they require the individual to explore the novel, complex, 
contradictory or unusual stimuli (Urban, 2003; Zenasni, Besançon, & Lubart, 2008).  
 There have been a number of scales developed to measure tolerance of ambiguity. 
Budner (1962) distinguished between three types of ambiguous situaitons: novelty, 
complexity, and insolubility (p.30), which may cause various forms of behavior such as 
avoidance, repression and denial, or discomfort and anxiety. He developed a 16-item (8 
reverse) scale for measuring tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity, which was designed to 
assess responses to different ambiguous situations (e.g., novelty, complextiy, 
insolubility). Below are some items that appeared on the original scale (Budner, 1962): 
• A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at 
things. 
• It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. 
• I would like to live in a foreign country for a while. 
Rydell-Rosen (1962) also developed a 16-item scale that was later modified into a 20-
item scale (MacDonald, 1970) with items such as: 
• A problem has little attraction for me if I don't think it has a solution. 
• I am just a little uncomfortable with people unless I feel that I can understand 
their behavior. 
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• There is a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything. 
 
Norton (1975) the developed a more in-depth scale called the Measure of Ambiguity 
Tolerance (MAT-50). He lists 61 items categorically placed in 8 categories such as job-
related and everyday habits. He showed the construct validity of this scale through 
various experiments that showed it had predicative power. For instance, those who scored 
high on tolerance of ambiguity tended to volunteer for undefined experiments more 
readily; used a different set of aesthetic judgments when evaluating a piece of art as good 
(“unusual” for high AT while “complete” for low AT); and tended to dramatize more in 
small problem solving groups (p. 616-618). Some items on this scale are as follows:  
• I tend to like obscure or hidden symbolism.   
• I will not consider buying an item unless the price is clearly marked on it.  
• I seem to enjoy parties the most when I know most of the people there.  
 
 Tolerance of ambiguity provides one the flexibility to deal with antimonies and 
paradoxes, which are an essential part of creativity. A number of empirical studies have 
found AT to be related to a number of measurements for creativity. Merrifield and 
colleagues (1961), to which they describe tolerance of ambiguity as “a readiness to accept 
indefiniteness”, found in their study to be correlated with association fluency (r = 0.15) 
and originality (r = 0.12). Although these results are not a strong correlation, in another 
study, Tegano (1990) found that AT was significantly correlated to a creative style index 
(r = 0.31, p > 0.01). Brophy (2001) looked at the relationship between convergent 
performance, which relies on logical and analytical skills, and divergent thinking, which 
relies on ideation fluency and analogical reasoning, with tolerance of ambiguity. He 
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found those who had high ambiguity tolerance scores did significantly better on the 
divergent performance tasks than the convergent performance tasks; while those with low 
ambiguity tolerance, the opposite was true. Comadena (1984) looked at the relationship 
of creative performance of undergraduates during brainstorming sessions and observed 
that AT was positively related with the number of ideas generated (ideational fluency). In 
a more recent study, Zenasni and colleagues (2008) found that tolerance of ambiguity 
was moderatley and significanlty linked to flunecy, as measured by divergent thinking 
tasks (r = 0.36, p < 0.01). In addition, tolerance of ambiguity is often correlated positively 
with other constructs like willingness to take risks and receptiveness to change, which are 
also viewed as important traits for creativity, while negatively to dogmatism (Norton, 
1975; McLain, 1993). Given these results, it appears that tolerance of ambiguity plays an 
important role as a personality trait and has predictive force for creativity mostly in 
regards to ideational fluency, risk taking, and openness to the novel and unfamiliar.  
Summary 
In summary, as can be viewed in this section, there are a number of important individual 
differences to consider when looking at the creative person, beyond the personality 
factor, openness to experience. Though this list (self-efficacy, persistence, intrinsic 
motivation, curiosity and tolerance of ambiguity) is far from a comprehensive list of 
personality factors related to creativity, they have all been shown to have strong 
correlations to various measurements of it. Figure 4.1 illustrates this relationship. 
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 Figure 4.1: Illustration of individual difference factors of a creative person 
 In short, for this study, as described in detail in the following chapters, I designed 
two sets of creative personality questionnaires. The first questionnaire used items from 
the five-factor model of personality. The second questionnaire used the before mentioned 
traits (e.g., self-efficacy) to develop a set of items that looked at the creative personality 
from multiple trait dimensions. In the next subsection, I move from personality to the 
creative self-belief system.   
4.4 CREATIVE SELF-BELIEFS: “YES I AM CREATIVE”  
People have a tendency to assess or consider their physical and mental abilities when 
confronted by tasks that are both novel and routine (Ackerman & Wolman, 2007). This 
leads to self-estimates of cognitive and other competencies and characteristics that 
constitute a self-concept. The question that often is raised is: how reliably do people 
provide self-estimates for a creative activity like “writing a poem”? When completing a 
self-estimate questionnaire, people often are susceptible to suffering from what is known 
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as the better-than-average effect. This self-serving effect reflects the tendency for people 
to evaluate themselves more favorably than others on behaviors and trait ratings (Alicke, 
Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995). Despite this obvious possibility and 
the intuitive skepticism towards self-evaluative questionnaires, a number of studies that 
have used such instruments have found them to have high predictability on creativity 
scores (see Table 4.4 for a list of some of these studies).  
TABLE 4.4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF RATED MEASURES OF CREATIVTY AND OTHER 
MEASURES OF CREATIVE POTENTIAL 
Study Strength of relationship Creativity instrument 
Furnham, Crawshaw, 
and Rawles (2006) r = 0.27, p < 0.05 
The Barron Welsh Art Scale 
Furnham and Bachtiar 
(2008) r = 0.18, p < 0.05 Divergent Thinking Test 
Furnham, Batey, Anand, 
and Manfield (2008) r = 0.18, p < 0.05 Divergent Thinking Test 
Putwain, Kearsley, and 
Symes (2012) 
r = 0.36, p < 0.01 
r = 0.32, p < 0.01 
r = 0.28, p < 0.01 
r = 0.29, p < 0.01 
Intrinsic motivation 
Extrinsic motivation 
Fluid intelligence8 
Literacy Achievement 
 Even though research is still relatively scarce, these types of self-rating 
assessments are often correlated with other important factors related to creativity (e.g., 
intrinsic motivation, divergent thinking, and fluid intelligence). Next I describe some 
scales that have been developed in order to look at ways to measure such creative self-
ratings.  
                                                      
 
8 Fluid intelligence (gf) refers to the ability to solve novel problems such as those that require deductive and inductive reasoning (McGrew, 2005). It is 
often measured by a test called the Ravens’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2004) where subjects view a group of patterns with 
one section missing and they have to select from a list of possible elements the one that would keep the pattern consistent and whole.   
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 Kaufman and Baer (2004) developed a self-rated questionnaire that measured the 
subjects’ beliefs in their creativity in various domains. In this first version, called the 
Creativity Scale for Different Domains (CSDD), only 10 items were used and they were 
scored on a 5-point scale. Each item represents a different domain such as: science, 
managing interpersonal relationships, writing, art, interpersonal communication, solving 
one’s own personal problems, mathematics, crafts (e.g., woodworking, sewing, repairing 
things, building things, cooking, etc.), and bodily/physical movement (e.g., dance, sports, 
etc.). An example for managing interpersonal relationships is as follows,  “How creative 
are you in the area of managing interpersonal relationships?”. In addition, there is one 
global item that addresses one’s overall general belief in one’s creativity. Furnham 
(2000) and Furnham and colleagues (2005) provide a slightly different approach to 
measuring creativity from a self-rating perspective in a questionnaire format called the 
Self-Estimates of Creativity (SEC). The items in this questionnaire were based on 
Gardner’s Multiple Intelligences. The researchers simply replaced the word 
“intelligence” with “creativity”. Therefore this questionnaire used the following 
categories: verbal or linguistic creativity, logical or mathematical creativity, spatial 
creativity, musical creativity, body-kinesthetic creativity, interpersonal creativity, and 
intrapersonal creativity. Subjects rated how creative they perceived themselves to be in 
each of these categories.   
 Later Kaufman (2006) further developed his inventory and expanded it to 56-
items, which he called the Creativity Domain Questionnaire (CDQ), he subsequently 
through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis determined seven general thematic 
areas of creative performance: Artistic-Verbal, Artistic-Visual, Entrepreneur, 
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Interpersonal, Math/Science, Performance, and Problem-Solving. This questionnaire was 
revised and shortened to 21-items that loaded onto 4 factors as can be viewed in Table 
4.5 (Kaufman, Cole, & Baer, 2009). Each item is completed on a six-point scale ranging 
from 1 “Not at all creative” to 6 “Extremely creative”.  
TABLE 4.5: 21-ITEMS AND 4 FACTORS IN THE REVISED CREATIVITY DOMAIN QUESTIONNAIRE 
(CDQ-R, KAUFMAN ET AL., 2009) 
 
Drama 
1) Acting 
2) Dancing 
3) English literature/criticism 
4) Keeping a journal/blog 
5) Vocal performance/singing 
6) Writing poetry/prose 
Math/science 
7) Algebra/geometry 
8) Chemistry 
9) Computers/computer science 
10) Life sciences/biology 
11) Logic/puzzles 
12) Mechanical abilities 
Arts 
13) Crafts 
14) Interior design/decorating 
15) Painting/drawing 
Interaction 
16) Leadership  
17) Money management 
18) Playing with children 
19) Selling people things 
20) Solving personal problems 
21) Teaching/education 
Note: The four domain scores can be averaged to obtain a global creativity score. The items and 
instructions are published in Kaufman and colleagues (2009) 
 Kaufman (2012) more recently developed a self-report instrument called the 
Kaufman Domains of Creativity Scale (K-DOCS), which has 50-items that look at 
everyday creativity from different domain-specific perspectives. Similar to other self-
report measures, subjects are asked to reflect and compare how creative they would rate 
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themselves as compared to other similarly aged individuals on a 5-point scale. The K-
DOCS has five factors: Self/Everyday (e.g., “Teaching someone how to do something”), 
Scholarly (e.g., “Debating a controversial topic from my own perspective”), Performance 
(encompassing writing and music) (e.g., “Shooting a fun video to air on YouTube”), 
Mechanical/Scientific (e.g., “Writing a computer program”), and Artistic (e.g., 
“Sketching a person or object”). This approach focuses on the domain relevance or 
domain specific nature of creativity, which views creativity not as a general all 
encompassing trait, but highly influenced by a domain. For example, one study (Jeon, 
Moon, & French, 2011) found that domain knowledge in math explained more of the 
variance in creative performance in math than divergent thinking, but in art the reverse 
was true. So domain knowledge likely plays an important factor for creativity in some 
fields, especially ones like math and science, as the above style of questionnaires 
demonstrated.  
 In summary, as can be seen from the above review, there are a number of 
different ways to self-estimate or self-evaluate one’s perceived creativity by way of a 
questionnaire and such a method has increased in popularity and use over the past few 
decades and is still being developed and tested. The main differences appear to be length 
(ranging from 10 to 56 items) and the domains (artistic to mechanical or more general) 
used in the questionnaires. Although such a method may seem flawed due to the obvious 
problems associated with such questionnaires, as people are likely to amplify and 
overestimate their creative abilities when asked to compare themselves to others, these 
instruments have been shown to correlate well with other creative tests and personality 
instruments.  
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 In order to look at the multiple dimensions of creativity, I developed a number of 
questionnaires for this study. In this subsection, I outlined the importance of self-beliefs 
in regards to creativity. Consequently, I developed a creative self-beliefs questionnaire 
for this study in Japanese, which is described in detail in the following chapter. In the 
next section, I look at the final part for assessing creativity and some say the most 
important for it looks directly at some perceivable product that the participant actually 
produces within the experimental setting.  
4.5 HAIKU: A SHORT POEM AS A CREATIVE PRODUCT 
The final way of assessing creativity in this thesis is through a creative product. The 
creative product is often viewed as the source for any study on creativity. For example, 
Mackinnon (1987) contends that “the starting point, indeed the bedrock of all studies of 
creativity, is an analysis of creative products, a determination of what it is that makes 
them different from more mundane products” (p.120). So in essence, to be creative, one 
has to produce a creative product that is distinguishable and assessable like a short story, 
a poem, a drawing, or a sketch of an invention. The limitations of the experimental 
condition (time, resources, space, etc.) restrict what kind of products can be included in 
any study. Some have used collages or storytelling as a creative product task (Baer, 
1993). Still others have used captions for pictures (Kaufman, Lee, Baer, & Lee, 2007) or 
poetry (Amabile, 1996; Kaufman, Baer, Cole, & Sexton, 2008). All of these different 
methods aim to get the participants to quickly produce some product that then could be 
assessed for creativity. Naturally all of them have the limitation of forcing an individual 
to be creative on the spot. It is this last method (poetry writing) that deserves more 
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attention since it is the method that I used in this research. Both Amabile (1996) and 
Kaufman and colleagues (2008) developed their own quasi-haiku form respectively 
called the “American Haiku” and the “SciFaiku”.  
 Haiku has become a popular form of writing poetry and continues to generate a 
wide amount of interest in Euopre, the Americas, and other parts of Asia. School children 
outside of Japan often learn about it and practice writing it in class. This interest and 
fascinatation with haiku can be summarized by Blyth (1952) as follows:  
It is not merely the brevity by which [the haiku] isolates a particular group of 
phenomena from all the rest; nor its suggestiveness, through which it reveals a 
whole world of experience. It is not only in its remarkable use of the season 
word, by which it gives us a feeling of a quarter of the year; nor its faint all-
pervading humour. Its peculiar quality is its self-effacing, self-annihilative 
nature, by which it enables us, more than any other form of literature, to grasp the 
thing-in-itself (Blyth, 1952, pp. vol. 4, p. 980).  
Japanese haiku (俳句 – haiku) are inherently short, simple, and profound and typically 
follow three important rules: haiku should have 17 syllables with a 5 – 7 – 5 pattern; 
haiku should contain a “cutting word” (切れ字 – kireji) that combines the two elements; 
and haiku should contain a seasonal word (季語 – kigo). Although these rules, especially 
the 17 syllables, have been questioned as being a necessary feature of this style of poetry, 
as haiku became internationally popular and began to be written in many different 
languages. In fact, Ross (1993) even suggests that the more recent generation of 
American poets have “through experimentation all but obliterated the requisite form and 
substance of classic Japanese haiku: there is a consistent lack of seasonal references, 
surrealist techniques and figurative expression are introduced” (p. xxiii). As haiku crossed 
borders it took on new forms and lost some of the rules associated with it and yet in its 
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economically minimal form, “haiku should leave the reader wondering” (Blasko & Merski, 
1998, p. 40). Creative researchers took this form of poetry and altered it to fit their paradigm 
of research as a viable creative product. For instance, Amabile (1982, 1996) developed her 
“American Haiku” with the following instructions for the participants: 
The instructions presented to subjects asked them to write a simple form of 
unrhymed poetry consisting of five lines: line I is a single noun; line 2 consists of 
two adjectives describing the noun; line 3 consists of three verb forms relating to 
the noun; line 4 contains any number of words (a phrase or sentence about the 
noun); and line 5 repeats the noun of line 1. For the poem they wrote at the 
beginning of the experimental session, subjects were given "Snow" as the first 
(and last) line (Amabile, 1985, p. 396) 
She states “the format of the poem, this uniform theme was used in an effort to reduce 
variability and simplify creativity assessment” (p. 396). Kaufman and colleagues (2008) 
also created their own haiku form that also seeks to limit the theme of the poem by 
narrowing the range of topics to Science Fiction, which they playfully call SciFaiku. 
Below are the instructions and an example: 
SciFaiku is a form of poetry derived from haiku, a traditional Japanese poetry 
form composed of three lines of less than 17 syllables. The topic is science 
fiction. It strives for a directness of expression and beauty in its simplicity. 
SciFaiku also frequently strives for insightful commentary on the human 
condition. Here is an example: 
on blackhole’s edge 
indecision 
drifts me in  (Kaufman et al., 2008 p. 177) 
Haiku or writing a short poem is one example of a creative product used in creativity 
research. The biggest drawback with such a task is its high reliance on domain specific 
creativity. That is to say, it really focuses narrowly on literature, creative writing, and 
language competencies, as compared to other forms of creativities often found in math, 
the sciences, the digital world, and other domains. Undeniably, choosing a creative 
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product as a task in an experiment is a difficult choice and there are a number of 
constraints in the experimental setting, most notably material available to the participants 
and time. Despite these limitations, approaching creativity in a multifaceted way, it is 
important to use some type of product that provides an observable variable, as compared 
to solely relying on scores taken from questionnaires or self-report scales. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1999) notes ideational fluency and openness to many ideas are good 
and valued personality traits, but “that objective quality called ‘creativity’ is revealed in 
the products, and that judges and raters can recognize it” (p. 314). This recognition of 
creativity by others is a crucial step in the creative process and in the next section I 
describe a technique that has been developed to do just this.  
4.5.1 THE CONSENSUAL ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE: USING JUDGES AS EVALUATORS 
OF CREATIVITY 
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter on metaphor, evaluating the creativity of a 
product like a poem or a metaphor is a difficult and challenging endeavor (as compared 
to conventional metaphors that typically have correct or incorrect responses). Using a 
statistical method, based on “uniqueness” of response, overlooks the social side of 
creativity and the importance of “finding the familiar” within the novel (as indicated by 
the Optimal Innovation approach in GSH). Therefore I mentioned the possibility of using 
a technique whereby a group of judges (experts in the given domain) endorse and agree 
that “yes this is creative”. This, in fact, is done in the real world with poetry contests and 
science awards. It is also done within research on creativity and the most common 
method is called The Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) developed by Amabile 
(1982, 1996). This method is in stark contrast to the rating criteria found in divergent 
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thinking tasks, which were previously mentioned in this chapter, for these tasks seek to 
develop and objective way to measure creativity. On the other hand, CAT approaches 
creativity subjectively. According to this method, judges have the expertise, knowledge 
and background to be able to spontaneously recognize the creativity of a product 
(Amabile, 1982, 1996). Its popularity and success, as well as, having been shown to be 
reliable under various conditions (Amabile, 1996; Baer, 1994; Hennessey, 1994) have 
some calling it the “gold standard” of creativity assessment (Carson, 2006). 
 This technique does not attempt to theorize what creativity is, but rather relies on 
the subjective beliefs of the experts to “know” this. These evaluators work independently 
from one another and usually are provided very little guidance or criteria in how to rate 
the products, but are told to depend on their own sense of creativity. They are also told 
not to rate them according to some ideal standard, but relative to one another. Another 
important instruction that is usually provided to the evaluators is to go through all the 
products and simply provide each one a LOW, MEDIUM, or HIGH score and then 
shuffle the products and go through them a second time in a different order and provide a 
score based on some Likert-scale (e.g., 5-point scale). This is to reduce the effect of order 
on influencing the scores for the judges. Since most of the judges are not trained to do 
this, some instruction is usually provided, but again the researcher usually leaves it open 
enough for the evaluators to follow their own beliefs and set of appraisals. For instance, 
in one study, Baer (1994) provided the following instructions:  
There is only one criterion in rating these tests: creativity. I realize that creativity 
doesn’t exist in a vacuum, and to some extent creativity probably overlaps other 
criteria one might apply—aesthetic appeal, organization, richness of imagery, 
sophistication of expression, novelty of word choice, appropriateness of word 
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choice, and possibly even correctness of grammar, for example—but I ask you to 
rate the stories solely on the basis of your thoughtful-but-subjective opinions of 
their creativity. The point is, you are the expert, and you needn’t defend your 
choices or articulate a definition of creativity. What creativity means to you can 
remain a mystery—what I want you to do is use that mysterious expert sense to 
rate the stories for creativity (Baer, 1994, p. 39–40).  
Since the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) has had strong support and is 
the most widely used product-based assessment of creativity (Hennessey & Amabile, 
1999), a number of studies have attempted to test its reliability, validity, and point out 
some limitations using it. The next section goes into more detail about these issues.  
Reliability, Validity & Issues with the Consensual Assessment Technique for Evaluating 
Creative Products 
In the previous section, I outlined the CAT as a possible way to score the creative 
products, as well as, the before mentioned creative metaphor tasks. In this subsection, I 
go into more detail about the reliability, validity, and possible issues with this form of 
assessment. Developed on the basis that creativity assessment in research should reflect 
real-world assessment of creativity, the CAT shows that it obviously has ecological 
validity. In addition, using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, Amabile (1996) found good 
inter-rater reliability correlations from 0.7 to 0.89 using this technique. Moreover when 
the reliability is specific to the creative task of writing a poem (which typically consists 
of the American haiku, which is a five-line stanza poem usually referred to as cinquains), 
the reliability is consistently high (0.82 ~ 0.89). In one study, using 151 undergraduate 
students and 4 English graduate students as judges, the reliability score was 0.89 (Ruscio, 
Whitney, & Amabile, 1996).  
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 Though one major question involving CAT, as an evaluative method in creativity 
research, is the ambiguity surrounding the word “experts”, which Amabile (1996) loosely 
defines as individuals “who have at least some formal training and expertise in the target 
domain” (p. 73). Hickey (2001) points out that Amabile theorizes inter-judge reliability 
by experts is a direct indication of construct validity, as she states, “if appropriate judges 
independently agree that a given product is highly creative, then it can and must be 
accepted as such” (Amabile, 1982, p. 1002). Yet finding experts to do such an assessment 
is not an easy task. Consequently, there has been a considerable amount of research into 
the reliability of using non-experts or quasi-experts whereby the researcher attempts to 
train these individuals to become more expert-like in their assessments (Dollinger & 
Sharafran, 2005; Kaufman & Baer, 2012; Kaufman, Lee, Baer, & Lee, 2007). In the 
study by Dollinger and colleagues (2005), they compared the creativity ratings of 
drawings between a group of expert judges and trained non-expert judges and found that 
their scores were highly correlated. The training consisted of showing the non-experts 16 
representative drawings to illustrate prototypical levels of creativity assessments (by 
expert artists) before they had to evaluate the drawings in the study.  
 In fact, in some studies, the experts actually showed lower levels of reliability 
than the non-experts. For instance, Hickey (2001) used a numbers of raters (composers, 
music teachers, music theorists and even two groups of children) to judge the creativity 
of 11 musical compositions by children. He found that the music teachers and theorists 
showed the highest inter-judge reliabilities (0.73 and 0.64 respectively). Composers 
showed the lowest inter-judge reliabilities, even lower than the children. He concludes by 
indicating that the teachers appear to be the most reliable judges of creativity. Dolinger 
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and colleagues (2004) showed similar results in a different domain. Using a drawing 
production task, he then had a group of psychologists and a group of artists rate the 
drawings for creativity on two measures, details, and the overall gestalt of the drawing. 
The alpha reliabilities for the psychologists were 0.88 and 0.85, respectively, and for the 
artists, 0.59 and 0.78. Such findings have shifted the notion of ‘expert’ to a more 
temperate view and recently researchers have suggestd that raters should “be familiar 
enough with the domain to have developed, over a period of time, some implicit criteria 
for creativity” (Hennessey, Amabile, & Mueller, 2010, p. 256). The poems completed in 
this study relied on the assistance from Japanese colleagues with either linguistic or 
literature backgrounds and can be assumed to have acquired sufficient knowledge to 
reliably judge the creativity of the poems. It should also be noted that judgments of 
creativity based on the CAT is limited by various factors like historical time, societal 
trends, and cultural norms (Amabile, 1996). In the final section of this chapter, I feel it is 
necessary to provide a brief section on creativity and culture, especially as it applies to 
Japan since this research took place in Japan and all the participants are university aged 
Japanese students. 
4.6 A NOTE ON CULTURE AND CREATIVITY: THE CASE OF JAPAN 
Creativity is highly valued and perceived positively across cultures (Westwood & Low, 
2003). Japan like other areas of Asia (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore) has recently been 
aggressively pushing to advance creativity in business, education, and society (MEXT, 
2006; Tan, 2000). The Ministry of Education in Japan explicitly lays out the importance 
of creativity as they urge the need to “train researchers with broad perspectives who are 
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rich in creativity and originality ... it is critical to foster and secure exceptional young 
researchers with abundant creativity” (MEXT, 2006 part 3.3.1.1 (2) & (3) italics are 
mine). It would be far beyond the reach of this thesis to provide a rich description of how 
culture impacts creativity, but as the research in this thesis took place in Japan, it is 
important to briefly consider the cultural setting.  
 Asian cultures have had to confront what has become known as the “creativity 
problem” or the “Needham Problem”, which questions why Asian cultures have fallen 
behind the West in regards to creativity. This notion of Asians lacking creativity has been 
reinforced by the publication of various popular books in Singapore such as, Why Asians 
Are Less Creative Than Westerners (Ng, 2001) and Can Asians Think? (Mahbubani, 
2002). Such authors who propagate this “creativity problem” in Asia often point out how 
the values (e.g., Confucian values) that a culture observes, encourages, and transmits to 
the young can have a strong influence on creativity within the culture. Values that are 
commonly associated with Confucianism have been pointed out to hinder and stifle 
creativity such as conformity (Lubart, 1990), conservatism (Dollinger, 2007), and 
authoritarianism (Rubenstein, 2003).  
 Japan tends to be lumped together with those of other Confucian cultures. These 
cultures have often been said to advocate conformity, have high power distance (e.g., 
hierarchical) and be collectivistic societies. I do not attempt to refute any of these claims 
outright, but provide some evidence that may contradict these assumptions. The work of 
Hofstede (2001) often provides the source for the collectivistic-individualistic dichotomy 
that places countries along this continuum. In an attempt to contrast the West with the 
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East in a generalizable way, Japan somehow became the exemplar of collectivistic 
societies in the East. This is despite the contradicting data where in fact, at the time 
period when Hofstede (2001) conducted his study, Japan (22/239) measured more closely 
with the western nations of Argentina (22/23) and Spain (20) than with the eastern 
nations of Taiwan (44), Singapore (39/41), or South Korea (43) in regards to the cultural 
dimension of individuality. This whole dichotomous notion of western countries (U.S. 
often being the exemplar), as being individualistic, and eastern countries (Japan), as 
being collectivistic has been questioned and any assertion that such a dichotomy exists is 
far from conclusive and actually lacks empirical support (see Matsumoto, 1999; 
Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Takano & Osaka, 1999; Takano & Sogon, 
2008). In addition, Japanese are often viewed as conforming more to societal norms than 
those in the West, yet again empirical evidence suggests otherwise, where in the classic 
Asch’s conformity experiment, Japanese conformed no more than Americans (Williams 
& Sogon, 1985; Takano & Sogon, 2008).  
 Moreover when examining creativity from a cultural or national perspective, 
choosing how to examine “creativity” can be rather diverse and subjective. For instance, 
if we look at patents as an indicator of innovation and creativity within a country, Japan 
by far has the most patents. For instance Japan has been granted 177,750 in 2014, which 
ranks top in the world, as compared to 144,621 for the USA, a country that has more than 
double the population (WIPO, 2016). Or if we take a different domain like food creativity 
                                                      
 
9 These numbers refer to the Individualism Index Values for 50 countries and three regions (Hofstede, 2001 p. 215). Note: where there are two numbers, 
this means that two countries have the same score.  
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and use the Michelin guide as the group of judges, Tokyo has more stars than even Paris 
(Robinson, 2007).  
 I acknowledge that culture has a strong impact on creativity, both in terms of 
encouraging and constraining it, but culture is something dynamic and changing and in 
the current environment in Japan, creativity is highly valued and there are attempts to 
cultivate it within the educational system. Also Japan has a longer history of research and 
interest in regards to the psychology of creativity than often asserted in the literature. 
Books on the topic have been written since the early 1900s, especially in regards to 
education (see Akiyama, 1983; Onda, 1986 for a brief history of creativity research in 
Japan). Torrance’s divergent thinking tests have also been used in Japan since the 1970s 
(Torrance & Sato, 1979; Sato & Onda, 1978) and continue to be used (Saeki, Fan & 
Dusen, 2001). The interest in encouraging creativity can be exhibited in how language 
reflects and reveals these changing trends, whereby in the past the common saying, 出る
杭は打たれる (deru kui ha utareru -  “The nail that sticks up gets hammered down”), I 
have noticed has been playfully altered in a university education document to 出るくい
を伸ばす (deru kui wo nobasu - “Extending the nail that is sticking up”). So the two 
contrasting images from these idiomatic expressions are one of conformity and 
constraining uniqueness and originality and the other of encouraging and promoting 
one’s uniqueness. The point here is to show that creativity is an important element of 
education and highly regarded within the overall society in Japan.  
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4.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 
In this chapter, I have shown the wide range of instruments frequently used to measure 
creativity. It has become more generally agreed upon that the best way to measure the 
multifaceted nature of creativity is to use multiple instruments that approach creativity 
from varying dimension like the product, the process, and the person. This chapter has 
outlined these differing dimensions and ways that previous research has attempted to 
measure it, as well as, the relationships between these numerous variables. In summary:  
• Divergent thinking tasks provide a glimpse into the creative process and creative 
potential of the individual and really measure ideational thought, or the ability to 
come up with many ideas, and originality; 
• Past creative achievement is a good predictor of future creative activities;  
• Openness to Experience is a crucial personality trait that has been shown to be 
highly correlated with various other creative measurements in various cultural 
settings;  
• Numerous other individual difference variables like tolerance of ambiguity, self-
efficacy and intrinsic motivation also are highly relevant and important for 
creativity;  
• People are aware of their own creativity and self evaluations of creative abilities 
also provide more insight into the creative person;  
• Finally creativity is most strongly associated with some tangible product like a 
poem or invention, which is judged to be creative by some group at a specific 
time within a certain social environment.  
In the next chapter, I describe a pilot study that provided valuable insight into the 
difficulties of gathering data and how I developed the final measurement tools to assess 
creativity and creative metaphoric competence.  
 Chapter 5 A Pilot Study and the Development of the Creativity 
Instruments and Creative Metaphor Production Tasks 
Developing the necessary instruments to measure creativity and creative metaphoric 
competence proved to progress slowly and along a nonlinear path. Throughout the 
academic years of 2013-2015, I experimented with various tools to assess these abilities 
in English classes that I taught at the university. For the creativity instruments this 
usually involved having the students do divergent thinking tasks or produce some 
creative product during class. I often integrated them into the lesson as a learning tool to 
build students’ creativity with the language (see Birdsell, 2014). I also administered 
questionnaires at the end of class along with other teachers in my department who 
volunteered to distribute them in their classes. The metaphoric competence tasks were 
often integrated into awareness raising exercises that aimed to get the students to become 
more aware of the underlying metaphorical structure motivating many metaphors found 
in natural everyday language. Through the use of these tasks, I began to realize they 
mostly developed students’ vocabulary knowledge of conventional expressions and failed 
to assess novel metaphors. So I shifted my focus to simpler and more open-ended 
exercises that prompted students to produce their own metaphors. In this chapter, I go 
into more detail of how I developed these various instruments. I first begin by describing 
a small pilot study, as a way to frame the discussion, and then throughout the chapter 
weave together other studies that I conducted that helped me finalize and narrow down 
the instruments into the versions that I eventually used in the main study.  
 
 162 
5.1 LESSONS FROM A SMALL PILOT STUDY 
In February of 2015, I conducted a lengthy, but small, pilot study to test the instruments 
and methods of collecting the data. Seven informants volunteered to participate in the 
study and were paid an hourly wage of 850 yen/hour based on university guidelines for 
student employment. This study took 3 hours to complete and was conducted in a 
classroom at the university. The participants sat at a desk and then received a folder with 
the materials inside it. The first step required the participants to sign a consent form (see 
Appendix A). Then they filled in their age, faculty, sex, TOEIC and TOEFL scores on the 
outside of the folder. This front page was bilingual written in both English and Japanese. 
The following material was inside the folder and numerically labeled: 
(1) Vocabulary Test 
(2) Questionnaires 
(3) Creativity Tests 
(4) English and Japanese Metaphor Tests 
 
A PowerPoint presentation guided the participants through each section. In this chapter, I 
cover various elements of the above sections of this pilot study. I first briefly address the 
vocabulary test and then the development of the creativity instruments and finally the 
creative metaphor production tasks. 
5.2 THE VOCABULARY TEST 
Many students take the TOEIC and TOEFL tests while attending university in Japan, yet 
it is definitely not mandatory, so I considered that there would be many blank responses 
in the section that asked them to input these scores. Recognizing this and considering the 
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importance of having some data on the participants’ English level, I looked at other ways 
to assess their English abilities. Since the participants completed a number of instruments 
for this study, I needed to use something short and efficient. Therefore I decided to use an 
abridged version of a vocabulary test based on Paul Nations and David Beglar’s 
“Vocabulary Size Test” (2007). This test aims to measure vocabulary size based on word 
families of the 14 most common 1000 sets of words. In each word family there are 10 
vocabulary items, so there is a total of 140 items on the original test10. Again in order to 
minimize the time to complete this vocabulary test, these items were reduced to 5 items 
of vocabulary for each 1000 set of words, so I used a 70-item test. The method of 
reducing this number was based on the following: removing borrowed English words that 
have an equivalent “katakana” word in Japanese and words that I found rather rare or 
unusual like “weir: We looked at the weir” and “lintel: He painted the lintel”. This is far 
from a perfect method of reducing a large vocabulary test, but again it is a supplementary 
part of the overall research. Together with a standardized test like a TOEIC score, this 
vocabulary test provided some insight into the participants’ English levels. This test was 
rather straightforward and did not change between the pilot and main study.  
5.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS 
The idea that creativity can actually be assessed or measured by way of a psychometric 
tool or self-assessment questionnaire is in itself rather controversial. I, by no means, 
suggest that the tools I developed in this research reveal the social side of creativity or the 
full range of creativity in varying domains of experience. Rather, I propose that these 
                                                      
 
10 To see the original http://www.victoria.ac.nz/lals/about/staff/publications/paul-nation/Vocab_Size_Test_Japanese.pdf 
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tools that I developed for this research do provide some insight into the creative 
individual from a multidimensional perspective including personality, past creative 
achievements, belief in one’s creativity, and ability to produce creative products. I 
discuss each of these in greater detail in the following subsections. 
5.3.1 THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
In the pilot study, the participants completed two different questionnaires: a 60-item Big 
5 personality questionnaire and a 66-item creative person questionnaire that looked at 
various creative traits, as outlined in the previous chapter (e.g., self-efficacy, curiosity, 
etc.). These questionnaires I concluded after the pilot study were too long, so my first 
goal was to reduce the items on these two questionnaires. To accomplish this, I created 
something called the 16-item Five-Factor Model of the Creative Personality 
Questionnaire (FFM-CPQ) and the 24-item Creative Personality Questionnaire (CPQ), 
which I describe in more detail below. 
Creativity: The 16-item Five-Factor Model of a Creative Personality Questionnaire 
In the pilot test, I used a 60-item (12-items for each of the Big 5 factors) personality 
questionnaire developed from items from the Internationality Personality Item Pool, as 
described in Chapter 4.4 (see Goldberg et al., 2006 or http://ipip.ori.org). In order to 
reduce the number of items on this questionnaire, I first reduced the 60-items to 50-items. 
These items consisted of the following: 9 items for conscientiousness, neuroticism, 
extraversion, and agreeableness; and 14 items for openness to experience. The additional 
items for openness were used since openness is the factor most commonly correlated with 
creativity (McCrae, 1987). The goal was to create a streamlined creative personality 
 165 
questionnaire based on the five-factor model for the main study. In order to accomplish 
this, undergraduate university students (n=130, male=70) in various faculties at a 
university in northern Japan were asked to complete a questionnaire that asked them to 
score on a 6-point scale the characteristics they believed a creative person has. I did this 
for two main reasons. First, I wanted to develop a questionnaire based on students’ 
perspectives of a creative personality. Secondly, I wanted to condense a very long 
questionnaire that dealt with various personality types (e.g., agreeableness and 
neuroticism) to a more manageable one that solely focused on the creative personality. It 
should be noted here that this is a rather unusual approach since most questionnaires are 
self-assessment in style, so I explicitly told them both verbally and on the questionnaire 
that this was not a personality test about themselves, but they were to score these items 
based on their own perceptions and beliefs of a highly creative person. The questionnaire 
was phrased as follows: 
• I think the characteristics of a creative person are... 
The questionnaire was administered during the last 10 minutes of an English class. The 
questionnaire included items from the five personality factors and it was completed in 
Japanese (see Appendix C for the complete list of items included on this questionnaire 
along with the mean score for each one). I then took the 11 highest and 5 lowest (reverse) 
items based on their mean scores and created, The 16-item FFM-CPQ (Five-Factor 
Model of the Creative Personality Questionnaire). Openness to Experience items made up 
most of this list, as was to be expected, along with a few Extraversion items. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Extraversion has also been shown in the literature to 
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be frequently correlated with creativity. This might also suggest that creativity is part of a 
higher order common factor or meta-trait referred to as “plasticity”, which encompasses 
both Openness and Extraversion. This is compared with the second factor, “stability”, 
which encompasses Neuroticism (emotional stability), Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness (see DeYoung, 2006; Silvia et al., 2009). 
 There are also three items from the factor Agreeableness. One item has to do with 
understanding others’ emotions and the second item is a very complex concept called 
“sunao” in Japanese. This word has multiple meanings in English such as: “spare, plain, 
bare, unembellished, unornamented, accepting, straightforward, obedient”11. This is 
typically opposite of a creative person within a Western context for according to Gough’s 
(1979) adjective list of a creative person, negative traits include such items as 
“submissive and well-mannered”, which “sunao” encompasses. In addition, the reverse 
item, manipulative, was also included. The one item from Conscientiousness, a reverse 
item, “does things in a sloppy manner”, perhaps reveals the importance of careful and 
systematic planning that goes into accomplishing something creative. There is one item 
from the factor neuroticism that could have been included based on its cumulative low 
score, but was not included because I judged other items with comparable low scores to 
be more suitable for a study on creativity. Table 5.1 provides the final list of items, their 
factors, means, and overall ranking. This questionnaire was then used for the main study. 
 
                                                      
 
11 http://ejje.weblio.jp/content/素直 
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TABLE 5.1: RESULTS FROM A STUDY TO DEVELOP THE 16-ITEM FFM CREATIVE PERSONALITY 
QUESTIONNAIRE (SEE APPENDIX D FOR THE ORIGINAL JAPANESE VERSION)  
a Scale / Item (6-point scale) Mean b 
O Has a rich imagination 5.28 1 
O Has wide interests 5.25 2 
O Likes to get lost in thought 5.11 3 
O Is very curious about learning new things 5.08 4 
O Sees the beauty in things that others might not notice 4.85 5 
E Often searches for stimulating things 4.77 6 
E Is very energetic 4.71 7 
A Is “sunao” 4.63 8 
A Feels others’ emotions 4.62 9 
O Plays it by ear 4.6 10 
O Likes to solve difficult problems 4.52 11 
E Is afraid to draw attention to oneself * 2.65 45 
C Do things in a half-way manner / Does a sloppy job of work * 2.60 46 
A Is manipulative * 2.48 47 
O Has a narrow world view * 2.4 49 
O Not really interested in art and other works of beauty * 2.24 50 
a Refers to factor (O, Openness to Experience; E, Extraversion; A, Agreeableness; C, 
Conscientiousness)  
b Refers to the ranking based on the means    * Refers to reverse items 
 
Beyond the Big Five: A 24-item Creative Personality Questionnaire  
To develop a creative personality questionnaire that goes beyond the Big 5, I decided to 
focus on the following traits: self-efficacy, persistence, intrinsic motivation, curiosity, 
and tolerance of ambiguity. I selected items from various questionnaires (as outlined in 
the previous chapter) that aimed to explore these components, which resulted in a 66-item 
questionnaire that was used in the pilot study. As I mentioned at the start of this section, I 
soon realized from administering, observing, and discussing afterwards with the student 
participants in the pilot study that this questionnaire’s length was too long and contained 
too much information. I accordingly reduced the number to 44 items (see Appendix E). 
This revised 44-item questionnaire was then administered to university students at the 
end of an English class. I collected a sample size of 185 responses and performed a 
principle components analysis on these items for the purpose of data reduction and to 
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look for interrelated correlations between the variables. Despite the sample size being 
slightly small for the recommended minimum 5 cases for each item (making an ideal size 
of 220), I did obtain a measure of sampling adequacy above the 0.6 level (.788) as 
measured by Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was significant 
(p < 0.001).  
 To achieve simple structure, I rotated the loadings using an orthogonal technique 
(Varimax) because I did not perceive these items to be highly correlated with each other. 
I limited the loading to a 0.4 bivariate correlation or above. Five components had 
eigenvalues above 1 and explained 41% of the variance. I went through the items and 
removed the ones (a total of 7 items) that did not load onto any of the components. I also 
removed the fifth component since it only had two items. In addition, I also removed 
items that loaded low on the four components or those that contained similar language 
between the items. Through this process, I was able to reduce the initial 44 items to a 
more manageable 24-item questionnaire with four components, which explained 49% of 
the cumulative variance. Looking through these items, the four components could be 
theoretically labeled as the following: (1) Self-efficacy; (2) Persistent goal directed 
motivation; (3) Reluctance / Intolerance to ambiguity; and (4) Exploratory motivation. 
See Table 5.2 below for the items and loadings on the respected components.  
TABLE 5.2: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS – ITEM REDUCTION TO 24 (SEE APPENDIX F FOR 
THE ORIGINAL JAPANESE VERSION)  
  Component 
a  1 2 3 4 
37 I often think of new ways to use things around me. .697    
22 I’m good at finding common characteristics among dissimilar things. .695    
06 I believe I am good at adapting to new and unfamiliar situations.	    .670    
２ I am good at proposing original solutions to a problem. .634    
32 I am knowledgeable about many different subjects. .611    
12 I am good at making analogies. .579    
 169 
04 In a discussion, I rarely have an opinion on the topic. -.426    
19 I often am absorbed in my studies and lose track of time.  .699   
42 I usually accomplish what I set out to do.  .665   
13 I have a “never give up” attitude in life.  .644   
07 I am studying at university simply because I enjoy learning new things.   .577   
26 I quit when I cannot solve a problem.  -.527   
30 I prefer to conform to the rules than stand out.   .778  
35 I like to strictly follow a daily routine in my life.   .735  
20 I am not very curious.   .589 -.450 
18 I prefer a teacher who is serious than one who is playful.  -.401 .544  
08 When confronted by a risk I will choose the safer side of things.	    .533  
21 I am reluctant to participate in new endeavors.   .494  
34 I like things that are new and unusual.    .636 
01 Acquiring new knowledge about the world is very stimulating to me.        .624 
39 I often daydream.    .602 
25 A good teacher is one who gets students to become more curious about the world.    .600 
15 I like to discover new things on my own outside of class.    .576 
a The number it appeared on the questionnaire 
 
 After having reduced these two questionnaires in the pilot study down to a 16-
item FFM-CPQ and a 24-item CPQ, I decided that I also needed to include other 
instruments to fully assess the creative person from a multidimensional perspective, 
namely, a Past Creative Achievement Questionnaire and a Creative Self-Beliefs 
Questionnaire. As mentioned in the previous chapter, these types of questionnaires have 
been widely used in the literature on creativity and creative achievement questionnaires 
are commonly used to measure real world creativity, as past creative achievements is 
often indicative of future creativity. In the next section I address how I developed these 
for the main study.  
Development of Two Self-Report Questionnaires: Creative Achievements & Creative 
Self-Beliefs 
A 34-item Past Creative Achievement Scale (see Table 5.3 for the full list of items) was 
developed in order for the participants to self report their own past creative achievements 
in various domains suitable for university students in Japan. I adapted and developed a 
Japanese version from previous research (see Batey, 2007; Dolinger, 2003; and Carson et 
 170 
al., 2005) with items that look at everyday creative activities. I focused the questionnaire 
on four domains:  
• Music, Arts, and Writing 
• Math, Science, and Computers 
• Clubs, Theater, Dance, Performance and Presentation 
• Home Arts 
The first domain consists mostly of the traditional forms of art such as painting, poetry, 
and playing an instrument. The second domain looks more at the scientific side of 
creativity, such as using computers and winning math or science awards. The third 
domain focuses on the performance side of creativity that assesses things like dance and 
theater. The final domain looks more at everyday creativity. There is also a final open-
ended item where the participants can add other creative achievements they feel they 
have accomplished that are not represented on this questionnaire. Similar to Batey’s 
(2007) study, this questionnaire follows a simple binary format in the form of a Yes/No 
question. For example on item #1, the participants were asked the following: 
• Outside of your school classes have you ever taken an art class? 
The scoring for this questionnaire was weighed differently depending on the creative 
achievement. For example, the above item has a score of “1” while the following item #4 
has a score of “3”, which is the highest possible score: 
• Outside of your school classes have you ever sold an item of your art? 
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In this questionnaire there is a total maximum score of 60 points, plus any additional 
items the participant added to the the open-ended “other” item that appears at the end of 
this questionnaire. Any written-in “other” items were given a score of “1”. The 
questionnaire begins with the following statement: 
• Outside of your school classes have you ever ~   
 Table 5.3 provides the full list of items translated into English (see Appendix G 
for the original Japanese version). 
TABLE 5.3: 34-ITEM PAST CREATIVE ACHIEVEMENT SCALE 
a Scale / Item 
 MUSIC, ARTS and WRITING	  
1 1. 〜 taken an art class 
2 2. 〜 won a prize for your art 
2 3. 〜 displayed your art in an exhibition 
3 4. 〜 sold an item of your art 
1 5. 〜 studied one of the traditional Japanese arts (flower arrangement, calligraphy, tea 
ceremony) 
2 6. 〜 displayed your traditional Japanese arts (flower arrangement, calligraphy, tea ceremony) 
in an exhibition 
1 7. 〜 done creative writing (poetry, short story, novel, manga) 
2 8. 〜won a prize for your writing 
2 9. 〜 participated in a public reading of your writing 
3 10. 〜 published your writing in a journal or book 
1 11. 〜 taken a music class 
2 12. 〜 won a prize for your music 
2 13. 〜 publicly played a music concert 
3 14. 〜 recorded your own music 
 MATH, SCIENCE AND COMPUTERS  
2 1. 〜 designed your own web site 
2 2. 〜 put together your own computer, radio, or other electronic device 
2 3. 〜 designed your own software 
2 4. 〜 won a prize at a science fair or local science event 
2 5. 〜 won a math award 
2 6. 〜 invented something that has actually been made and used by other people 
3 7. 〜 published in any kind of scientific research journal 
 CLUBS, THEATER, DANCE, PERFROMANCE and PRESENTATIONS  
1 1. 〜 started your own club 
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2 2. 〜 acted live on stage for a theater play 
2 3. 〜 directed or produced a play or a short movie (YouTube) 
2 4. 〜 performed publicly in a dance performance 
2 5. 〜 done live comedy 
2 6. 〜 won a prize at a speech or presentation contest 
 HOME ARTS  
1 1. 〜 invented a game 
1 2. 〜 cooked your own original recipe 
1 3. 〜 planned a trip by yourself 
1 4. 〜 designed your own clothing 
1 5. 〜  made someone a present 
1 6. 〜  made your own jewelry 
1 7. 〜  collected things (coins, stamps, insects, tape) 
1 Write down any other creative activities you have accomplished 
a This number is the possible score for each item 
 In addition to the above 34-item Past Creative Achievement Questionnaire, I also 
developed a questionnaire that evaluates one’s beliefs in one’s own creative abilities. 
This questionnaire was adapted and developed from previous studies, as outlined in 
Chapter 4.4 (see Furnham, 2000; & Kaufman et al., 2009). This questionnaire is called 
the 24-item Creative Self-Beliefs Scale (See Table 5.4 for all the items). Similar to the 
Past Creative Achievement Questionnaire, this one is divided into different domains of 
experience; The Arts and Performance; The Social Self; and Science, Math, and Logic. 
The participants were asked to rate how creative they believe they are on a 10-point scale, 
“1” is “not at all creative” to “10”, which is “very creative”.  
TABLE 5.4: THE 24-ITEM CREATIVE SELF-BELIEFS SCALE (SEE APPENDIX H FOR THE ORIGINAL 
JAPANESE VERSION) 
Scale / Item 
The Arts and Performance 
1. Writing poems or short stories.   
2. Coming up with humorous jokes.  
3. Doing art (drawing, painting, photography, pottery, graphic design).  
4. Playing a musical instrument or singing.   
5. Giving a speech or presentation.  
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6. Home life (clothes fashion, gardening, cleaning, cooking).  
7. Doing sports, gymnastics or dance.   
8. Acting in film or theater.   
The Social Self  
1. Brainstorming new ideas with your friends.  
2. Settling disputes between friends.   
3. Finding something fun to do even when you don’t have any money. 
4. Traveling and interacting with other cultures. 
5. Teaching something to someone. 
6. Thinking of ways to help the community. 
7. Making people feel relaxed and comfortable.  
8. Maintaining a good balance between my studies and my personal life. 
The Sciences, Math and Logic 
1. Sketching out ideas that you come up with for inventing a new product.  
2. Putting together electronic devices (radio, computer, robot). 
3. Solving difficult math problems.  
4. Doing puzzles or figuring out riddles. 
5. Doing experiments.  
6. Coming up with ways to fix a buggy computer.  
7. Writing a computer program.  
8. Thinking of new ways to use things around you. 
 
Summary: The Questionnaires 
In summary, I developed four distinct questionnaires that aim to measure different facets 
of the creative person.  
• The first questionnaire (16-item FFM-CPQ) focuses on the personality of the 
individual and uses items from the Big 5 personality traits that have been judged 
to be essential traits for a creative person.  
• The second questionnaire (24-item CPQ) goes beyond these Big 5 traits and 
expands the creative personality to include such items as motivation, persistence, 
and self-efficacy.  
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• The third questionnaire (34-item Past Creative Achievement Scale) moves away 
from the personality traits and concentrates on past creative achievements.  
• Finally the fourth questionnaire (24-item Creative Self-Beliefs Scale) addresses 
how one perceives one’s own creativity in various domains of experience.  
In the next section, I discuss different instruments that prompted the participants to 
produce a creative product or something tangible during the study that then could be 
assessed for creativity by a group of judges.  
5.3.2 THE CREATIVE PRODUCTS 
 
In the previous chapter, I described various ways to measure creativity by assessing a 
creative product that the participants actually had to produce. Using a creative product to 
measure creativity has strong construct validity since the participants’ aim in this task is 
to create something novel and meaningful. Although the common issue that researchers 
face is choosing a task that can be done in a short amount of time and not require some 
domain specific skill (e.g., compose a song, sculpture, etc.) that is likely unevenly 
distributed among the participants. Past research has used various tasks from collages to 
stories to poems. Each of these tasks has their own limitations. Since this research aims to 
look at creativity from many different dimensions and thus requires multiple instruments, 
I decided to choose both verbal and figural creative product tasks. I describe below the 
development of a creative product that uses a haiku-like format and a second one that 
uses drawing prompts.  
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Development of a Creative Product: The Haiku 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the work of Amabile (1996) and how she developed a 
creative product assessment tool called the “American Haiku”. I informally tested a 
modified version of it in English classes during the 2014 academic year. I provided the 
class with the example in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1: Creative product: An American haiku 
In class, students produced a poem in English with the following seasonal topic, “Winter” 
while using the writing style found in Figure 5.1. In a different class, students had the 
seasonal topic, “Spring”, and they also were asked to write a second “American Haiku” 
with their own topic. Table 5.5 provides some examples of these students’ poems.   
TABLE 5.5: EXAMPLES OF STUDENTS’ POEMS BASED ON THE “AMERICAN HAIKU” FORMAT 
Winter 
Cold, snowy 
Ski, slip, snow 
We don’t want to go out 
Winter 
Winter 
White, beautiful 
Ski, skate, sled 
Sports and views are very interesting 
Winter 
Winter 
Cold, beautiful 
See, feel, enjoy 
All things look white 
Winter 
Winter 
Cold, cool 
Roll, play, fun 
I make a snowman 
Winter 
Spring 
Beautiful, misty 
Bloom, meet, separate 
The best season of separating is 
Spring 
Spring 
Warm beautiful 
Flourish, born, breathe 
Trees grow in clear forests 
Spring 
Ocean 
Wavy, foamy 
Roll, rumble, crash 
All captured in this shell at my ear 
Ocean 
Line 1: theme – single noun 
Line 2: 2 Adjectives describing Line 1 
noun 
Line 3: 3 Verbs related to Line 1 
noun 
Line 4: A phrase or sentence about Line 1 
noun 
Line 5: theme – repeat Line 1 
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Spring 
Warm, shining 
Active, hope, sing 
Everyone wants to change one’s self 
Spring 
Spring 
Windy, beautiful 
Jog, kiss, date 
I’ve kissed the girl - 
Spring 
Tuna  
Juicy, glossy 
Swim, fast 
All Japanese love it 
Tuna 
Sun  
Hot, powerful 
Work, roll, fire 
I must work like that 
Sun 
Moon  
Lonely, chill 
Shine, break, fill 
He gives us kindness and sadness 
Moon 
Street 
Crowded, busy 
Greet, dart, surprise 
Funny accidents happen  
Street 
What becomes apparent here is that the differences between the poems seem negligible 
and difficult to evaluate. This task requires the participants to follow a very rigid pattern 
of writing (e.g., 2 adjectives followed by 3 verbs) and what appears to happen from 
looking at the poems created by the participants is that there are a number of repeated 
words like “cold” and “white” for winter and “warm” and “beautiful” for spring. What 
becomes evident is that this creative product turns more into a divergent thinking task 
that aims to measure statistically unique adjectives for these topics. Another concern here 
is that this American Haiku format is structured for the English language and would not 
work the same in Japanese.  
 Bearing these concerns in mind, in the pilot study, I asked the participants to use 
Japanese and in order to get enough variation between the poems, I provided fewer 
restrictions and only instructed them to write a short poem like a haiku and incorporate 
one of the four seasons as the topic. Below are the instructions provided in the pilot study 
for the creative product: 
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Write a short poem like a Haiku or Tanka. Use one of the four seasons as the 
theme of your poem. 
Table 5.6 provides two examples of the participants’ poems, which I have loosely 
translated into English. Participant #1 actually wrote a Tanka style of poem, which is 
similar to a Haiku, but slightly longer and follows a 5-7-5-5 syllable pattern 
(unfortunately I was unable to maintain this in the translation). It also likely has a double 
meaning in the final line. The word (しふく- shifuku) means bliss, but also ordinary or 
private clothes, which may refer to being naked (i.e., similar meaning to “birthday suit”). 
Participant #6 wrote a longer poem that used free verse and long descriptive sentences. 
The responses from the participants in the pilot study demonstrated that this format works 
well as a creative product task.  
TABLE 5.6: EXAMPLES OF PARTICIPANTS’ POEMS FROM THE PILOT STUDY (SEE APPENDIX I FOR 
THE ORIGINAL JAPANESE FOR THESE 2 SELECTED POEMS) 
English Translation of Poems 
Research Participant #1 
Only in Autumn 
Do I go out on the veranda 
Just after the wind blows 
Nakedness all around  
A time of bliss 
Research Participant #6 
The snow doesn’t melt, so around the base of the cherry tree I scatter hot water.  
Though in the kettle the water was boiling, by the time it reached down to the cherry tree, it 
had cooled. 
Where the lukewarm water had melted the snow around the roots, one part of the snow had 
changed to ice. 
 In order not to rely too much on language for a measurement of creativity, I also 
developed a creative product that involves two types of drawing tasks. I explain how I 
first developed one of these tasks from a DT activity and then over the past couple of 
 178 
years administering it to students established a dataset of drawings, which was used to 
assess originality.  
Development of the Creative Product: Complete a Drawing 
Over a span of years (2013-2015), I used the picture completion DT task in my English 
classes as a mini-lesson to get students to creatively draw a picture and then describe the 
picture to a partner. I found that this exercise could be done in a short amount of time and 
in fact resulted in a creative product that could be assessed on a couple of dimensions like 
originality and overall creativity. This provides a creative product quite different than the 
haiku poem for it relies less on language and more on nonverbal abilities like drawing 
and imagery. The only constraint is that the participants had a limited amount of time 
(10-15 minutes) and they had to start by using four lines that appear on the page, as 
shown in Figure 5.2.   
Complete the picture 
Title: ___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Example of the complete the picture drawing task 1 
From the collected pool sample of drawings (n=173) over the two-year span, I equated 
the statistical uniqueness of the drawings (originality). I created a scoring criteria as 
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follows based on a 6-point scale for originality: 6 points = less than 0.6%; 5 points = 
0.6% to 1.7%; 4 points = 1.8% to 2.9%; 3 points = 3.9% to 5%; 2 points = 5.1% to 10%; 
1 point = over 10%. Table 5.7 shows the drawings categorized as tools, animals & 
insects, large made objects, small made objects, nature, food, and humans & ghosts along 
with the frequency of occurrence, percentage of occurrence and the originality score.  
TABLE 5.7: PICTURE COMPLETION POOL OF DRAWINGS AND ORIGINALITY SCORING CRITERIA 
CATEGORY IMAGE  Frequency % Originality Score (5-point) 
Tools 
20.2% 
Sword 11 6.4% 2 
Pens/Pencils 23 13.3% 1 
Compass 1 0.6% 5 
Animal & Insects 
18.5% 
Pikachu 5 2.9% 3 
Rabbit 8 4.6% 3 
Bird 1 0.6% 5 
Fish 3 1.7% 5 
Koala 1 0.6% 5 
Squirrel 1 0.6% 5 
Squid 3 1.7% 4 
Starfish 1 0.6% 5 
Turtle 1 0.6% 5 
Horse 1 0.6% 5 
Shark 1 0.6% 5 
Cockroach 2 1.2% 5 
Butterfly 2 1.2% 5 
 Dinosaur 1 0.6% 5 
 Fox 1 0.6% 5 
Large Made 
Objects 
24.3% 
House / 
Building 21 12.1% 1 
Rocket 12 6.9% 2 
Airplane 3 1.7% 4 
Tunnel 2 1.2% 5 
Bridge 1 0.6% 5 
Tower 1 0.6% 5 
 Boat 2 1.2% 5 
Small Made 
Objects  
8.1% 
Shirt 1 0.6% 5 
Origami 1 0.6% 5 
Ear Ring 1 0.6% 5 
Soccer Ball 1 0.6% 5 
Hat 1 0.6% 5 
Box 1 0.6% 5 
TV 1 0.6% 5 
 Game Catcher 2 1.2% 5 
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 Book 1 0.6% 5 
 Flag 1 0.6% 5 
 Necktie 1 0.6% 5 
 Baseball bat 1 0.6% 5 
 Robot 1 0.6% 5 
Nature / Place 
17.3% 
Crystals/ 
Diamonds 13 7.5% 2 
Flowers 4 2.3% 4 
Mountain Top 2 1.2% 5 
Sea 1 0.6% 5 
Camping 1 0.6% 5 
Snowman 1 0.6% 5 
 Graveyard 4 2.3% 4 
 Ice/Ocean 2 1.2% 5 
 Star 1 0.6% 5 
Food 
1.7% 
Banana 1 0.6% 5 
Cheese 2 1.2% 5 
Human & Ghosts 
8.1% 
Face 6 3.5% 3 
Person 7 4.0% 3 
Ghost 1 0.6% 5 
Other 
2.3% 
Aomori 1 0.6% 5 
Bacteria 1 0.6% 5 
Heart 1 0.6% 5 
Egyptian 
Sphinx 1 0.6% 
5 
 TOTAL 173   
In addition to the uniqueness or overall originality of the drawings, this creative product 
was also scored for overall creativity by a group of evaluators or judges. For instance, 
Figure 5.3 shows an example of 6 drawings taken from the pilot study. Each one has been 
scored for each of these two criteria using a 6-point scale. Again, originality was based 
on the above frequency table, while creativity was based on a cumulative score by 3 
judges.  
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Drawing 1: Rocket 
 
Originality: 2 
Creativity: 5 
Drawing 2: Space
 
Originality: 2 
Creativity: 10 
 
Drawing 3: An Old Man 
 
Originality: 3 
Creativity: 13 
Drawing 4: Mouses Eat 
Cheese 
 
Originality: 5 
Creativity: 12 
 
Drawing 5: The Tower that 
Sees Everything in the World 
 
Originality: 6 
Creativity: 17 
Drawing 6: Starfish
 
Originality: 6 
Creativity: 3 
Figure 5.3: Examples of scoring for the creative product: Drawing task 1 
 
Development of the Creative Product: Drawing & Ideational Fluency 
The before mentioned creative drawing relies on originality and overall creativity, a 
second type of drawing similarly developed from the DT tests relies on ideational thought 
and fluency or the ability to come up with many drawings to fit a pattern, as well as, an 
overall creativity of the drawings. There are two types of possible tasks (as described in 
Chapter 4.1.1): one called lines where the participants receive a page with many lines that 
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look like X’s and have to create as many images from these X’s as possible and the other 
called circles where the participants receive a page with many circles that look like O’s. 
Figure 5.4 is an example of a blank page from this form that was used in the pilot study 
(this has been condensed to only two rows though in the study the rows of “O’s” covered 
the entire page).  
 
O O O O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Figure 5.4: Circles figural task: Drawing task 2 
 
In the pilot study participants were shown the lines form with drawings on it, as an example. 
Then they were told to come up with as many drawing as possible using the circles form. They 
had 15 minutes to complete this task. Figure 5.5 and 5.6 show examples from participants 3 
and 6 in the pilot study. 
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Figure 5.5: Drawing task 2: Participant 3 (pilot study) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Drawing task 2: Participant 6 (pilot study) 
Common drawings were wheels on a vehicle (e.g., car, bicycle), glasses, eyes, ears, 
nostrils, fruit (e.g., apples and cherries), and buttons on a shirt. These drawing were 
assessed using two criteria: fluency or the overall number of drawings and an overall 
consensual assessment of creativity by a group of judges, so similar to the previously 
mentioned set of drawings. For instance, participant 6 scored higher on fluency (19 to 11) 
but lower for overall creativity (9 to 14), as assessed by 3 judges on a 6-point scale. In 
summary, the main study used 3 creative products: a short (haiku-like) poem in Japanese 
and two drawing tasks.  
5.3.3 SUMMARY: THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS 
This section has provided background to the development of the creative instruments 
used in the main study. I have shown that to grasp the complexity of creativity, it is 
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important to use multiple instruments that aim to measure different facets of this 
construct such as personality traits, past creative achievements, self-assessment of one’s 
own creativity, and actually producing a creative product. Better understanding the 
varying components of creativity and the inter-relationships between them is in itself a 
worthwhile endeavor, but this thesis also aims to investigate creative metaphoric 
competence, and to examine if this ability shows up in both an L1 and an L2. In order to 
investigate this possibility, in the next section I discuss the development of a set of 
metaphor tasks used in this research that aims to assess creative metaphoric competence 
in both an L1 and L2.  
5.4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CREATIVE METAPHOR PRODUCTION TASKS 
In the previous section, I have outlined the instruments that I developed in order to 
measure the many different facets of creativity. In this section, I turn my attention to the 
different ways to measure metaphoric competence. First, I begin by discussing a 
metaphor recognition task that appeared in both the pilot and main study. Then I examine 
some initial tests that I developed and used in the pilot study and the shortcomings of 
them. Finally I discuss in greater detail, the two production tasks that I decided to use for 
the main study.  
5.4.1 THE METAPHOR RECOGNITION TASK 
In order to familiarize the participants with the concept of “metaphor” and variations 
between conventional and novel metaphors in language, two versions of a Metaphor 
Recognition Task were developed in Japanese (L1) and English (L2). Although the 
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sentences in each of the two languages were different, the two sets included similar 
patterns of literal, conventional, and novel metaphorical sentences. Participants were 
asked to score each sentence from “1” being “a literal sentence” to “5” being “a 
conventional/everyday metaphorical sentence” to “10” being “a creative/novel 
metaphorical sentence”. They were provided the same example at the start of each task 
(the Japanese version was in Japanese). They were shown how to mark these sentences as 
indicated in Figure 5.7.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Examples from the metaphor recognition task 
 
They were also told that such responses could vary from person to person and simply to 
respond how they felt towards each sentence for there are in fact no right or wrong 
answers. Table 5.8 lists the sentences used for the Japanese and English versions (see 
Appendix K to see the original Japanese version). Next to each sentence, the mean 
average from the pilot study is also included in this table.  
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TABLE 5.8: METAPHOR RECOGNITION TASK 
Japanese Version Mean English Version Mean 
1. Will you give me a hand? 4.0 1. He has a sore back.  2.0 
2. The prison guard was not kind. 1.0 
2. The new student’s mind is a 
sponge. 
6.29 
3. The cave painting is ancient graffiti. 3.86 
3. Traffic here is terrible in the 
summer.  
3.43 
4. The contract is a handcuff. 8.57 4. The nurse’s touch was medicine. 7.0 
5. The wind blew all through the night. 1.29 
5. She has a lot of emotional 
baggage.  
6.71 
6. Now the yen is sharply falling. 4.0 
6. Unfortunately his attitude is a 
cancer. 
8.86 
7. His dream vanished. 5.0 
7. Failing the test was a blow to his 
confidence.  
6.14 
8. His new book received a showering 
of criticism. 
4.71 
8. During the troubling times, his 
wife was his anchor. 
7.14 
9. Tokyo Skytree is high. 1.0 9. Their friendship is crumbling.  5.57 
10. His lecture is sleeping medicine. 9.0 10. The economy is on the edge. 5.43 
 
 The scores on the Japanese version are as expected. Participants clearly 
distinguished conventional metaphorical expressions like talking about the value of a 
currency in spatial terms, as in, falling and rising and another common metaphor in 
Japanese is to describe criticism as a “shower” from more novel metaphors like 
describing a contract as a “handcuff”, which scored very high (8.57). The literal 
expressions were accordingly scored very low (1.0, 1.29, 1.0). On the other hand, 
participants scored the English version similarly, but the stark contrast is not as apparent, 
which might indicate more doubt and uncertainty such as scoring, “Traffic here is terrible 
in the summer” relatively high (3.43), which is comparable to the Japanese expression, 
“The wind blew all through the night” (1.29). The point though for this exercise was to 
help the participants to become more aware of metaphors in both languages and to show 
them how some metaphors are viewed as being more “conventional” and others more 
“creative”. At the end of this section in both the pilot and main study, I also indicated that 
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the goal of this research was to respond creativity to the followings metaphor tasks. So in 
short, this exercise acted like a primer for the ensuing tasks and also aimed to raise their 
awareness of metaphors in language and to reiterate that the goal of this research was to 
produce creative and novel metaphorical responses.   
5.4.2 MEASURING METAPHORIC COMPETENCE: INITIAL SHORTCOMING 
In this subsection, I describe the varying shortcomings and inadequacies of my initial 
metaphor production tasks. Again, the goal of these tasks was to be able assess to a 
certain degree one’s metaphoric competence in both an L1 and L2, especially in regards 
to creative metaphor production. Similarly to measuring a creative product, priming 
participants to create novel metaphors is a complicated task. As I have mentioned 
throughout this thesis, my goal was not to evaluate their ability to understand or use 
conventional metaphorical expressions in context, but to look more closely at their ability 
to produce their own creative metaphors that are both meaningful and novel. Despite this 
intention, the various instruments that I initially designed often failed to capture the 
creative aspect of metaphors. For instance, in one task the participants were asked to 
complete a triad of words or expressions with an associated emotion like the following 
example: 
 
In the above example, the emotion commonly associated with these words is anger. Yet 
what I realized is that this type of task mostly tested the depth of their semantic 
knowledge of various words and not their creative ability to produce novel metaphors. So 
this task was too narrow and constraining and subsequently I needed to develop 
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something more open-ended that allowed for a wide range of responses. In the next part, I 
specifically look at two examples of tasks that I had in the pilot study, but also were not 
used in the main study and I describe why I did not include them.  
Examples from the Pilot Study 
One task that I experimented with in the pilot study required the participants to produce 
as many adjectives as possible to replace the adjective in a conventional expression like 
“the picture is (colorful)”. Benedek and colleagues (2014) used a similar approach to this 
(as described in Chapter 3.5.2). In this example, possible responses are “a rainbow”, “a 
wing of a pressed butterfly”, “a box of crayons”, “a garden in full bloom” and so on. 
Viewing this example, it seems that this could be a promising task to assess creative 
metaphor production, but a few problems emerged. First, other common adjectives that I 
used in this task like “big”, “smooth” or “hard” have a limited possible range of 
responses. How many different ways can one metaphorically extend the adjective 
“smooth”? So the participants’ responses to items in this task were minimal and a number 
of them actually did not provide any responses to a few of the adjectives. The second 
problem is that this task likely directs the participants’ attention to focus more on 
attributional metaphors or metaphors that rely on mere appearances (e.g., the snake is a 
river) or physical similarity. For example, for the prompt “the bread is (hard)”, many 
participants responded with the word “rock”. A rock is likely one of the more common 
exemplars for the category, “objects that are hard”. Attributional metaphors are less 
cognitively demanding and appraised as less interesting (see Chapter 2.3.1 & Gentner, 
1988), as compared to relational metaphors and therefore this task did not seem 
appropriate for this study. Moreover, since the participants usually provided few and 
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similar responses for each adjective, thereby limiting the variance between the subjects’ 
scores, I concluded that it was probably not a reasonable way to measure creative 
metaphoric competence.  
 A second example of a task that I tried to develop and used in the pilot study, but 
failed to produce any meaningful responses from the participants is a modern version of 
the Metaphor Triads Task (Kogan, Connor, Gross, & Fava 1980). The goal was to assess 
the participants’ ability to combine visual stimuli together in metaphorical ways. Similar 
to Kogan and colleagues (1980), I used three images. Two pairs of these images could 
literally be combined while the third pair could be metaphorically combined. For instance 
in one example from the pilot study, there was the following triad: a bird, a violin and a 
tree. The bird and tree could be paired to express the literal expression, “The bird is in the 
tree”. The violin and tree could be combined to express the literal expression, “The violin 
is made of wood.” The third also could be metaphorically combined to express the 
similarity between a bird singing and the music of the violin. Nevertheless in an attempt 
to bring another mode (in this case the visual) into one of the metaphor tasks, this task 
failed to produce any measurable data in the pilot study. This could possibly be due to the 
fact that the task itself forced the participants into producing a conventional metaphor 
that the researcher had already designed into the set of pictures. So in actuality, similar to 
the before mentioned set of three words that aimed to prime the participants to produce 
an emotion, this task also overly constrained them to respond in a very limited and 
constricted way.  
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 In response to these shortcomings, I then decided that the metaphor tasks had to 
be open-ended enough to allow the participants the freedom to produce their own 
metaphor, while at the same time appropriately structured in order to prime them to 
actually produce a metaphor. Consequently, I decided to rely on two variant tasks: one is 
contextually independent and the second is contextually dependent. I go into more detail 
about each of these in the next section.  
5.4.3 CREATIVE METAPHOR PRODUCTION TASKS USED IN THE MAIN STUDY 
In this final part of this section on the development of the metaphor tasks, I describe in 
detail the two tasks that were used in the main study. These are called and “The Context 
Independent” and “Context Dependent” metaphor tasks. 
①	 The Context Independent Metaphor Task: The Copula (A is B)  
 
Finding a task that is both suitably open, allowing the participant to create a novel 
metaphor, and at the same time sufficiently constrained, allowing the researcher a degree 
of control, is a tremendous challenge. In the end, simplicity is perhaps the best option.  
One type of task used in the main study was the context independent metaphor task based 
on the copula A is B. Independent, insofar as there is no context to the metaphor, but 
rather the participant is simply provided a topic or the “A” part of the metaphor and asked 
to provide a source or the “B” part of the metaphor and then to interpret the meaning of 
it. In the following part, I first discuss the pilot study version of this and then the revised 
version, which was used in the main study. After that, I provide the rationale for 
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including this task in the main study as a way to measure creative metaphoric 
competence.  
Lessons from the Pilot Study 
In the pilot study, participants were asked to produce a nominal metaphor using a copula 
(A is B) format. For example, the participants on the English version received the 
following nominal metaphor: 
• College is a garden. 
They were then provided with the following interpretation of this metaphor: 
• Interpretation: While attending college students grow a lot like plants grow in a 
garden. Rain and sunshine are like knowledge. Rain and sunshine help plants 
grown while knowledge helps students grow. In a garden there are many different 
types of flowers and also at college there are many different types of people. 
They were provided two topics in each language (English: “Life is ... ” and “Memories 
are ...”; Japanese: “Love is ...”, and “Looking for a job is ...”). I provided one metaphor 
example for each of the topics. For example, for the Japanese topics, I provided the 
following examples: “Love is a rollercoaster” and “Looking for a job is being lost in a 
maze”.  For each of the metaphors provided by the researcher, they were then asked to 
interpret what they thought these metaphors meant. Then they were asked to come up 
with their own metaphors and subsequent interpretations of them. By providing them 
these initial examples, I thought it would prime them to more easily produce their own 
metaphors.   
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 A number of issues arose in the pilot study in regards to this task. Firstly, the 
layout was too complicated and the directions too confusing. Secondly, by providing the 
participants with an example metaphor using the topic likely constrained their thinking 
about the topic. Taking these considerations into account, for the main study I made a 
few modifications. Firstly, I removed the example metaphors. Secondly, I changed the 
format to something that more closely resembles the creative process that includes both 
ideational fluency and evaluation. So in the main study, the participants were provided a 
topic like “college” and then asked to come up with as many metaphors as possible that 
could be used to describe this topic such as: College is a garden; College is a party; 
College is doorway; College is madness; College is freedom; College is homework; 
College is a mirror; College is flying. This is in fact a type of divergent thinking task, so 
ideational fluency is crucial. Yet in contrast to DT tasks, the creative process involves 
another crucial stage, an evaluative stage of reflecting on the items and judging the one 
that is most appropriate. Therefore they were then asked to evaluate this list of metaphors 
that they had just produced and choose only one that they believed in their viewpoint was 
the most novel and meaningful. Finally they were asked to provide an interpretation of it.   
The Context Independent Metaphor Task: A Creative Process 
In order to provide some rationale for choosing this task for the main study, first I need to 
return to a quote that I mentioned earlier in this thesis, “the value of research on metaphor 
lies in the fact that metaphor shows on a small scale all the principal features of the 
thought processes that are most significant in creativity” (Miall 1987, p. 82). This 
metaphor task clearly shows on a small scale similar thought processes to creativity. For 
instance, the creative process proposed in the literature encompasses four phases: 
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problem analysis, ideation, evaluation, and implementation (Zeng et al., 2011). In a 
similar way, the above metaphor task requires similar phases in order to complete it. 
Figure 5.8 provides a visual model of this process. First one has to analyze the topic and 
access one’s conceptual knowledge of this concept and then use divergent thinking or 
ideation to think of many possible vehicles to complete this metaphor in a meaningful 
and novel way. After that, one must evaluate this list and determine which one is most apt 
based on it being both novel and meaningful. Finally one then needs to provide an 
interpretation of this metaphor. 
 
  
 
Figure 5.8: The metaphor process for producing/interpreting a nominal metaphor 
 
 A slightly alternative way to approach this process is to view it using a conceptual 
model as seen in Figure 5.9. In this model, the written stimuli, which in this case using 
the example provided above, is “College is...”, enters the sensory system through the 
visual mode. One first has to identify that this writing is indeed a recognizable linguistic 
code (as opposed to Arabic to a non-Arabic speaker). Since this written code is without 
context and the task asks the participants to produce a creative metaphor to complete it, 
the representational system for this concept becomes active, which includes semantic 
knowledge, autobiographical knowledge, and associational structures for this concept. 
 Analysis  Interpretation  Ideation  Evaluation 
 
Read the topic and assess 
one’s knowledge of this 
concept 
 
Come up with many 
possible metaphors for 
this given topic 
 
Evaluate the 
appropriateness of these 
different metaphors and 
judge one to be most apt 
 
Provide an interpretation 
of this metaphor and 
explain why it is an apt 
metaphor 
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Creative metaphoric competence ensues as the participant seeks combinatorial 
possibilities that may complete the metaphor in a meaningful and creative way.  
 
Figure 5.9: A conceptual model of the process to produce a response for the context independent 
metaphor task 
 Once one has exhausted all the possible combinations, one then evaluates the best 
possible response by considering what features would be mapped from this source onto 
the topic. This likely happens somewhat unconsciously and by asking oneself the 
question, how interesting and appropriate is it? Interest or pleasure arises from the 
combining of two concepts that are semantically distant, but at the same time, they allow 
for the recoverability or discovery of certain shared features. The more unexpected or 
surprising these shared features are, the greater the interest or pleasure (see Wimmer et 
al., 2016 for a discussion on non-conventional figurative language and emotional 
aesthetic appreciation). This task requires one to seek out possibilities and then choose 
the best one and finally provide reasons for this choice. One of the challenges to these 
 195 
creative metaphor tasks is to develop a way to measure these responses, which I address 
in the next section.  
Assessing the Context Independent Metaphor Task 
In the previous part of this section, I discussed the creative process required to complete 
the context independent metaphor task. The question that then arises is; how can one 
reliably evaluate these responses? Tests that aim to measure metaphoric competence that 
are based on conventional metaphors rely on similar methods as traditional vocabulary 
tests whereby there are right and wrong responses. In contrast, this instrument aims to 
measure the creative side of metaphor production and therefore assessing the responses 
are less objective and therefore require some consensual input. In order to do this, a 
group of evaluators scored them based on a simple criterion, “is the response creative?” 
In order to minimize the ambivalence in the scores, a simple 3-point scale was developed. 
Using a wider scale (e.g., a 5-point scale) would entail being able to qualitatively explain 
the difference between giving one response 4-points and another 5-points and this could 
be problematic. To eliminate this possibility and provide the evaluators a clear guide, I 
adapted scales used in previous studies (Beaty & Silvia, 2013; Littlemore 2001a, 2010; 
Silvia and Beaty, 2012) and used the following evaluation criteria: 
• 1 – Not creative > literal, not appropriate, or highly conventional responses 
• 2 – Somewhat creative > extended conventional responses 
• 3 – Creative  > surprising and novel responses 
(When rating these metaphors one should consider the following points: A creative metaphor 
involves novelty and originality, remoteness/distance between the two concepts, an element of 
surprise, and aesthetic appreciation. On the other hand, a non-creative response uses language 
that is highly conventional or even literal, familiar, and not surprising, and involves minimal 
cognitive effort to understand.) 
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In addition to the above “creative” score, this task also had a second score based on the 
sheer number of metaphors the participant created, which was labeled, the “fluency” 
score for this task. So in brief, this context independent task has two scores, a 
consensually assessed creative score and a tallied fluency score. In the next section, I 
discuss a contrasting task or the second set of creative metaphor production tasks used in 
the main study called the context dependent task.  
②	 The Context Dependent Metaphor Task: Complete the Sentence 
Along with a context independent metaphor task, I also included in the main study, a 
context dependent metaphor task. These sentences were similarly constructed, as those 
found in Littlemore’s (2010) study, which used two sets of sentence starters (one in 
English and one in French) to test original metaphor production. These sentences 
provided the participants a starting context that they then needed to creatively complete. 
Each sentence primes a certain topic based on the contextual cues within the sentence. 
For example, the following sentence from the Japanese version primes the topic of 
“Disappointment”.  
• His parents had many expectations that their son would be successful, so they got 
him into an expensive private university. But rather than studying hard, he began 
to party every night and in the end he had to drop out of school. His parents dream 
(＿＿). 
Due to the length of the sentences, there are a number of linguistic constraints to this task. 
First, it requires the participants to comprehend a full sentence. Moreover one needs to 
overcome the ambiguity of the incomplete part. In addition, one needs to have the 
linguistic skills to complete the sentence in a meaningful way. This requires 
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understanding the grammatical structure of the sentence. In the pilot and main study, 
there were five context dependent metaphor-priming sentences in each language (see 
Table 5.9 for the full list). In order to develop these sets of sentences in the two respected 
languages, I first compiled a set of topic ideas that could be used to prime the participants 
to produce a metaphor. Then I worked and consulted with a Japanese university student 
research assistant who helped me compose these sets of sentences in the two languages, 
and to provide insight and advice into choosing culturally appropriate themes that are 
familiar to Japanese university students (i.e., school, music, looking for a job, being in 
debt, disappointing one’s parents, falling in love, and an angry teacher). 
TABLE 5.9: A COMPLETE LIST OF THE SENTENCES IN THE CONTEXT DEPENDENT METAPHOR TASK: 
ENGLISH AND JAPANESE VERSIONS 
English Japanese 
Prime: Recalling a memory is 
1) In writing class, Mary has been told to look 
into her past and (＿＿) some of her 
memories for there is a lot of good drama 
there. 
Prime: A beautiful voice is 
1) She has a beautiful voice. Whenever I 
hear her voice, I imagine (＿＿). 
Prime: A burden (debt) is 
2) After graduating from university, he has not 
been able to find a job.  But still he bought a 
new car and a lot of new clothes. Now he 
has a lot of credit card debt and worries. He 
(＿＿). 
Prime: Nervousness/Excitement is 
2) A friend asked her to give a speech at her 
wedding reception, she (＿＿). 
Prime: A large group of people are 
3) Yesterday in Odaiba, AKB48 came to sign 
autographs for their fans. There were so 
many people waiting outside and when they 
finally opened up the gate to let the fans 
approach the tables, (＿＿). 
Prime: Disappointment is 
3) His parents had many expectations that 
their son would be successful, so they 
got him into an expensive private 
university. But rather than studying hard, 
he began to party every night and in the 
end he had to drop out of school. His 
parents dream (＿＿). 
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Prime: Anger is 
4) The school festival was suppose to be a fun 
occasion, but when the teacher saw the 
students painting on the walls he got really 
angry. He (＿＿). 
Prime: An unforgettable experience is 
4) It was really exciting for I was 
competing against the top-level skaters 
in the world in the Olympics. So I will 
never forget this experience. This 
experience (＿＿). 
Prime: Falling in love is 
5) I met this really great girl/boy last night. We 
went out and had a great time. When I got 
home I couldn’t sleep. She/he really (＿＿). 
Prime: Happiness/Pride is 
5) When I passed the university entrance 
exam, my parents (＿＿). 
Establishing a way to assess these responses is a key part to developing this instrument. 
In the next part, I approach this in a similar way to the context independent task, but also 
consider the differences between these two tasks and the need to slightly alter this 
assessment.  
Assessing the Context Dependent Metaphor Task 
Assessing the context dependent metaphor task is slightly different than assessing the 
context independent task because of the greater reliance on linguistic knowledge in the 
former task (i.e., having to read an incomplete sentence in the L2, as compared to having 
to read a single word). For instance, the first sentence item in the English set (E1) primes 
the respondents to think about recalling a memory. The part that needs to be filled in 
requires a verb for grammatical accuracy. In the L1, this is rather elementary, but in the 
L2 this adds an additional layer of complexity in order to complete. Responses could vary 
between literal verbs like “think about” or “remember”, to more conventional metaphors 
like “dig up” or “pull out”, to more novel ones like “paint” or “harvest”. These examples 
are relatively straightforward to assess, but participants who provided a metaphor (based 
on the topic “memories”), but not the correct grammatical form to fit the pattern of the 
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sentence, obviously may cause some difficulty to assess. For example, in the pilot study, 
one participant provided the noun “jewel” to complete the sentence, which is 
grammatically ambiguous (i.e. “look in her past and jewel some of her memories”), but 
conceptually is appropriate (i.e., “memories are jewels”). Accordingly this was an issue 
that needed to be addressed when assessing the responses in the main study. 
Consequently, in contrast to the context independent task, which is assessed through a 
cumulative score based on a group of evaluators, this task initially was assessed by the 
researcher and then discussed and modified or confirmed with a second evaluator. The 
second evaluator was a native English or Japanese speaker, respectively.  
 In order to provide some structure to assessing these responses, a set of criteria 
was developed. Returning to the above five sentences, in the first one from the Japanese 
set, the participants were asked to complete a sentence that primes the topic, a beautiful 
voice. Looking at the responses from the main study, there were four possible categories 
of responses: not creative (“Mariah Carey” – comparing a beautiful voice to someone 
who has a beautiful voice – often these are literal, predictable, and tightly associated with 
the topic concept), somewhat creative (“an angel” – comparing a beautiful voice to some 
imagined entity – these are typical responses and often are considered conventional 
metaphors), somewhat creative (“after completing difficult homework, that moment 
being praised for doing it when submitting it to the teacher”- these are less common in 
the pool of responses, but do not seem terribly appropriate), and creative (“beads 
scattered on white drawing paper” – comparing a beautiful voice to another mode, the 
visual, in the form of some artistic expression – these are both novel and apt responses 
and the relations between the two concepts are distant). Therefore this set of criteria 
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added an additional score on the scale, as compared to the context independent task. This 
was deemed necessary to add after looking through the responses for there seemed to be 
one additional category of responses that were creative, but lacked the element of surprise, 
aesthetic appreciation, or appropriateness. Each of these sentence completion tasks were 
then assessed using this format: 
• 1 – Not Creative > highly predictable, tightly associated with the topic, highly 
conventional metaphorical or literal response, and common response among the 
participants 
• 2 – Somewhat Creative > not as common of a response, a conventional metaphor, 
but slightly more creative 
• 3 – Creative (novel) > unfamiliar, unconventional, novel response, but not 
completely appropriate or hard to find meaning in it  
• 4 – Creative (novel + appropriate) > unfamiliar, unconventional, novel response, 
surprising, and also appropriate and meaningful – vivid and has good imagery 
In the context independent task, every participant provided a response, but in this task, a 
few participants did not provide any response, especially in the English version. 
Therefore, a “0” point was also required for these blank responses.  
5.4.4 SUMMARY: THE CREATIVE METAPHOR PRODUCTION TASKS 
 
In this section of the chapter, I have discussed the course of developing various metaphor 
tasks, which eventually, I narrowed down to two types of tasks: a context independent 
one and a context dependent one. The former resembles the creative process that 
measures both ideation or fluency and overall creativity of the response, which is 
comprised of both a metaphor and an interpretation of it. The latter task is more heavily 
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dependent on the language and context of the sentence, which required the participants to 
complete the unfinished part of it. Table 5.10 outlines the metaphor tasks that were used 
in the pilot and main study. 
TABLE 5.10: METAPHOR TASKS USED IN THE PILOT AND MAIN STUDY 
Pilot Study Main Study 
Expand the adjective in the sentence 
with a metaphor  
*Not included 
• Too limiting in the number of possible responses 
Metaphor Triads Task - Visual Mode  *Not included 
• Confusing, few responses by participants, 
constraining 
Context Independent Metaphor Tasks Context Independent Metaphor Tasks  
• Modified version – made it simpler and clearer to 
understand 
Context Dependent Metaphor Tasks Context Dependent Metaphor Tasks  
• Unchanged 
 
5.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 5 
In this chapter I have provided background on the various instruments that have been 
developed and used for the main study. Both the creativity instruments and the creative 
metaphor production tasks went through major alterations through initially using them in 
an informal classroom setting through to a more formal pilot test and finally into the 
versions that were used in the main study. The goal was to measure the different facets of 
creativity and creative metaphoric competence in the individual participants. It might be 
advantageous now to briefly return for a moment to the questions posed in this thesis. 
First I aimed to explore the relationship between an individual’s creative metaphoric 
competence in an L1 and an L2. It is hypothesized that the individual’s preference for 
novelty will appear in both the L1 and L2. That is to say, when a participant is confronted 
with these metaphor production tasks and has to respond within a limited time frame, one 
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approach is to rely on salience (Giora, 2003) or what comes to mind easiest and with the 
least amount of cognitive effort, yet obviously this is not always the case. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, the fine-coarse semantic processing model (Jung-Beeman, 2005) could 
explain such a difference among individuals. For instance, some people may rely more 
heavily on fine-grained semantic processing, often associated with processing literal 
language, but more specifically highly conventional and familiar language. For example, 
when confronted with the context independent metaphor task, they may simply provide a 
response that is semantically close to the topic, in this sense, a literal or conventional 
response while others may recruit coarser semantic processing in order to seek out 
connections between more distantly related semantic concepts. So the question is, does 
this preference or inclination for novelty and using coarser semantic processing appear in 
both languages?  
 The second question addresses the creativity instruments and the role that 
creativity plays in the production of novel metaphors in an L1 and L2. It is assumed that 
novel metaphor production requires a number of similar personality traits found in 
creativity research like risk taking, curiosity, tolerance of ambiguity, and openness 
(especially to possible alternative meanings to words), and persistence. So it is 
hypothesized that scores on the creative personality questionnaires should have some 
correlation to the scores for the creative metaphor production tasks. 
 
 Chapter 6 Main Study: Methods and Assessment of the Creativity 
Instruments and Creative Metaphor Production Tasks 
In this chapter the process of analysis and descriptive statistics are reported in detail 
along with the raters’ assessments of the productive creativity and metaphor tasks. In the 
following chapter (Chapter 7), I then present the inferential statistics and discuss the 
results from the main study. Throughout this thesis it has been suggested that metaphoric 
competence needs to be further classified as either being competent with conventional 
expressions that are used in everyday language or being competent in producing creative 
metaphors. In the former case, depth and breath of vocabulary knowledge in the given 
language is necessary and thus highly contingent on linguistic skills. The latter relies 
more on ideational fluency and combinatorial abilities linking distantly related concepts 
together. If this is the case then it is hypothesized that this form of metaphoric 
competence might be an individual difference or the proclivity towards novelty and 
uniqueness whether or not using an L1 or L2. Consequently, in order to investigate this, it 
is necessary to first look at ways to measure creative metaphoric competence in both an 
L1 and L2 and then look at the relationship between them. Moreover it is hypothesized 
that various measurable features of creativity such as personality, past creative 
achievements, self beliefs in one’s creativity and actually producing a creative product 
may also be related to creative metaphoric competence.  
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 In this chapter, I describe in detail the main study. First, I begin by describing the 
student participants. Then I review the instruments used in this study, which summarizes 
the material developed in the previous chapter. Next I discuss the methods used to collect 
the data. Afterwards, the main focus of this chapter explores the reliability of the 
instruments in the main study and provides an outline of how I assessed and coded the 
participants’ responses. In short, the latter part of this chapter primarily focuses on the 
process of analysis of the data and provides descriptive statistics to the various 
measurements collected in the main study.  
6.1 PARTICIPANTS 
The participants in the main study (n=130) were Japanese university students in northern 
Japan with Japanese as their first language (L1) and English as a foreign language (L2). 
There was a relatively even distribution of males (n=60) and females (n=70). Of these 
130 participants, 116 completed all the sections of the research. I did not ask the 
participants to provide their age, but they did provide their class grade and faculty. At the 
time the participants completed the research, a large majority were 1st year students, but 
since it was open to all students, a few 2nd and 3rd year students joined and a very small 
number of 4th year students also participated (4th year students, n=9; 3rd year, n=14; 2nd 
year, n=27; 1st year, n=80). The participants came from the various faculties at the 
university, but a majority came from the faculties of Medicine and Humanities (Medicine 
n=69, Humanities n=35, Agriculture =11, Science & Technology n=11, Education n=4).  
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6.1.1 ENGLISH LANGUAGE BACKGROUND 
The participants had all studied English as a foreign language for a minimum of seven 
years (3 years in junior high school, 3 years in high school, and 1 year in university)12. 
Although these participants were by no means bilingual, each student had had a relatively 
similar and significant background experience with the English language. In terms of 
English abilities, as measured by a standardized English test, I asked the participants to 
provide any test score on a common standardized test like the TOEIC or TOEFL. 103 
participants provided either a TOEIC score or a G-TELP score. G-TELP is a standardized 
test that had been recently implemented at the university and these scores were then 
converted into an equivalent TOEIC score based on a conversion table provided by the 
university. The average TOEIC score of these 103 participants was 699 with a wide range 
from 310 to 920. This level is roughly comparable to the B1 Threshold level or an overall 
intermediate level of English ability with a few outliers on both sides (A2 and B2).  
 In addition to these standardized tests, the participants also completed a 
vocabulary test. This test, as outlined in the previous chapter, is a condensed version of 
Paul Nations and David Beglar’s “Vocabulary Size Test” (2007). The aim was to provide 
another measure to assess the participants’ English abilities. This test was a 70-item 
multiple-choice test and the average score of the participants in the main study was 43 
(range Low=30 High=54). In short, the student participants had some variation in their 
English abilities, which might have affected their capacity to respond to the English 
                                                      
 
12 English is a required course for all junior and senior high school students in Japan and also is a required course for 1st year university students at the 
university where the research took place. 
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metaphor tasks, especially the context dependent task that requires them to comprehend a 
longer contextualized sentence in the L2.  
6.1.2 RECRUITING THE PARTICIPANTS 
During the months of November and December of 2015, student participants were 
recruited through flyers and posters and word of mouth. This was predominantly done in 
and around the language-learning center at the university. They were clearly told that the 
research would take 2 hours to complete and they would receive compensation for their 
time based on the university regulations for employing students in research-based 
projects. Despite these efforts to recruit students and the monetary incentive for 
participation, few students (n=46) took the initiative to participate in this study. In order 
to increase the number of participants, I recruited students (n=84) directly from English 
classes in the spring term of 2016. In this case, I asked the students to participate in order 
to assist me in completing a research project, but explicitly told them that this was not a 
requirement for the class and that participating or not participating in this research would 
not have any influence on their final grades for the class.  
6.1.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
All student participants were presented with and completed a consent form that explained 
in detail the research goals, the tasks involved in this research, and an explicit statement 
clarifying that all data collected would remain anonymous (see Appendix A for the 
Japanese version of this consent form with an English translation of it). I also informed 
them that participating in this research was voluntary and they could withdraw at any 
time. As a consequence, as mentioned above, 14 students or about 11% of those who 
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began the study did not fully complete every section. The students were informed that 
since this study was anonymous, any formal feedback could not be provided, but if they 
were interested in this research, they could inquire afterwards with me and I would 
provide more details about the results. 
 In addition to the abovementioned student consent form; I also received verbal 
permission to conduct this study with students at the university both from the professor in 
charge of my department and the office staff who took care of the paperwork, especially 
in regards, to providing students compensation for their time. My research proposal also 
went through the ethical review board at the University of Birmingham and was approved 
in order to commence the research project. 
6.2 MATERIALS 
In Chapter 5, I provided a detailed outline of the development of the instruments used in 
the main study. To briefly review, the first main goal of this study was to address creative 
metaphoric competence in both an L1 and L2 through evaluating the creativity of 
metaphor production on two varying sets of metaphor tasks. The second main goal of this 
research aimed to assess individual differences in creativity as measured through using a 
set of questionnaires that evaluated participants’ personality, past creative achievements 
and self-appraisal of one’s own creativity. In addition, a verbal and figural creative 
product was also collected from the participants. Finally I explored how these individual 
differences in creativity related to one’s creative metaphoric competence in both the L1 
and L2. I briefly review the instruments used in this study in the following subsections. 
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6.2.1 THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS 
In order to approach the complex and often elusive construct of creativity, a number of 
instruments were developed with the aim of approaching it from multiple different 
perspectives. This included using questionnaires and having the participants produce an 
actual creative product. Table 6.1 provides an outline with the measurement aims for 
each of the instruments used to measure creativity.  
TABLE 6.1: OUTLINE OF THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS 
 
The Creativity Instruments Measurement Aim 
The Questionnaires (4) 
16-Item FFM-
CPQ 
A reduced five-factor model questionnaire 
based on Japanese university students’ 
assessment of personality traits crucial for a 
creative person 
24-Item CPQ  
A questionnaire that encompasses a wide 
range of creative personality traits like 
tolerance of ambiguity, curiosity, and 
motivation 
34-Item Past 
Creative 
Achievements  
Past creative achievements in a number of 
different domains with the underlying 
assumption that past creative achievement is 
predictive of future creativity 
24-Item Creative 
Self-Beliefs 
A self assessment of one’s own creativity in 
a number of different domains with the 
underlying assumption that creative people 
are aware of their own creativity 
The Creative Production 
Tasks (3) 
Drawing 1 
A complete the drawing task that aims to 
measure originality or statistical uniqueness 
and overall creativity 
Drawing 2 
A complete the drawing task that aims to 
measure ideational fluency by counting the 
total number of drawings and overall 
creativity of the drawings 
Poem 
A short written composition in the format of 
a Japanese “haiku” or “tanka” that aims to 
measure verbal creativity 
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This is by no means an exhaustive set of instruments that could have been used to 
measure creativity. I should take some caution in using this word as a noun (see Runco, 
2008) and should probably refer to these instruments as attempts to measure creative 
personality, creative past achievements, creative self-beliefs and creative products, but 
not creativity, as some overarching individual trait. Moreover, one may notice from this 
list that it does not include divergent thinking (DT) tasks, which are often used to 
measure creativity in the literature, but this instrument has also come under a lot of 
criticism for conflating divergent thinking with creativity (see Cropley, 2006 & Sawyer, 
2006). In short, as Piffer (2012) has poignantly expressed “DT tests cannot be considered 
measures of creativity, as they neither assess one's lifetime creative output (person's 
creativity) nor the creativity of a product” (p. 260). Another major criticism of divergent 
thinking tests is the overreliance of them on originality and fluency and their neglect of 
appropriateness (Zeng et al., 2011). Appropriateness or sometimes referred to as value or 
relevance along with novelty are the two standard characteristics of creativity (Amabile, 
1983, Boden, 2004; Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). Therefore DT tests were not included 
in this study. Alternatively, this study used a diverse set of instruments that measured 
different facets deemed important for creativity in order to produce a more 
comprehensive assessment of it.  
6.2.2 THE CREATIVE METAPHOR PRODUCTION TASKS 
The metaphor tasks used in this study consisted of two different metaphor production 
tasks. Table 6.2 provides an outline with the measurement aims for each of these tasks.  
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TABLE 6.2: OUTLINE OF THE METAPHOR TASKS 
 
Metaphor Tasks Measurement Aim 
The Context Independent 
Task (2 topics/L1, L2) 
Metaphor fluency 
A metaphor task that aims to measure the 
ability to find multiple associations to a 
certain topic prompt 
Creative metaphor 
production  
A metaphor task that aims to measure the 
ability to produce a creative metaphor and 
provide an interpretation of it for a certain 
topic prompt 
The Context Dependent 
Task (5 sentences/L1, 
L2) 
Creative metaphor 
production 
A metaphor task that aims to measure the 
ability to produce a creative response that is 
embedded within a longer sentence prompt.  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the context-independent task required the participants to 
seek out various ways to complete a metaphor by providing a source for a given topic and 
then choosing the most creative one from this list and providing an interpretation of it. 
This process intends to reflect the creative process on a small scale, from ideation to 
evaluation and then analysis or in the case of this metaphor task, interpretation (see Zeng, 
et al. 2011 for an in depth evaluation of the different parts of the creative process). 
However, the context dependent task relied more on language and the ability to interpret 
meaning from the sentence in order to produce a novel and appropriate response to 
complete the sentence. In contrast to the creativity instruments, which were all completed 
in the L1, these tasks had two versions, one in the L1 (Japanese) and the second in the L2 
(English). 
6.3 PROCEDURE 
In Chapter 5, I mentioned that prior to the main study, I conducted a small pilot study. 
Besides providing insight into how to better develop the instruments for the main study, 
this pilot study also brought forth some crucial methodological problems. In order to 
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minimize these problems for the main study, I had to adjust a number of procedures. 
Below are three pivotal complications that surfaced during the pilot study and while 
analyzing the participants’ responses: 
• The creativity and metaphor sections of this study relied on paper and pencil 
writing exercises. After looking over the responses, I found that many of them 
were illegible and would require some guessing or additional assistance to 
interpret the handwriting.  
• The environment and process was not conducive to creativity. It was rigid, over 
controlling, and not very relaxing. 
• After conversing with the informants who participated in the study and others 
who wanted to participate but could not fit it into their schedules, I concluded that 
the length was too long for one sitting and in order to gather enough informants I 
had to be more flexible in the format of conducting it.  
Taking the above factors into account, I reformatted the data collection procedure 
accordingly for the main study. First, I transferred the material into Google forms, so the 
participants could type the responses instead of handwriting them. I made these forms 
available online and accessible through the computers within the university’s language 
learning center. In addition, the new format divided the test into four clear sections that 
could then be taken at separate time slots, allowing for more flexibility (see Figure 6.1). 
Yet, it should be noted that once a participant started a section, one had to complete that 
section in order for the data to be saved correctly.  
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Figure 6.1: Screen shot of the front web page of the study divided into the four parts 
 Student participants entered the language-learning center and informed the staff 
that they wanted to take part in this research. The staff asked them to fill in their names 
and arrival times on a sign-in form. If this was their first visit, they were informed of the 
procedures to complete this research. In addition, they were told to spend a total of 2 
hours to complete all four parts, but they did not have to complete all four parts in one 
sitting. When they left, they marked the departure times on the sign-in form. Figure 6.2 
provides a photo of the language learning center and the computers available for the 
participants to use.   
Part 1 – The 
Questionnaires and the 
Vocabulary Test 
Part 2 – Metaphor Task 
(Japanese Version) 
Part 3 – Metaphor Task 
(English Version) 
Part 4 – The Creative 
Products 
(Poem & Creative Drawings) 
The Consent Form 
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Figure 6.2: Photo of the language-learning center and computers used in the study 
 Students were explicitly told to respond as creatively as possible to the various 
creative production and metaphor tasks in the study. Explicitly instructing participants to 
“be creative” has been shown in previous research to increase creative performance on 
the given tasks (Chen et al., 2005; Harrington, 1975). Students did not use their names on 
any of these forms, except when they signed the consent form. In order for me to be able 
to assemble the different sections of the study together for each participant, the 
participants used their student ID codes. After all the sections had been assembled into 
one spreadsheet data form, these ID codes were converted into a simplified and 
completely anonymous set of participant codes. All the data collected was stored in a 
password protected Google account dedicated to this research. Nobody else besides the 
primary researcher had access to this account.  
6.4 PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSMENT 
Since this study used a wide array of tasks to evaluate both creative traits in the 
individual and competencies to produce creative metaphors, assessing all these tasks 
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proved to be quite difficult. This is especially true when attempting to assess creativity in 
general. One possible way to accomplish this requires the use of outside evaluators in 
order to provide some ecological validity to the assessment. The goal was to obtain high 
inter-rater reliability in their evaluations of the participants’ responses, which then would 
indicate a certain amount of consensual assessment and thereby reducing an overreliance 
on subjectivity in the data. Yet obviously, the assessment of creativity in its very nature is 
subjective and the difference between anomaly and creativity is at times ambiguous, but 
likewise in the real world, something is often deemed creative when a group of judges 
concur and then state that it is so (see Amabile, 1996 for a detailed outline of the 
reliability and validity of using the CAT to evaluate creativity and Chapter 4.5.1). In the 
next two subsections, I discuss in detail how the creativity instruments and metaphor 
tasks were assessed and the methods used in order to complete this.  
6.4.1 ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE ON THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS 
 
The creativity tasks were arranged into two different sections. The questionnaires were 
part of the first section of the study, and all 130 participants completed them. In contrast, 
the creative products (the drawings and poem) were the fourth section of this study and 
the participant completion rate for this section dropped to 92% (119 of the 130 
participants). The questionnaires used quantitative analysis to assess the participants’ 
responses while the creative products relied on the consensual assessment technique to 
measure the creativity of that specific product. The following parts of this subsection 
provide a detailed look at the assessment method for each instrument. I first describe the 
questionnaires and then look at the creative products. 
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6.4.1.1 The Creativity Tasks: The Questionnaires 
 
 16-Item Five-factor Model of the Creative Personality Questionnaire (FFM-CPQ) 
Assessment 
Participants replied to the 16 items in the FFM-CPQ using a 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from “Completely disagree” (1) to “Completely agree” (6). The initial prompt was the 
following: 
I see myself as someone who...  
This prompt was followed by the 16 items in the questionnaire such as, “Has a rich 
imagination”. Table 6.3 provides the means and standard deviation of the 16 items in the 
main study ranked by highest mean to lowest.  
TABLE 6.3: ITEMS ON THE 16-ITEM FFM-CPQ BASED ON MEAN SCORES 
a Item Mean SD 
9 Has wide interests 4.68 1.30 
16 Feels others’ emotions 4.43 1.21 
4 Is very curious about learning new things 4.32 1.19 
2 Is “sunao” 4.27 1.24 
12 Likes to solve difficult problems 4.22 1.34 
13 Often searches for stimulating things 3.84 1.45 
14 Is very energetic 3.75 1.35 
7 Sees the beauty in things that others might not notice 3.68 1.43 
3 Plays it by ear 3.64 1.36 
15 Has a narrow world view 3.61 1.33 
1 Has a rich imagination 3.52 1.27 
8 Likes to get lost in thought 3.38 1.31 
11 Is afraid to draw attention to oneself 3.31 1.48 
10 Do things in a half-way manner / Does a sloppy job of work 3.22 1.35 
5 Not really interested in art and other works of beauty 3.13 1.59 
6 Is manipulative 2.66 1.43 
n=130  
a order in the questionnaire 
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 The 16-item FFM-CPQ has an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha (α=0.78), which 
indicates that there is adequate internal consistency and the plausibility that these items 
measure a single latent construct. It should be noted here that internal consistency, which 
is the interrelatedness of a set of items, is important for but not synonymous with 
homogeneity or the unidimensionality of a set of items (Schmitt, 1996). Table 6.4 
provides the inter-item correlations. Looking at those with high correlations such as (4) 
“Is very curious about learning new things” and (9) “Has wide interests” (0.60); (1) “Has 
a rich imagination” and (8) “Likes to get lost in thought” (0.59);  (13) “Often searches for 
stimulating things” and (14) “Is very energetic” (0.54) and (5) “Not really interested in 
art and other works of beauty*” and (7) “Sees the beauty in things that others might not 
notice” (-0.37), these suggest that there is good internal reliability between the items. 
TABLE 6.4: INTER-ITEM CORRELATION MATRIX 
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 1.0                
2 .28 1.0               
3 .35 .27 1.0              
4 .44 .26 .51 1.0             
5 -.30 -.01 -.08 -.15 1.0            
6 .23 -.01 .21 .24 -.09 1.0           
7 .40 .06 .18 .42 -.37 .08 1.0          
8 .59 .18 .34 .50 -.24 .17 .39 1.0         
9 .20 .16 .43 .60 -.29 .20 .38 .43 1.0        
10 -.01 -.17 -.14 -.10 .07 .03 .00 .11 .02 1.0       
11 -.17 -.04 -.25 -.24 .04 -.19 -.18 -.25 -.18 .04 1.0      
12 .24 .15 .35 .42 -.10 .11 .39 .46 .41 -.10 -.12 1.0     
13 .30 .01 .50 .48 -.21 .16 .30 .44 .52 .15 -.40 .44 1.0    
14 .30 .26 .51 .48 .02 .19 .22 .39 .40 .00 -.28 .40 .54 1.0   
15 -.24 -.14 -.49 -.25 .09 .02 -.09 -.23 -.07 .14 .27 -.26 -.27 -.17 1.0  
16 .10 .12 .20 .14 -.13 -.14 .07 .08 .17 .04 -.00 .10 .22 .27 -.12 1.0 
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24-Item Creative Personality Questionnaire (CPQ) Assessment 
The 24-item CPQ used a similar questionnaire method, as the above 16-item FFM-CPQ. 
Table 6.5 provides the means and standard deviation of the 24 items in the main study 
ranked by highest mean to lowest. 
TABLE 6.5: ITEMS ON THE 24-ITEM CPQ BASED ON MEAN SCORES 
a Items M SD 
14 A good teacher is one who gets students to become more curious about the 
world. (EM) 
5.22 0.93 
6 Acquiring new knowledge about the world is very stimulating to me (EM) 5.00 1.03 
24 I prefer a teacher who is serious than one who is playful (TA*) 4.85 0.98 
11 I am not very curious (TA*) 4.72 1.13 
10 I like things that are new and unusual (EM) 4.56 1.28 
2 I often daydream (EM) 4.50 1.31 
19 I like to discover new things on my own outside of class. (EM) 4.48 1.12 
4 I am studying at university simply because I enjoy learning new things (PM) 4.35 1.45 
12 I usually accomplish what I set out to do (PM) 4.15 1.13 
7 I like to strictly follow a daily routine in my life (TA*) 4.12 1.40 
17 I am reluctant to participate in new endeavors (TA*) 3.98 1.38 
16 I have a “never give up” attitude in life (PM) 3.92 1.66 
8 I often am absorbed in my studies and lose track of time (PM) 3.86 1.39 
9 I believe I am good at adapting to new and unfamiliar situations (SE) 3.83 1.43 
1 I’m good at finding common characteristics among dissimilar things (SE) 3.61 1.18 
18 I often think of new ways to use things around me (SE) 3.26 1.34 
5 I am good at proposing original solutions to a problem (SE) 3.24 1.35 
13 I am knowledgeable about many different subjects (SE) 3.10 1.33 
3 I prefer to conform to the rules than stand out (TA*) 3.05 1.39 
21 I am good at making analogies (SE) 2.99 1.24 
23 I quit when I cannot solve a problem (PM*) 2.96 1.31 
22 In a discussion, I rarely have an opinion on the topic (SE*) 2.92 1.46 
15 When confronted by a risk I will choose the safer side of things (TA*) 2.60 1.32 
a order in the questionnaire 
SE – Self-efficacy; PM – Persistent intrinsic motivation; TA – Tolerance towards ambiguity; EM 
– Exploratory intrinsic motivation 
* - Reverse items 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, from a pilot study that developed this questionnaire, four 
components theoretically labeled as the following emerged from that study: (1) Self-
efficacy (SE); (2) Persistent goal directed motivation (PE); (3) Tolerance of Ambiguity 
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(reversed items for Reluctance / Intolerance to ambiguity) (TA); and (4) Exploratory 
motivation (EM). Tables 6.6 – 6.9 provide the inter-item correlations, Cronbach’s alpha, 
and the average mean of all the items. Results indicate that self-efficacy and tolerance 
towards ambiguity items showed adequate reliability while the other two components 
showed questionable reliability. Despite this low reliability, which could be related to the 
shorter length of the measures, they may still be quite useful (see Schmitt, 1996).  
TABLE 6.6: SELF-EFFICACY (SE) (AVERAGE MEAN WITH ITEM 22 REVERSED M=3.45) 
a 1 5 9 13 18 21 22* 
1 1.0       
5 .32 1.0      
9 .35 .34 1.0     
13 .35 .38 .28 1.0    
18 .32 .47 .12 .44 1.0   
21 .37 .26 .19 .36 .16 1.0  
22* .14 .37 .42 .14 .06 .15 1.0 
a order in the questionnaire 
α=0.73 
* - Items reversed 
 
TABLE 6.7: PERSISTENCE AND MOTIVATION (PM)  (AVERAGE MEAN 4.00 * WITH ITEM 23 
REVERSED) 
a 4 8 12 16 23* 
4 1.0     
8 .35 1.0    
12 .15 .41 1.0   
16 .15 .27 .45 1.0  
23* .25 .33 .37 .24 1.0 
a order in the questionnaire 
α=0.67 
* - Items reversed 
 
TABLE 6.8: TOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY (TA) (AVERAGE MEAN 3.89) 
a 3 7 11 15 17 24 
3 1.0      
7 .48 1.0     
11 .38 .37 1.0    
15 .37 .27 .32 1.0   
17 .33 .25 .46 .34 1.0  
24 .14 .40 .31 .05 .25 1.0 
a order in the questionnaire 
α=0.73 
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TABLE 6.9: EXPLORATORY MOTIVATION (EM) (AVERAGE MEAN 4.75) 
a 2 6 10 14 19 
2 1.0     
6 .20 1.0    
10 .18 .42 1.0   
14 .24 .41 .31 1.0  
19 .17 .29 .36 .17 1.0 
a order in the questionnaire 
α=0.64 
 
Table 6.10 provides the inter-item correlations between the four constructs in this 
creative personality questionnaire. As expected all four items showed positive and 
significant correlations.  
TABLE 6.10: INTER-ITEM CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE FOUR COMPONENTS ON THE 24-ITEM 
CPQ 
 Self Efficacy 
Persistent 
Motivation 
Tolerance of 
Ambiguity 
Exploratory 
Motivation 
Self Efficacy 
 
 
1.0 
.00 
   
Persistent 
Motivation 
 
.41** 
.00 
1.0 
.00 
  
Tolerance of 
Ambiguity 
 
.57** 
.00  
.33** 
.00 
1.0 
.00 
 
Exploratory 
Motivation 
.53** 
.00 
.36* 
.00 
.53** 
.00 
1.0 
.00 
 
N=130 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level      
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
Past Creative Achievements Assessment 
The participants for this section of the study were asked to choose a binary “yes/no” 
response to the following prompt: 
Outside of your school classes have you ever ~  ?   Yes ___ | No ____ 
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This prompt was followed by a list of 34-items categorized into different domains of 
experience such as “Music, Arts and Writing” and “Math, Science and Computers” (See 
Table 6.11 for the full list). Each item was weighed (from 1 to 3) based on the 
significance of the achievement. For instance, the first item “taken an art class” is 
weighed with a “1” score and the total cumulative score in the main study for this item is 
“74”, which means that 74 of the 130 participants marked “yes” here. On the other hand, 
the item “sold an item of your art” is weighed with a “3” and has a total cumulative score 
of “12”, which means that only 4 participants marked “yes” for this item. Table 6.19 
provides the complete list of the items along with the total cumulative score for each 
item. 
TABLE 6.11: PAST CREATIVE ACHIEVEMENT ITEMS BASED ON CUMULATIVE SCORES 
a MUSIC, ARTS and WRITING (14 b)  c 
1 taken an art class 74 
2 won a prize for your art 104 
2 displayed your art in an exhibition 70 
3 sold an item of your art 12 
1 studied one of the traditional Japanese arts (flower arrangement, calligraphy, tea 
ceremony) 
71 
2 displayed your traditional Japanese arts (flower arrangement, calligraphy, tea 
ceremony) in an exhibition 
74 
1 done creative writing (poetry, short story, novel, manga) 39 
2 won a prize for your writing 24 
2 participated in a public reading of your writing 20 
3 published your writing in a journal or book 9 
1 taken a music class 65 
2 won a prize for your music 40 
2 publicly played a music concert  64 
3 recorded your own music 96 
 MATH, SCIENCE AND COMPUTERS (7)    
2 designed your own web site 34 
2 put together your own computer, radio, or other electronic device 38 
2 designed your own software 22 
2 won a prize at a science fair or local science event 16 
2 won a math award 4 
2 invented something that has actually been made and used by other people 6 
3 published in any kind of scientific research 18 
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 CLUBS, THEATER, DANCE, PERFROMANCE and PRESENTATIONS (6)  
1 started your own club 4 
2 acted live on stage for a theater play 16 
2 directed or produced a play or a short movie (YouTube) 20 
2 performed publicly in a dance performance 60 
2 done live comedy 30 
2 won a prize at a speech or presentation contest 30 
 HOME ARTS (7)  
1 invented a game 8 
1 cooked your own original recipe 39 
1 planned a trip by yourself 65 
1 designed your own clothing 8 
1 made someone a present 78 
1 made your own jewelry 23 
1 collected things (coins, stamps, insects, tape) 46 
 OTHER (WRITE IN ITEMS)  
1 (e.g.) Nail art, wrote lyrics to a song, pottery, made furniture, made a plastic model 26 
N=130 
a This number represents how each item is weighed - the higher the number the more significant 
the creative achievement.  
b This number is the total number of items in this domain  
c This number is the total cumulative score of all the participants for this individual item.  
 In the main study, the minimum score among all the participants was 0 and the 
highest score was 34 with an average mean cumulative score of 10.33. The total possible 
cumulative score score for this questionnaire was 78. 
Creative Self-Beliefs Assessment 
In this questionnaire, participants were asked to score on a 10-point scale from (1) “not 
creative at all” to (10) “very creative”, the level of creativity they believe they have in 
various domains of experience. This questionnaire has 24-items, so a total of 240 points 
is the highest possible score. In the main study, the minimum score was 56 and the 
maximum was 230 (M= 147, SD=40). Table 6.12 provides the means and standard 
deviation of the 24 items in the main study ranked by highest mean to lowest. 
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TABLE 6.12: ITEMS ON THE 24-ITEM CREATIVE SELF-BELIEFS QUESTIONNAIRE BASED ON MEAN 
SCORES 
a Items Mean SD 
4 Writing a computer program.   7.05 2.54 
6 Acting in film or theater.    6.60 2.78 
3 Doing puzzles or figuring out riddles. 6.58 2.57 
10 Thinking of new ways to use things around you.   6.57 2.37 
24 Doing art (drawing, painting, photography, pottery, graphic design). 6.56 3.11 
21 Finding something fun to do even when you don’t have any money. 6.50 2.92 
13 Solving difficult math problems.   6.45 2.70 
14 Coming up with humorous jokes.   6.39 2.68 
5 Giving a speech or presentation. 6.28 2.64 
9 Home life (clothes fashion, gardening, cleaning, cooking). 6.22 2.61 
7 Settling disputes between friends.   6.20 2.61 
18 Maintaining a good balance between my studies and my personal life.   6.15 2.64 
23 Brainstorming new ideas with your friends.   6.15 2.69 
12 Doing sports, gymnastics or dance.   6.07 2.48 
22 Doing experiments.   6.04 2.48 
11 Thinking of ways to help the community.   6.02 2.14 
1 Writing poems or short stories.   5.84 3.33 
15 Coming up with ways to fix a buggy computer.   5.82 2.84 
19 Putting together electronic devices (radio, computer, robot) 5.82 3.22 
16 Playing a musical instrument or singing.   5.81 2.82 
20 Traveling and interacting with other cultures.   5.68 2.63 
8 Sketching out ideas that you come up with for inventing a new 
product. 
5.56 3.35 
17 Making people feel relaxed and comfortable.    5.22 3.21 
2 Teaching something to someone.    5.19 3.35 
N=130;   a order in the questionnaire 
Tables 6.13 – 6.15 provide the inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for each of 
the three creativity domains found in this questionnaire. All three show adequate to good 
internal reliability.  
TABLE 6.13: THE ARTS AND PERFORMANCE ITEMS  
a 1 5 6 9 12 14 16 24 
1 1.0        
5 .36 1.0       
6 .36 .53 1.0      
9 .24 .27 .43 1.0     
12 .03 .31 .42 .38 1.0    
14 .48 .39 .62 .42 .42 1.0   
16 .10 .28 .36 .32 .29 .40 1.0  
24 .65 .39 .55 .38 .17 .56 .18 1.0 
α=0.82; a The numbers are how they appeared in the questionnaire and correspond to the items in 
the before mentioned table 
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TABLE 6.14: THE SOCIAL SELF ITEMS 
a 2 7 11 17 18 20 21 23 
2 1.0        
7 .48 1.0       
11 -.17 .12 1.0      
17 .72 .37 .04 1.0     
18 .35 .49 .13 .45 1.0    
20 .08 -.02 .26 .26 .11 1.0   
21 .60 .31 -.09 .71 .31 .05 1.0  
23 .24 .08 .30 .47 .09 .34 .31 1.0 
α=0.76 
 
TABLE 6.15: THE SCIENCES, MATH AND LOGIC ITEMS  
a 3 4 8 10 13 15 21 23 
3 1.0        
4 .23 1.0       
8 .29 .34 1.0      
10 .29 .28 .45 1.0     
13 .45 .48 .49 .32 1.0    
15 .30 .42 .20 .29 .29 1.0   
19 .29 .15 .64 .17 .56 .04 1.0  
22 .05 .28 .50 .39 .30 .27 .31 1.0 
α=0.79 
 In summary, in the above analysis, I have described the descriptive statistics from 
the 4 questionnaires used in the main study. The first two looked specifically at the 
creative personality. I used these two in order to look at creativity from multiple trait 
dimensions. The Past Creative Achievement Questionnaire examined the participants past 
experiences in a range of creative activities. This type of questionnaire has been widely 
used in the literature to measure “real world” creativity (see Chapter 4), but was 
developed specifically for this study for Japanese university students. The final 
questionnaire looked at one’s perceived creativity in varying domains. In this next part of 
this subsection, I shift my focus from the questionnaires to the creative products.  
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6.4.1.2 Creativity Tasks: The Creative Products 
In the main study, I used three different tasks to prompt the participants to produce a 
creative product. Two prompted them to generate some form of a drawing and the third 
one prompted them to write a short poem. I explain how each one of these tasks was 
assessed below and provide some examples of the variations in scores. 
Creative Product: Drawing Assessment 
As explained in more detail in sections 4.1.1 and 5.3.3, participants completed two 
different drawing tasks. In the first task, the participants were presented with an 
incomplete picture consisting of only 4 lines, which they then were asked to complete. In 
the second drawing task, the participants were given a page full of circles and were asked 
to draw as many pictures as possible from these circles. In order to assess the creative 
product drawings 1 and 2, I recruited three (3rd and 4th year) undergraduate art majors 
from the faculty of education to evaluate the drawings. I placed all the images onto a 
PowerPoint file, one drawing per slide13. The evaluators came into a small classroom 
with a large Big Pad in the room. They were told to use their own subjective opinion of 
creativity and to evaluate each one accordingly. They viewed each slide for 
approximately 5-8 seconds. In order to first get a feel of the level of creativity among 
these drawings, they viewed all of them twice. The first time, they were asked to simply 
mark an “L”, “M”, or “H” next to each number corresponding to each drawing. Then the 
second time viewing the drawings, each rater evaluated the drawings on a 6-point Likert 
scale from (1) “not creative” to (6) “very creative”. The three evaluators inter-rater 
                                                      
 
13 See http://bbirdsell.wixsite.com/index/project-page and http://bbirdsell.wixsite.com/index/creativity-research-2 for a full list of these drawings in PDF 
format 
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reliability was very good (Drawing 1, α=0.88; Drawing 2, α=0.94). For Drawing 1, the 
average cumulative score by the three raters was 9.45 with a range from 3 to 18 and 9.24 
with a range from 3 to 18 for Drawing 2. The two sets of scores for the drawings were 
then summed for a total creative product drawing score with a range from 6 to 35 and an 
average score of 18.69. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show examples of the range of scores from 
low to high as judged by the evaluators.  
Low cumulative score “3” 
(subject 31) 
Middle cumulative score “9” 
(subject 58) 
High cumulative score “18” 
(subject 111) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Examples of the range of scores for the drawing task 1 
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Low cumulative score “3”  
(subject 38) 
 
 
 
 
Middle cumulative score “9” 
(subject 22) 
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High cumulative score “18” 
(subject 61) 
 
Figure 6.4: Examples of the range of scores for the drawing task 2 
 
Creative Product Drawing 1: Originality 
The originality, or the statistical uniqueness, of drawing 1 was also assessed using the 
pilot study results as a criterion. In Chapter 5, I outlined how I developed this originality 
criterion based on a collected pool sample of drawings over a two-year span. They were 
scored based on a 6-point scale. 6-point scores were given to drawings that were 
completely original, 5-point scores to those that had occurred 3 times or less (e.g., fish, 
tower, boat) and each subsequent lower score were more statistically common drawings 
up until 1-point, which referred to those that occurred over 10% (e.g., pen/pencil and 
house) in the collected pool sample. The scores in the main study ranged from 1 to 6 with 
a mean average of 3.54.  
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Creative Product Drawing 2: Fluency 
Creative product drawing 2, which required the participants to draw as many pictures as 
possible from a series of circles, were then given a fluency score based on the sheer 
number of drawings each participant drew (along with the before mentioned overall 
creativity score). On the page there were 5 pairs of circles horizontally arranged into 9 
rows. So there were 45 possible images, although it should be noted that many 
participants did not restrict themselves to drawing an image for each pair of circles, 
which means that one image could include a number of circles (e.g., the legs of an 
octopus could include 5-6 pairs of circles). I created a simple scoring criterion for this in 
order to maintain a 6-point scale, similar to the originality criterion, based on counting 
the number of images (see Table 6.16 for the complete 6-point scale). For instance, 
subject 38 only drew 4 images, so received 1-point. On the other hand, subject 22 
produced 21 images, so received 3-points (see Figure 6.4 above for the drawings from 
these subjects).  
TABLE 6.16: SCORING CRITERION FOR DRAWING 2 FLUENCY ASSESSMENT 
1 0 – 7 
2 8 – 15 
3 16 – 23 
4 24 – 31 
5 32 – 39 
6 Over 40 
 
 
Creative Product: Poem Assessment 
For the final creative product, the participants were asked to write a short poem like a 
haiku. In section 4.5, I described the rationale for using this type of creative product. 
Moreover in section 5.3.2, I provided some background in how I developed this task 
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specificity for this final study. In order to score the creativity of these short poems, five 
independent raters were selected to assist in evaluating the poems in this study. Four of 
the five raters were professors at a national university in Japan and the fifth one was a 
PhD student in an Asian Studies department at a university in the U.S., but was currently 
doing research in Japan. Three were native Japanese speakers with some knowledge of 
English and two were native English speakers, but highly fluent in Japanese and had a 
strong background in Japanese literature (i.e., the before mentioned PhD student). Each 
rater was first provided a hard copy of all the poems and asked to read through them and 
provided each poem a simple score of L (“low”), M (“medium”), or H (“high”). A week 
later, I sent them a link to a Google form with all the poems and a 6-point scale under 
each poem (see Figure 6.5 for an example). They were asked now to provide a score for 
each poem by rating each one from 1 to 6 (“1” being the least creative and “6” being the 
most creative).  
 
Figure 6.5: Screenshot example of the form for rating the poems 
They were also informed that there should be roughly an even number of poems 
distributed among the 6-point scale, but it did not have to be exactly evenly divided. The 
following suggestions were provided at the top of this form to help guide the raters when 
rating each poem: 
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• Is the poem creative? 
• Is the word choice in the poem novel?  
• Does the poem have good rhythm?  
• Does the poem possess rich imagery?  
• Is the poem expressed clearly?  
The poems on the Google form appeared in random order for each rater therefore 
lessening the chance of the order influencing their scores. Each poem had a numeric code 
next to it (in Figure 6.5, the code is “01”), so they could reference the hard copy of poems 
that they had previously rated “L”, “M”, and “H”, which also had the code attached to 
each one. Table 6.17 provides the mean scores for each rater. Despite rater 3 and 5 
scoring the poems considerably higher than rater 1, the five raters had adequate internal 
consistency (α=0.70) between their scores.  
TABLE 6.17: MEAN SCORE FOR EACH RATER ON THE POEM ASSESSMENT  
Rater Mean SD 
Rater 1 2.86 1.23 
Rater 2 3.23 1.25 
Rater 3 3.82 0.82 
Rater 4 3.30 0.94 
Rater 5 3.85 1.20 
n=125  
The five scores for each rater than were summed, providing each participant an overall 
score for the verbal part of the creative product. The average score was 17.06 with a low 
score of “9” and a high of “26”. Table 6.18 provides a couple examples of poems that 
were evaluated with a “9” (low), “15” (medium), and “25-26” (high). I included “25” 
since only one poem received a “26” score. So in short, this means that there was not one 
poem that received all “1’s” or all “6’s” from all 5 raters. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, participants were asked to write a short poem like a haiku, using one of the 
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seasons as the topic (See Appendix J for the full list of poems in Japanese by the 
participants).  
TABLE 6.18: EXAMPLES OF SCORING VARIATION IN THE CREATIVE PRODUCT: POEMS 
Low Score “9” Example Medium Score “15” Example High Scores “25-26” Example 
(subject 93) 
Summer has come 
the cherry blossoms scatter - 
Hirosaki Castle 
 
夏が来て	 桜が散るなり	
弘前城 
 
(subject 10) 
With the bicycle, 
a whiteness swaying - 
one-piece  
 
自転車と	 白く揺れる	 ワ
ンピース 
 
(Note: one-piece is a Japanese 
borrowed word from English, 
but in more colloquial English 
refers to a dress or summer 
dress.) 
(subject 84) 
A fleeting moment 
flowing unbroken  
a stream and a field 
not knowing where it goes 
it has a purpose 
 
はかなくも        縷々とし流
る        野の小川        行方も
知らず        目指すものあり        
（折句：はるのゆめ） 
(Note: In Japanese the subject 
wrote an acrostic poem – the 
first sound of each line makes 
a new word. Translated from 
Japanese, it is “Spring 
Dream”. ) 
 
 
(subject 125) 
I am going with you 
to the firework festival 
how I look forward to it 
 
君とゆく  花火大会  楽しみ
に 
(subject 62)  
Friends 
parting and meeting  
on this spring morning 
 
仲間との	 別れと出会いの	
春の朝 
 
(Note: Spring is the start of the 
school year in Japan.) 
(subject 100) 
So many icicles  
All lined up – 
A glockenspiel! 
 
つららをね	 たくさん並べ	
グロッケン 
 
(Note: ね – is a colloquial 
sound meaning something like 
“hey look...”) 
A few noticeable differences emerged from these examples. First the lower scored 
examples tended to be very conventional (e.g., the scattering of cherry blossoms) or 
situational (e.g., going to a firework festival) while the mid-level scored examples used 
more imagery, as in subject 10’s poem. In this example, the writer mixed the movement 
of the bicycle with the swaying color of a dress blowing in the wind. The highest scored 
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poems were quite different. Subject 84 used a complex writing technique to compose the 
poem whereby the first sound in each line formed a word pair or perhaps a title for the 
poem while subject 100 created this simple, but unique analogy between a row of 
hanging icicles and a glockenspiel. So the combination of simplicity, uniqueness, and 
imagery could possibly explain why the raters highly evaluated this poem for creativity. 
6.4.1.3 Summary to the Creativity Assessment Section 
In this subsection, I described how each creativity instrument was scored for the main 
study. The two personality questionnaires followed very similar scoring methods that are 
typically used in the psychometric tradition of personality assessment. On the other hand, 
the Past Creative Achievement Questionnaire used a scaling technique based on the 
significance of the achievement whereby some achievements had a higher score than 
others. The self-beliefs questionnaire relied on a cumulative score over a wide array of 
activities in various domains of experience. The creative products used the consensual 
assessment technique to score the creativity of the drawings along with a uniqueness and 
fluency score for drawing 1 and drawing 2, respectively. Likewise, the poem also used 
the consensual assessment technique to evaluate the creativity of the writing. The main 
difficulty in the assessment of these creative products was finding raters who had some 
interest, background, and specialty in the arts and poetry. 
6.4.2 ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE ON THE CREATIVE METAPHOR PRODUCTION 
TASKS 
A total of 124 participants completed the Metaphor Creativity Tasks in English while 128 
completed the Japanese version. This discrepancy is likely based on the difficulty of 
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doing this task in a foreign language. Moreover it could also be the result that the English 
version was the 3rd part of this study and therefore it is possible that a few participants 
lost interest in this research and/or failed to return to complete it. In the following parts of 
this section, I first address the context independent task and then the go into more detail 
about the assessments in each language (English and Japanese).  
6.4.2.1 The Context Independent Task 
Scores for the context independent task consisted of a fluency and creativity score. The 
fluency score was the cumulative number of responses they provided for each prompt 
while the creativity score was the summed score provided by three independent raters 
based on a 3-point scale. As a quick summary of this task, the participants were asked to 
produce as many metaphors as possible using the following four topics, two in each 
language:  “Love” (English 1 – E1), “Memories” (English 2 – E2) and “Life” (Japanese 1 
– J1) “Looking for a Job” (Japanese 2 – J2). The participants were then asked to choose 
the one that they thought was the most creative and provide an interpretation of it. So the 
fluency score was based on the absolute number of metaphors they came up with for each 
topic. These were then aggregated into one fluency score labeled “Japanese Context 
Independent Metaphor Score - Fluency” (JCIMS-F) for the L1 (Mean=8.96; Low=3; 
High=22) and “English Context Independent Metaphor Score - Fluency” (ECIMS-F) for 
the L2 (Mean=6.64; Low=2; High=19).  
 The second score focused on creativity and utilized a consensual assessment 
technique, whereby three independent raters evaluated the metaphors and interpretations 
of them for creativity. In order to accomplish this, I created four Google forms for each of 
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the four topics and inputted all the participant responses into these forms. Each 
metaphor/interpretation item had a unique participant code attached to it and beneath it a 
3-point Likert scale scored as follows: 
• 1 – Not creative > literal, not appropriate, or highly conventional responses 
• 2 – Somewhat creative > extended conventional responses 
• 3 –Creative  > surprising and novel responses 
The raters were all professors at universities in Japan or PhD students associated with a 
university in the UK with some background knowledge in metaphor research. They were 
told to use their own opinions of creativity, but were also presented with an outline of key 
aspects of creativity (as presented in the previous Chapter 5.4.3), in order to rate these 
metaphor/interpretation items. Each rater saw the responses in a different order 
(randomly generated) in order to avoid any bias based on the positioning of the metaphor 
in the list. Scores on the 2 tasks were then aggregated into one score in each language and 
labeled “Japanese Context Independent Metaphor Score - Creativity” (JCIMS-C) for the 
L1 (Mean=9.59; Low=6; High=18) and “English Context Independent Metaphor Score - 
Creativity” (ECIMS-C) for the L2 (Mean=11.78; Low=314; High=18).  
The Context Independent Task: English 
Participants in this final study completed two variants of the context independent tasks 
one in English and the other in Japanese. In order to assess the English part, three native 
English-speaking raters independently scored the responses for creativity. Their 
assessments showed adequate inter-rater reliability between them (α=0.76 and α=0.74 
                                                      
 
14 The 3 score is possible because one participant only completed one of the topics and left the other blank.  
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respectively for the two different tasks). Tables 6.19 (E1) and 6.20 (E2) show the raters 
mean scores and standard deviations for the English topics followed by a set of examples 
that the raters evaluated with a low score and another set they evaluated with a high score 
(See Appendix L for the full list of the participant responses to these two metaphor tasks 
in each language).  
TABLE 6.19: E1: CONTEXT INDEPENDENT TASK – TOPIC: MEMORIES 
Rater Mean SD 
Rater 1 2.05 0.73 
Rater 2 1.90 0.75 
Rater 3 1.94 0.79 
n=124 α=0.76 
Rater 1 Frequency % Rater 2 Frequency % Rater 3 Frequency % 
1 28 22.6 1 39 31.5 1 40 32.3 
2 62 50.0 2 58 46.8 2 51 41.1 
3 34 27.4 3 27 21.8 3 33 26.6 
 
 
The following are examples of those that were scored low by all 3 evaluators (English 
version): 
* The first part is the metaphor, the sentence following the “>>” is the participant’s interpretation 
of the metaphor.  
Memories are dream >> Memories fade soon. (Subject 7) 
Memories are mind >> Because the one which matches mind is easier to take out and 
than a picture is taken with a camera a memory is in the neighborhood all the while. 
(Subject 14) 
Memories are life. >> Memories are grand sum of life. (Subject 89) 
Memories are ambiguous >> Even if we think we remembered things correctly, our 
memories are not correct. We often remember mistakenly. (Subject 91) 
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The following are examples of those that were scored high by all 3 evaluators (English 
version): 
Memories are bottles pouring water. >> Memories we can have is a limit. The older the 
memory is, the more likely it is forgot like bottle pouring water overflow. (Subject 21) 
Memories are many kinds of fruits. >> There are many kinds of fruits on the earth. Tastes 
of fruits are various for example, bitter, sweet and sourness. We experience a lot of things 
in our life. So our experiences are like fruits taste. (Subject 34) 
Memories are handcuffs. >> Memories are handcuffs, because memories often constrain 
people. (Subject 63) 
Memories are leaves. >> Some memories fall down and others are eaten by worms. 
(Subject 108) 
TABLE 6.20: E2: CONTEXT INDEPENDENT TASK – TOPIC: LOVE 
Rater Mean SD 
Rater 1 1.90 0.78 
Rater 2 1.82 0.63 
Rater 3 2.15 0.73 
n=124 α=0.74 
Rater 1 Frequency % Rater 2 Frequency % Rater 3 Frequency % 
1 44 35.5 1 36 29.0 1 21 16.9 
2 48 38.7 2 74 59.7 2 64 51.6 
3 32 25.8 3 14 11.3 3 39 31.5 
 
 
 
The following are examples of those that were scored low by all 3 evaluators (English 
version): 
Love is big. >> Everyone has big love. (Subject 56) 
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Love is peace. >> When people love other person, they become kind to other person. It is 
happiness. (Subject 81) 
Love is something which we can not stop. >> We cannot stop loving after it starts. 
(Subject 114) 
Love is truth. >> No one tell a lie to love, love is a truth. (Subject 130) 
The following are examples of those that were scored high by all 3 evaluators (English 
version): 
Love is an umbrella. >> If it is a sunny day (good day) we don't need it or just put it in 
our bag. However it is rainy day, umbrella stay with us together. (Subject 44) 
Love is paints.  >> There are many kinds of love as there are many kinds of color in 
paints. Expressing love is different depending on the person while painting is different 
depending on the person. How to love is decided by what you have done until now and 
how to paint is decided by what you have done until now. (Subject 62) 
Love is three-legged race. >> If they do not think about each other, they cannot advance. 
When one do not work well, the other can support him. (Subject 72) 
Love is a hot stone. >> When we fall in love, at first the love is very ambitious, but 
gradually it wither. A hot stone is at first very hot, but gradually it became cold. (Subject 
97) 
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 What appears from these metaphors and the subsequent evaluations of them is 
that when participants used an abstract source (e.g., Memories are mind, Love is truth) to 
complete the metaphor they were often rated low by the evaluators, but when they used a 
concrete or a more embodied source (e.g., Memories are leaves, Love is a hot stone), they 
were rated more creative. Where raters differed in their scores, this usually only occurred 
by a single point. For example, one rater gave a certain response a “1” score and another 
rater gave the same response a “2” score. Rarely did the raters provide scores that 
differed by more than two points. Some examples, when this did occur are the following:  
§ Memories are evidence. >> Memories are our identity. Our experiences make our 
characters. (Subject 75) (Rater 2 score=1; Rater 1 score =3) 
§ Love is tolerance. >> People relatively have different ideas, so if they do not have 
tolerance, this world would be covered with storms of quarrels. (Subject 57) (Rater 1 
score=1; Rater 3 score =3) 
What is interesting about the above examples and the discrepancy in scores is how the 
raters may have differently interpreted the responses. The first one, “memories are 
evidence”, it is possible that rater 2 interpreted “evidence” as the abstract meaning of the 
word, “proof, confirmation, etc.” while rater 1 may have viewed it quite differently, as in, 
the more perceptual meaning, “signs, traces, marks, etc.”. In the latter case, memories are 
these physical marks or traces that one leaves behind in the world, so a memory is like a 
fingerprint or threadlike piece of hair left behind and points somehow to the fact that this 
person was once there. In contrast, the former interpretation is more difficult to 
conceptualize. The second metaphor example above actually appears to more closely 
resemble a literal statement insofar as it refers to the fact that one needs to be tolerant 
when showing the emotion of love. So it is relatively clear why rater 1 may have scored it 
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low. On the other hand, the participant’s interpretation of the metaphor is quite 
interesting and the idea that without tolerance, love and the world in general would fall 
into “storms of quarrel”. So one possibility for the discrepancy between the scores is that 
rater 1 may have focused more heavily on the metaphor and rater 3 focused more on the 
interpretation of it.  
The Context Independent Task: Japanese 
Three native Japanese-speaking raters independently assessed the creativity of the context 
independent task. Their assessments also showed good inter-rater reliability between 
them (α =0.82 and α =0.87 respectively for the two different tasks). Tables 6.21 (J1) and 
6.22 (J2) show the raters mean scores and standard deviations for the Japanese topics 
followed by a set of examples that the raters evaluated with a low score and another set 
they evaluated with a high score.  
TABLE 6.21: J1: CONTEXT INDEPENDENT TASK – TOPIC: LIFE 
Rater Mean SD 
Rater 1 1.84 0.64 
Rater 2 1.51 0.70 
Rater 3 1.67 0.63 
n=128 α=0.82 
Rater 1 Frequency % Rater 2 Frequency % Rater 3 Frequency % 
1 38 29.7 1 78 61.0 1 53 41.4 
2 72 56.3 2 35 27.3 2 64 50.0 
3 18 14.1 3 15 11.7 3 11 8.6 
 
The following are examples of those that were scored low by all 3 evaluators (Japanese 
version): 
Life is sadness. >> In life one notices the sad and harsh things more than happy things. Therefore 
in order to avoid these unpleasant things, people try to improve and seek a better direction. Yet in 
the end, I think that life is meaningful because of the sadness. [人生は悲しみだ。>>人生は幸
せなことよりも悲しみや苦しみのほうが目につく。だからこそその嫌なことを避けるた
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めに改善を求めていい方向に持っていこうとする。だから、結局は人生は悲しみがあっ
てこそのものだと思うから。(Subject 45) ] 
Life is effort. >>  I think that the most important thing in life is effort. In order to achieve one’s 
goals, effort is essential. Humans are human beings because they keeping trying until they die. [
人生は努力です。>> 人生において一番大切なものは努力だと思います。どんな目標を
達成するにしろ努力が欠かせません。人間は死ぬまで努力し続けることで人間たるので
す。(Subject 58) ] 
The following are examples of those that were scored high by all 3 evaluators (Japanese 
version): 
Life is an electrocardiogram. >> An ECG moves up and down like the repetitive up and down 
movement of success and failure in life. [人生は心電図 >>心電図が上下するように、人生も
うまくいくこととうまくいかないことの繰り返しだから。(Subject 22)] 
Life is stir-fried vegetables. >> Stir-fried vegetables basically are not decided for you, but you 
have to choose the ones to cook with and also the spices you use. Everyone also cuts up the 
vegetables differently. So if ten people made stir-fried vegetables, you are likely to get ten 
different kinds of stir-fried vegetables. This is the same as life.  [人生は野菜炒めです。>>野菜
炒めは、基本的な材料が決まっていないから、自分で材料を選んで、味付けも考えなけ
ればなりません。野菜の切り方も様々だし、十人が作ったら十種類の野菜炒めができま
す。これは人生に通じます。(Subject 111) 
TABLE 6.22: J2: CONTEXT INDEPENDENT TASK – TOPIC: JOB-HUNTING 
Rater Mean SD 
Rater 1 1.70 0.74 
Rater 2 1.34 0.61 
Rater 3 1.53 0.66 
n=128 α=0.87 
Rater 1 Frequency % Rater 2 Frequency % Rater 3 Frequency % 
1 59 46.1 1 94 73.4 1 72 56.3 
2 48 38.0 2 25 19.5 2 44 34.4 
3 21 16.4 3 9 7.0 3 12 9.4 
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The following are examples of those that were scored low by all 3 evaluators (Japanese 
version): 
Job-hunting is a meeting. >> It is a place to meet friends who you will work with in the future and 
meet your future bosses. At the same time, it is also a place to earnestly meet to carry out plans to 
raise profits and return some of these profits to make new products and services. [就活は出会い
です。>> 将来一緒に同じような業務内容の仕事をするであろう仲間に出会ったり、将
来の上司に出会ったりする場所です。同時に、会社という、利益を上げてその一部を新
しい商品やサービスに還元するサイクルを行なっていく場所に本格的に出会うところで
もあります。(Subject 1)] 
Job-hunting is is difficult. >> You have to think about what kind of person you are and what you 
want to do in the future. Then go to many companies and do many interviews. When rejected 
from these jobs, you will become very depressed. Looking at all of this, job hunting is very hard. 
[就活は大変です。>> 自分はどのような人か、将来どうなりたいのか、自分について考
えること。多くの企業に行って、面接などをすること。 不採用になるとすごく落ち込む
こと。 これらを全部見て、就活はとても大変です。(Subject 12)] 
The following are examples of those that were scored high by all 3 evaluators (Japanese 
version): 
Job-hunting is a tide. >> The one who can successfully ride the wave will be raised up. After a 
long time adrift that person will be lifted up. [就活は潮流です。＞＞うまく波に乗れたもの
が引き上げられます。長い漂流の後、引き上げられたりします。(Subject 23)] 
Job-hunting is natto15. >> Natto is said to be delicious when you eat it after mixing it 100 times. It 
is because you have to work hard to get used to job hunting after preparing firmly as you did 
before eating natto. [就活は納豆です。>>納豆は、１００回まぜてから食べるとおいしい
という。就活も納豆を食べる前のようにしっかりと準備をおこなってから、ねばりづよ
くがんばらねばならないから。(Subject 126)] 
                                                      
 
15 natto is a common type of food in Japan, which is typically translated as sticky fermented soybeans. 
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 Differences of two points again were uncommon among the raters. It did occur in 
a few examples, especially with rater 2 who generally gave the responses a lower score 
compared to the other two raters. Below are two examples when this did occur: 
§ Life is a cicada. >> That is to say in a moment it just passes by.人生は蝉です。>> あっ
という間に過ぎてしまうということ。(Subject 53) (Rater 1 score=3; Rater 2 score 
=1; Rater 3 score =3) 
§ Life is a field. >> Life is a field because after much effort every day, it bears fruit. Thanks 
to the sun, rain, insects, and many other things a field can develop, in a similar way, life 
can be developed thanks to the help of many people.  人生は畑です。>> 日々の努力の
分だけ実りがあるから。太陽や水、虫など多くのもののおかげで成り立つように、
人生もまた多くの人のおかげで成っているから。(Subject 127) (Rater 1 score=3; 
Rater 2 score =1; Rater 3 score =2) 
In the next part of this subsection, I address the second metaphor task used in the main 
study, the context dependent task. I first describe the scoring criteria and then the 
descriptive statistics for this task in both languages.  
6.4.2.2 The Context Dependent Task 
The context dependent task required the participants to complete a sentence that primed 
them to use a metaphor. In order to evaluate participant responses to this task, I used a 
scoring criterion based on the following scale in this study: 
• 1 – Not Creative > literal or highly conventional responses 
• 2 – Somewhat Creative > extended conventional responses 
• 3 – Creative > novel, but difficult to find meaning in the responses 
• 4 – Very Creative > novel, surprising, and meaningful responses 
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 As discussed in Chapter 5, it was decided that this scale needed one additional 
score compared to the context independent task, due to the greater variation in the 
responses. For instance, in the context independent task, the participant had to complete a 
metaphor, but in this task, the participant was simply primed by the context to use a 
metaphor to complete the sentence, but could also have provided a more literal response.  
The differences between these 4-scores were determined based on a number of features 
such as conventionality, familiarity, and literalness on the lower side of the scale and 
novelty, originality, and surprise on the higher side of the scale. Also appropriateness was 
considered an important factor for a response to be very creative. That is to say, it had to 
allow one to recover the familiar within the novelty of the response or more precisely it 
had to allow one to construe meaning within it. It should be noted here that when a 
participant attempted to complete a few sentences in this task (there were a total of 5 
sentences), but left others blank – in such cases, these responses were given a “0” score. 
For participants who did not even attempt to complete this section were provided “data 
not available” for this section of the study. For the Japanese version, I first went through 
all the responses and translated them into English. Then for each version (English and 
Japanese), I gave the responses a score from 1-4 based on the above criteria. Then two 
native English speakers corroborated these scores for the English responses and two 
native Japanese speakers did the same for the Japanese responses. Items of disagreement 
between the raters were then discussed until a compromise was reached. Scores on the 5 
complete the sentence items were then aggregated into one score in each language and 
labeled “Japanese Context Dependent Metaphor Score” (JCDMS) and “English Context 
Dependent Metaphor Score” (ECDMS). 
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The Context Dependent Task: English 
In this task, the participants had to complete 5 sentences that primed them to use a 
metaphor. Each sentence was coded. For instance, the first English sentence was coded 
E1 and the next one E2 and subsequent ones followed this pattern. Table 6.23 provides 
the English items’ mean scores and standard deviations for each of the 5 sentences and 
the total average cumulative score for all 5 items. Table 6.24 looks at the English items’ 
score frequencies. For items 1, 3 and 5 a “1” score was most frequent while for items 2 
and 4, a “2” score was most frequent. Responses that received a “4” or highly creative 
score ranged from 5.3% (E4) to 15.3% (E2). Following these two tables, example 
responses for each scoring code in the scale are provided.  
TABLE 6.23: CONTEXT DEPENDENT TASK: ENGLISH ITEMS MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD 
DEVIATIONS 
Items Mean SD 
Item E1 1.47 1.0 
Item E2 2.39 0.97 
Item E3 1.90 1.07 
Item E4 1.85 0.82 
Item E5 1.46 0.87 
Cumulative average for all 5 items: 9.07 
 
TABLE 6.24: CONTEXT DEPENDENT TASK: ENGLISH ITEMS SCORE FREQUENCIES 
Item E1 Frequency % Item E2 Frequency % Item E3 Frequency % 
0 9 6.9 0 2 1.5 0 2 1.5 
1 75 58.1 1 17 13.0 1 54 41.3 
2 61 17.6 2 57 43.5 2 43 32.8 
3 18 5.3 3 29 22.1 3 7 5.3 
4 16 7.6 4 20 15.3 4 19 14.5 
Item E4 Frequency % Item E5 Frequency % 
0 - - 0 1 .8 
1 45 34.4 1 87 66.4 
2 60 45.8 2 25 19.1 
3 13 9.9 3 3 2.3 
4 7 5.3 4 9 6.9 
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The following are examples of those that were given a “4” score (English version): 
The school festival was suppose to be a fun occasion, but when the teacher saw the students 
painting on the walls he got really angry. He ... is weather in the mountains.  (Item E4, subject 
48) 
In writing class, Mary has been told to look into her past and ...  bring from old shelf ... some of 
her memories for there is a lot of good drama there. (Item E1, subject 111) 
The following is an example of one that was given a “3” score (English version): 
After graduating from university, he has not been able to find a job. But still he bought a new car 
and a lot of new clothes. Now he has a lot of credit card debt and worries. He ... is now standing 
on the edge of hell. (Item E2, subject 123) 
The following are examples of those that were given a “2” score (English version): 
I met this really great girl or boy last night. We went out and had a great time. When I got home I 
couldn’t sleep. She or he really ... is an angel. (Item E5, subject 59) 
The school festival was suppose to be a fun occasion, but when the teacher saw the students 
painting on the walls he got really angry. He ... is like an exploded bomb.  (Item E4, subject 95) 
The following are examples of those that were given a “1” score (English version): 
In writing class, Mary has been told to look into her past and ...  notice ... some of her memories 
for there is a lot of good drama there. (Item E1, subject 5) 
Yesterday in Odaiba, AKB48 came to sign autographs for their fans. There were so many people 
waiting outside and when they finally opened up the gate to let the fans approach the tables, ... it 
was panic. (Item E3, subject 4) 
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The Context Dependent Task: Japanese 
Similar to the English version, the participants had to complete 5 sentences that primed 
them to use a metaphor. Then each sentence was coded. For instance, the first Japanese 
sentence was coded J1 and the next one J2 and subsequent ones followed this pattern. 
Table 6.25 provides the Japanese items’ mean scores and standard deviations for each of 
the 5 sentences in this section and the total average cumulative score for all 5 items. 
Table 6.26 looks at the Japanese items’ score frequencies.  
TABLE 6.25: CONTEXT DEPENDENT TASK: JAPANESE ITEMS MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD 
DEVIATIONS 
Items Mean SD 
Item J1 1.96 .90 
Item J2 2.03 .90 
Item J3 1.95 1.0 
Item J4 1.67 .99 
Item J5 1.74 .82 
Cumulative average for all 5 items: 9.35 
 
TABLE 6.26: CONTEXT DEPENDENT TASK: JAPANESE ITEMS SCORE FREQUENCIES 
Item J1 Frequency % Item J2 Frequency % Item J3 Frequency % 
1 40 30.8 1 36 27.7 1 48 36.9 
2 67 51.5 2 66 50.8 2 59 45.4 
3 7 5.4 3 12 9.2 3 1 .8 
4 14 10.8 4 14 10.8 4 20 15.4 
Item J4 Frequency % Item J5 Frequency % 
0 1 .8 0 - - 
1 74 56.9 1 54 41.5 
2 32 24.6 2 62 47.7 
3 8 6.2 3 3 2.3 
4 13 10 4 9 6.9 
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The following are examples of those that were given a “4” score (Japanese version): 
 
His parents had many expectations that their son would be successful, so they got him into an 
expensive private university. But rather than studying hard, he began to party every night and in 
the end he had to drop out of school. His parents dream ... scattered like a snowstorm of torn up 
paper. （両親は、息子の成功へ期待を多く抱いていたので、彼らは高い私立大学に息子
を入学させた。しかし、彼は一生懸命勉強せず、パーティーで一晩中外出し始め、最終
的には学校を中退した。両親の夢は。。。紙吹雪のように散った。） (Item J3, subject 
14) 
 
When she was asked by her friend to give a speech at her wedding, she ... became a sparrow and 
quickly flew off. （結婚披露のスピーチを友達に頼んだら、彼女は。。。雀になり、素早
く逃げ去った。） (Item J2, subject 66) 
 
 
The following is an example of one that was given a “3” score (Japanese version): 
 
It was really exciting for I was competing against the top-level skaters in the world in the 
Olympics. So I will never forget this experience. This experience ... is more valuable than the 
Pacific Ocean.（本当にワクワクしている。なぜなら世界で最高のスケーターと競うため
にオリンピックに来たからだ。そして、私はこの経験を決して忘れません。この経験は
。。。太平洋よりも大きな価値がある。） (Item J4, subject 103) 
 
The following are examples of those that were given a “2” score (Japanese version): 
 
She has a beautiful voice. Whenever I hear her voice, I think of ...  the chirping of a bird in the 
morning.（彼女は素晴らしい声を持っています。私が彼女の歌声を聞く時はいつでも 、
。。。朝にさえずる小鳥。。。を想像する。）(Item J1, subject 122) 
 
When I passed the university entrance exam, my parents ... looked like popcorn jumping around. 
（私の両親が、私の大学入学試験合格をした時、彼らは。。。ポップコーンみたいに飛
び跳ねた。） (Item J5, subject 38) 
 
 248 
The following are examples of those that were given a “1” score (Japanese version): 
 
She has a beautiful voice. Whenever I hear her voice, I think of ...  an angel.（彼女は素晴らし
い声を持っています。私が彼女の歌声を聞く時はいつでも 、。。。天使。。。を想像す
る。）(Item J1, subject 7) 
 
It was really exciting for I was competing against the top-level skaters in the world in the 
Olympics. So I will never forget this experience. This experience ... is my treasure.（本当にワク
ワクしている。なぜなら世界で最高のスケーターと競うためにオリンピックに来たから
だ。そして、私はこの経験を決して忘れません。この経験は。。。私の宝物。） (Item 
J4, subject 63) 
 Many responses fit well into the four scoring categories and therefore little 
disagreement arose between the evaluators in these cases. Distinguishing differences 
between creative responses and conventional responses was rather transparent. The 
discrepancies mostly involved a single score unit (e.g., 1 to 2 or 3 to 4) and rarely 
involved a double or triple score unit (e.g., 1 to 3 or 4). Where there were disagreements, 
the evaluators were able to discuss the differences and jointly reach an agreeable score. 
Despite the relatively smooth process of scoring these responses, a couple of issues did 
arise: (1) To what degree of an extension on a conventional response is necessary for this 
response to score higher than the other highly conventional responses? (2) What kind of 
borrowing occurred between the L1 and the L2? For instance, could some of the 
responses that were written in English and given a creative score by the native English 
speaking evaluators, in fact, simply be a direct translation of some conventional 
expression in the L1? Such issues need to be recognized as possible limitations of this 
assessment method. 
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6.4.2.3 Summary of the Metaphor Assessment Section 
The context independent task showed to a certain degree that creativity could be reliably 
recognized by a group of independent raters. This assessment closely resembles the ones 
used in the literature on creativity, most notably the consensual assessment technique, as 
outlined by Amabile (1996). In this situation, the raters acted completely independent to 
assess the metaphors. On the other hand, the context dependent task, which relied more 
on the assessment technique used by Littlemore (1998), employed a slightly different set 
of coding criteria. Moreover, since this task did not directly prompt the participants to 
produce a metaphor, a fourth scoring item was added to account for the larger range of 
possible responses. The assessment process differed also by the fact that the raters 
worked more closely together and corroborated on the scoring of these responses.  
6.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 6 
In this chapter, I first described the participants and procedure for collecting the data in 
the main study. Then I provided a detailed description of the various instruments. I 
explained in depth the consensual assessment technique used in scoring both the 
metaphor tasks and creative products. This technique was shown to have good reliability 
as way to measure creativity of a product both in the form of a drawing, a poem, and a 
metaphor. In this chapter, I also presented the descriptive statistics for the various 
questionnaires developed for the main study. In summary, as shown in this chapter, there 
were a number of variables used in the main study in order to measure metaphor 
production in an L1 and L2, as well as creativity. In order to organize these variables, I 
have arranged them in Table 6.27. Each variable has a code that is an abbreviated 
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description of it. In the next chapter, I examine the results of the main study through the 
use of inferential statistics that explore the relationships between these variables and 
discuss possible ways to interpret these results.  
TABLE 6.27: FINAL VARIABLES USED IN THE MAIN STUDY FOR ANALYSIS 
Language Variables Code  
TOEIC score TOEIC 
Vocabulary score VOCAB 
Metaphor Creativity Variables Code 
English Context Independent Metaphor Score – Fluency ECIMS_F 
English Context Independent Metaphor Score – Creativity ECIMS_C 
Japanese Context Independent Metaphor Score – Fluency JCIMS_F 
Japanese Context Independent Metaphor Score – Creativity JCIMS_C 
English Context Dependent Metaphor Score  ECDMS 
Japanese Context Dependent Metaphor Score  JCDMS 
Creativity Variables Code 
16 items in the Five Factor Model Creative Personality 
Questionnaire 
FFM_CPQ 
24-item Creative Personality Questionnaire CPQ 
     24-item CPQ – Self-Efficacy CPQ_SE 
     24-item CPQ – Persistent Motivation CPQ_PM 
     24-item CPQ – Intolerance of Ambiguity CPQ_IA 
     24-item CPQ – Exploratory Motivation CPQ_EM 
34-item Past Creative Achievements Questionnaire ACHIEV 
24-item Creative Self Beliefs Questionnaire SELFBIO 
The Creative Drawings CP_DRAWING 
The Creative Drawing 1 – Originality CP_DRAWING_O 
The Creative Drawing 2 – Fluency CP_DRAWING_F 
The Creative Poem CP_POEM 
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Chapter 7 Results and Discussion  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 6, descriptions and methods of scoring each of the creativity measurements 
and creative metaphor tasks were analyzed in detail. There were two types of 
measurements. One type used a questionnaire format to measure personality items, past 
creative achievements, and one’s own beliefs in one’s creative abilities. The second type 
used a production task such as writing a poem, drawing a picture, or completing a 
metaphor in both the L1 and L2. This second set of measurements relied on the social 
side of creativity for it utilized a group of individuals who acted like gatekeepers and 
evaluated the creativity of the participants’ responses. Such a model of evaluating 
creativity has a long history in the field of creativity research and usually is labeled, the 
Consensual Assessment Technique (see Chapter 5). Now with this large set of variables, 
this chapter aims to look at the intercorrelations between them and gain a deeper 
understanding of the multifaceted nature of creativity and the cognitive ability to produce 
and interpret creative metaphors between a first and second language.  
 This chapter is divided into two main parts: 
• The results and  
• Discussion 
The first part, which looks specifically at the results from the main study, is further 
divided into three sections. In the first section, I examine the creativity instruments 
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looking for intercorrelations between the numerous variables. Then I perform a multiple 
regression analysis with the aim of finding predictor variables for the real-life creativity 
measurement (past creative achievements). In the second section, I examine the two 
creative metaphor instruments in Japanese (L1) and English (L2). In both of these two 
sets of data, I first analyze the correlations between the L1 and L2 and then perform a t-
test to look more closely at the differences in the scores between them. Finally in the 
third section, I explore the relationships between the various measurements based on the 
creativity instruments with the creative metaphor scores. Then in the second part of this 
chapter, I discuss these results and possible interpretations of them. 
7.2 RESULTS 
As indicated in Chapter 6, there were two types of measurements collected from the 
participants.  
• Measurements for creativity and 
• Measurements for creative metaphor production in an L1 and L2 
These measurements are shown in Table 7.1 along with the code in parenthesis, which is 
used in the subsequent tables in this chapter. 
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TABLE 7.1: TOTAL SET OF TASKS IN THE MAIN STUDY AND VARIABLES USED FOR ANALYSIS  
Creativity Tasks (Self-report 
measures) 
Creativity Tasks 
(Production + Consensual 
Assessment) 
Creative Metaphor 
Competence Tasks 
(Production + Consensual 
Assessment) 
16-items Five Factor Model 
Creative Personality 
Questionnaire (FFM_CPQ) 
 
24-item Creative Personality 
Questionnaire  
• Self-Efficacy (CPQ_SE) 
• Persistent Motivation 
(CPQ_PM) 
• Tolerance of Ambiguity 
(CPQ_TA) 
• Exploratory Motivation 
(CPQ_EM) 
 
34-item Creative Achievements 
Questionnaire (ACHIEV) 
 
24-item Creative Self-Beliefs 
Questionnaire (SELFBIO) 
The Creative Drawings 
(CP_DRAWING) 
 
The Creative Drawing 1 – 
Originality 
(CP_DRAWING_O)* 
 
The Creative Drawing 2 – 
Fluency 
(CP_DRAWING_F)* 
 
The Creative Poem 
(CP_POEM) 
 
* These scores do not use 
consensual assessment, but 
rather a score based on the 
statistical uniqueness of the 
drawing or a cumulative score 
based on total number of 
drawings. 
English Context Independent 
Metaphor Score – Fluency 
(ECIMS_F)* 
 
English Context Independent 
Metaphor Score – Creativity 
(ECIMS_C) 
 
Japanese Context Independent 
Metaphor Score – Fluency 
(JCIMS_F)* 
 
Japanese Context Independent 
Metaphor Score – Creativity 
(JCIMS_C) 
 
English Context Dependent 
Metaphor Score (ECDMS) 
 
Japanese Context Dependent 
Metaphor Score (JCDMS) 
 
* These scores do not use 
consensual assessment, but rather 
are cumulative scores based on 
total number of responses to a 
metaphor prompt. 
Hypotheses Involving the Creativity Measurements 
Creativity involves a number of interacting components (see Rhodes, 1961). The process 
of generating a creative product is one of these components and is often used to measure 
an observable variable that represents an individual’s creative potential. In this study, a 
poem and two drawings were used as the creative products. It is necessary to distinguish 
when analyzing the creativity variables between measuring creative potential, or possible 
traits or abilities that may lead to higher levels of creativity and creative achievement, 
which refers to real-life past creative achievements, as assessed by means of a 
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biographical measure (Eysenck, 1993; 1995). Therefore creative potential refers to 
predictors that may then result in creative achievement. In this approach then, creative 
potential measurements like DT tests (see Runco, 2010) or similarly designed creative 
product tasks are commonly viewed as independent variables. On the other hand, creative 
achievement refers to an individual’s past behavior in specific domains of experience (see 
Sivia et al., 2012; Carson et al., 2005). This variable more closely resembles “real-life” 
creativity and is the dependent variable in this model. Previous studies have also used a 
similar approach to distinguishing creative potential from creative achievement (Jauk et 
al. 2013; Jauk et al. 2014). In short, creative potential measures can be viewed as 
independent variables that may provide some predictive strength to the dependent 
variable, creative achievement. Creative potential in this main study used various creative 
products, as noted above, which required the participants to generate or produce 
something original and useful. Moreover, various creative personality measures were also 
used to measure creative potential. These measures are self-reporting measures that look 
at several creative traits like motivation, persistence, tolerance of ambiguity, and 
openness to experience, as well as, one’s own self-reported estimations of one’s 
creativity.  
 Below are a number of hypotheses for the main study in regards to the creativity 
measurements:  
• (HC1) Hypothesis 1: Scores measured by the Five-Factor Model of the Creative 
Personality Questionnaire (FFM_CPQ) and the personality traits (Self-efficacy, 
Persistent Motivation, Tolerance of Ambiguity, and Exploratory Motivation) in 
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the Creative Personality Questionnaire (CPQ) will be positively correlated with 
each other and display convergent validity.   
• (HC2) Hypothesis 2: Scores measured by the FFM_CPQ and items in the CPQ 
will be positively correlated with the levels of creativity reported in the SELFBIO 
and ACHIEV self reports and scores from the creative products (verbal: poem; 
figural: 2 drawings).  
• (HC3) Hypothesis 3: Scores measured by the creative products (verbal: poem; 
figural: 2 drawings) will be positively correlated with the SELFBIO and ACHIEV 
self reports.  
• (HC4) Hypothesis 4: Scores measured by the various independent observable 
measurements collected in this study (FFM_CPQ, CPQ, SELFBIO, and Creative 
Products) will have some significant predictability of the dependent variable, 
ACHIEV. 
 In short, it was assumed that since all of these variables were measuring different 
facets of creativity (personality, potential, product), they should all show signs of being 
related with one another. The SELFBIO instrument was one variable among the above 
sets of variables that could have shown some signs of not being related to the others. This 
assumption is based on the issue regarding the reliability of self-reports, especially in 
regards to self-beliefs in one’s ability. Although the ACHIEV form was also a self-report 
questionnaire, this one dealt with past experiences, which are more concrete and rely on 
memory recall to complete, while the SELFBIO self-report could have been more easily 
inflated. 
Hypotheses Involving the Creative Metaphor Tasks 
In Chapter 3, it was suggested that metaphors lie on a continuum from the highly 
conventional and familiar to the novel and creative. The more conventional a metaphor 
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is, the more likely it has been codified in the mental lexicon and consequently relies on 
memory retrieval for processing. In contrast, creative metaphors defamiliarize the reader 
through the use of novel connections between disparate semantic domains, but despite 
this unusual or surprising association, the metaphor still elicits meaning and therefore is 
seen as having value. The metaphors produced in this study were deliberate, insofar as 
the participants were asked to produce a metaphor in order to complete the particular 
tasks. The metaphors, similarly to the creative products, were assessed by a group of 
evaluators for creativity. Creativity was operationalized as having novelty and value. 
Value refers to the ability to retrieve or uncover meaning in the metaphor. In the main 
study, the participants were explicitly asked to produce creative metaphors.  
 Below are a number of hypotheses for the main study in regards to the creative 
metaphor tasks:  
• (HCM1) Hypothesis 1: Scores on the two metaphor tasks will show a positive 
relationship between the two languages.  
• (HCM2) Hypothesis 2: Scores on the two metaphor tasks in the L1 and the L2 
will not be significantly different from one another.   
• (HCM3) Hypothesis 3: The vocabulary test scores and self-reported TOEIC 
scores will show a positive relationship with the L2 metaphor tasks, but the not 
the L1 metaphor tasks. 
Hypotheses Involving the Creative Instruments and Creative Metaphor Tasks 
Previous research has aimed to look for relationships between metaphoric competence 
and various individual differences. For instance, Silva and Beaty (2012; Beaty & Silvia, 
2013) found that fluid intelligence (Gf) and broad retrieval ability (Gr) had a stronger 
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effect on the production of novel metaphors than conventional metaphors to which they 
conclude “creative metaphors rely more on executive processes, whereas conventional 
metaphors primarily draw from acquired vocabulary knowledge” (2013; p. 255). 
Littlemore (1998, 2001) also explored the relationship between metaphoric competence 
and various learning and communicative strategies and found a number of correlations, 
which suggests the cognitive dimension of metaphoric competence, especially in regards 
to creative metaphors. Therefore this study aimed to further explore the possible 
relationships between metaphor production and various instruments developed to 
measure creativity.  
 Below are a number of hypotheses for the main study regarding the relationships 
between the creative instruments and the creative metaphor tasks: 
• (HC-CM1) Hypothesis 1: Scores on the creative metaphor tasks will show a 
positive relationship with scores from the creative products. 
• (HC-CM2) Hypothesis 2: Scores on the creative metaphor tasks will show a 
positive relationship with the various creative personality traits. 
• (HC-CM3) Hypothesis 3: Scores on the creative metaphor tasks will show a 
positive relationship with real-life creativity. 
The next subsection describes the procedure for preparing the data for the final analysis 
and assumptions for conducting the respected tests. 
7.2.1 PREPARING THE DATA FOR ANALYSIS 
In this study all the data for each of the variables were entered into SPSS 24 as ordinal 
measurements. Using ordinal measurements fulfills one of the assumptions to use 
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parametric tests. Parametric tests have more statistical power than nonparametric tests 
insofar as being able to detect a difference that truly exists and are less likely to make a 
Type II error or an error that fails to reject the null hypothesis when in fact it is false. The 
other assumptions that need to be fulfilled are the following: 
• Random independent samples 
• Normally distributed 
• No extreme outliers 
• Homogeneity of variance 
• Large enough sample size 
The data was collected from a random sample and the sample size was large enough to 
conduct a parametric test. There were only two extreme outliers in the Past Creative 
Achievements Scale and none in the other measures. As for normal distribution, the 
measures of creative personality and creative self-beliefs were all normally distributed, 
whereas Figure 7.1 shows the distributions of the past creative achievements scores. This 
scale displayed positive skewness (skewness = 0.94, p<.01; kurtosis = 1.12, p<.01), yet 
this is predicted by theory and has been shown to be the case in previous research that 
used a similar creative achievement questionnaire (Jauk et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 7.1 Frequency distributions of the Past Creative Achievements Scale 
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 In the following three subsections of this part of the chapter, I first present the 
results from the creativity instruments, then those from the creative metaphor tasks, and 
finally I examine the relationships between the creativity measurements and the creative 
metaphor tasks. 
7.2.2 RESULTS FROM THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS 
This research was exploratory in nature and sought to find correlations between a broad 
set of variables. Therefore I initially analyzed the correlations between the 11 creativity 
instruments. Table 7.2 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations between the 
observed variables for these instruments.  
TABLE 7.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND INTERCORRELATIONS FOR THE CREATIVITY 
INSTRUMENTS. 
 Min, Max M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. FFM_CPQ 5, 53 27.73 (10.55) 1           
2. CQP_SE 5, 32 17.12 (5.80) .79** 1          
3. CQP_PM 2, 23 13.33 (4.25) .53** .41** 1         
4. CQP_TA 8, 32 18.64 (4.99) .64** .57** .33** 1        
5. CQP_EM 13, 30 23.76 (3.67) .61** .49** .36** .53** 1       
6. ACHIEV 0, 34 10.32 (6.66) .46** .38** .21* .27** .36** 1      
7. SELFBIO 56, 230 146.76 (39.56) .35** .33** .22* .21* .11 .32** 1     
8. CP_DRAW 6, 35 18.69 (7.02) .16 .17 .14 .12 .29** .19* .06 1    
9. CP_DRAWO 1, 6 3.54 (1.78) .15 .16 .13 .18* .14 .15 .02 .50** 1   
10. CP_DRAWF 1, 6 2.40 (1.37) .01 .09 .05 -.01 .08 .09 .08 .57** .12 1  
11. CP_POEM 9, 26 17.06 (3.66) .01 -.03 -.01 .05 .22* .01 -.12 .26** .16 .12 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
(HC1) Hypothesis 1: Scores measured by the Five-Factor Model of the Creative 
Personality Questionnaire (FFM_CPQ) and the personality traits (Self-efficacy, Persistent 
Motivation, Tolerance of Ambiguity, and Exploratory Motivation) in the Creative 
Personality Questionnaire (CPQ) will be positively correlated with each other and display 
convergent validity.   
Not surprisingly, the Five-factor model of the Creative Personality Questionnaire 
(FFM_CPQ) showed convergent validity with the various factors in the 24-item Creative 
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Personality Questionnaire (CPQ). For instance, FFM_CPQ showed positive and 
significant correlation with self-efficacy (0.79, p<.01), persistent motivation (0.53, 
p<.01), exploratory motivation (0.61, p<.01), and tolerance of ambiguity (0.64, p<.01). 
This was to be expected since all of these constructs are designed to measure theoretically 
the multifaceted nature of the creative personality.  
(HC2) Hypothesis 2: Scores measured by the FFM_CPQ and items in the CPQ will be 
positively correlated with the levels of creativity reported in the SELFBIO and ACHIEV 
self reports and the scores from creative products (verbal: poem; figural: 2 drawings). 
In support of HC2, the FFM_CPQ showed strong and significant correlation with the 
SELFBIO (0.35, p<.01) and ACHIEV (0.46, p<.01) self reports. This corresponds to 
findings from numerous previous studies that have also shown the strong relationship 
between Openness to Experience (one of the five personality types in the five factor 
model and the trait most heavily represented in the FFM_CPQ) and various aspects of 
creativity (Feist, 1998, 2010; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; see Batey & Furnham, 2006 for a 
detailed review). The difference here is that the FFM_CPQ was developed from a 
bottom-up perspective within the local environment of the present study. That is to say, a 
group of Japanese students in northern Japan (where this main study took place) were 
asked to select from a more comprehensive five-factor model questionnaire, the traits that 
they felt were most prominent in a creative person (see Chapter 5 for an in-depth 
explanation of the development of this questionnaire). Therefore this questionnaire is 
grounded within the local, social, linguistic, and cultural environment.  
 Moreover, as expected, the factors in the CPQ (SE – self efficacy, PM – persistent 
motivation, TA – tolerance of ambiguity, and EM – exploratory motivation) also showed 
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positive and significant correlations with the SELFBIO (SE 0.33, p<.01; PM 0.22, p<.05; 
TA 0.21, p<.05) and ACHIEV (SE 0.38, p<.01; PM 0.21, p<.05; TA 0.27, p<.01; EM 
0.36, p<.01) self reports. It should be noted here that only Exploratory Motivation did not 
show any sign of positive significant correlation with the SELFBIO scale. 
 Surprisingly and at odds with the hypothesis, the only personality trait that 
correlated with one of the creative products was Exploratory Motivation, which 
correlated with the CP Drawing (0.29, p<.01) and the CP Haiku Poem (0.22, p<.01). The 
other personality measures showed no signs of significant correlations with these two 
creative products.  
(HC3) Hypothesis 3: Scores measured by the creative products (verbal: poem; figural: 2 
drawings) will be positively correlated with the SELFBIO and ACHIEV self reports. 
In contrast to the hypothesis, the creative products, CP Drawing and CP Haiku, showed 
limited significant correlations to the SELFBIO/ACHIEV self reports. For instance, only 
the CP Drawing significantly correlated with ACHIEV (0.19, p<.05), but did not with the 
SELFBIO. Moreover, the CP Haiku did not correlate with either the SELFBIO or 
ACHIEV self reports. It should be noted here that the CP Drawing and CP Haiku (0.26, 
p<.01) positively and significantly correlated with each other, despite the two involving 
different modalities: verbal and visual. This is surprising, since previous studies 
(Torrance, 1990a as cited in Cramond, Matthews-Morgan, Bandalos, & Zuo, 2005 p. 
284) that have mainly focused on divergent thinking tasks in the different modes 
(verbal/figural) have found little correlations between the two. This study used a different 
verbal task in the form of a Haiku creative product, as compared to a DT task that might 
ask, “Come up with unusual uses for a brick” (see Chapter 4.1.1 for more detailed 
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explanation of DT tasks). Moreover the verbal task (Haiku) in this study was 
consensually assessed by a group of judges. The correlations between these two creative 
products (verbal/figural) might point to the domain specificity of creativity and reflect an 
overall artistic creativity measurement that the DT verbal tasks fail to assess. To again 
reflect on possible reasons why these creative products failed to correlate with the 
SELFBIO and the ACHIEV self-reports is the fact that these self-reports are very broad 
in scope covering a number of diverse domains of creative experiences such as science, 
drama, and everyday creativity and might reflect more of a general creativity.  
(HC4) Hypothesis 4: Scores measured by the various independent observable 
measurements collected in this study (FFM_CPQ, CPQ, Self-Bio, and Creative Products) 
will have some significant predictability of the dependent variable, ACHIEV. 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between the 
outcome (dependent variable), which in this case, is past creative achievement and the 
various potential predictor variables like personality, self-bio and the creative products. 
In this study, most of the variables did not contribute to the multiple regression model. 
The Five-factor model of the Creative Personality (FFM_CPQ) and SELFBIO scales 
were the only two independent variables that showed any significant predictability. For 
instance, in Model 1, a significant regression equation was found (F(1,128) = 34.840, 
p<0.00 with an R2 .214. In this case, participants’ predicted creative achievement is equal 
to 2.322 + .292 (FFM_CPQ). That is to say, participants’ creative achievement scores 
increased .292 with every additional point scored on this personality scale. In addition, 
21.4% of variability in the Creative Achievement scores can be explained by the Five-
Factor Model of the Creative Personality (FFM_CPQ). In Model 2, a significant 
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regression equation was found (F(2,127) = 20.534, p<0.00 with an R2 .244. Table 7.3 
summarizes the findings in these two models.  
TABLE 7.3: SUMMARY OF REGRESSION EFFECTS (CREATIVITY ACHIEVEMENTS AS DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE). 
Model Predictor β Std. error p value 95% Confidence 
interval 
1. FFM_CPQ only FFM_CQP .463 .052 .000 .188, .395 
2. FFM_CPQ and 
SELFBIO 
FFM_CQP .398 .055 .000 .143, .360 
 SELFBIO .186 .015 .034 .002, .060 
n = 130 
 Figure 7.2 shows two scatter plots with creativity as measured by Past Creative 
Achievements on the Y-axis. In the left scatter plot, FFM_CPQ is on the X-axis, and on 
the right scatter plot, SELFBIO is on the X-axis.  
  
 
Figure 7.2: A scatter plot with creativity as measured by past creative achievements and the 
FFM_CPQ (left figure) and SELFBIO (right figure) 
 In summary, the Five Factor Model of the Creative Personality (FFM_CPQ) and 
the Creative Self-Beliefs Scale (SELFBIO) both showed good predictability of past 
creative achievements. This suggests that the FFM_CPQ is a valid questionnaire to 
measure important personality traits crucial for creativity. In addition, this data also 
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shows that people are aware of their own creativity and can reliably assess it in a variety 
of domains. The second creative personality questionnaire (CPQ) failed to show any 
predictability and needs to be reevaluated and further tested. Surprisingly, the creative 
products also failed to show any predictability for past creative achievements for they 
also showed minimal correlations with the other variables in this study, as previously 
mentioned. This is considered in greater depth in the discussion section of this chapter. 
Next in the following subsection, I present the results from the creative metaphors tasks.  
7.2.3 RESULTS FROM THE CREATIVE METAPHOR PRODUCTION TASKS 
 
In this section, I examine the relationship between the Japanese and English scores on the 
creative metaphor tasks. Again, in this thesis I considered the possibility that if an 
individual has a tendency or disposition towards producing creative metaphors in an L1, 
this then would likely appear also in the L2. If this is the case, then participants in this 
study who scored high on the L1 creative metaphor tasks should also score high on a 
similar task in the L2.  
(HCM1) Hypothesis 1: Scores on the two metaphor tasks will show a positive 
relationship between the two languages. 
As predicted by HCM1, scores between the two languages displayed a significant 
positive correlation (0.23, p<.01) for the context independent metaphor task. Table 7.4 
provides the descriptive statistics for the scores on this task in the L1 and L2 and the 
intercorrelations between the two scores.  
TABLE 7.4: PAIRED SAMPLES STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR THE CREATIVITY SCORES ON 
THE CONTEXT INDEPENDENT METAPHOR TASK IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH 
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 Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean Correlation Sig. 
JCIMS_C 9.59 128 2.776 .245 .231 .000 ECIMS_C 11.78 124 2.707 .243 
 
 As for the context dependent task, Table 7.5 provides the descriptive statistics for 
the scores in the L1 and L2 and the intercorrelations between the two scores and a 
significant positive correlation (0.32, p<.01) was found between the two languages.  
TABLE 7.5: PAIRED SAMPLES STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR THE CREATIVITY SCORES ON 
THE CONTEXT DEPENDENT METAPHOR TASK IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH 
 Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean Correlation Sig. 
JCDMS 9.34 128 2.785 .246 .324 .000 ECDMS 9.07 124 2.794 .251 
 When these two sets of data are arranged together into one correlational table (see 
Table 7.6), the creative metaphor scores between the tasks show strong relationships. For 
instance, the Japanese Context Independent Metaphor Score (JCIMS_C) displayed a 
significant positive correlation with the English Context Independent Metaphor Score 
(ECIMS_C) (0.23; p<.01), the Japanese Context Dependent Metaphor Score (JCDMS) 
(0.28; p<.01), and English Context Dependent Metaphor Score (ECDMS) (0.20; p<.05). 
So despite the different types of tasks and different languages used to complete them, 
positive correlations were observed.  
TABLE 7.6: INTERCORRELATIONS FOR THE SCORES ON THE CONTEXT INDEPEDNET AND 
DEPENDENT METAPHOR TASKS IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH 
 1 2 3 4 
1. JCIMS_C 1    
2. ECIMS_C .231** 1   
3. JCDMS .282** .392** 1  
4. ECDMS .203* .266** .324** 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 While these results suggest that creative metaphor production and interpretation, 
as developed in these metaphor tasks, between an L1 and L2, share some cognitive 
ability, the results should also be approached with some caution for this research is 
exploratory in nature and extraneous variables could be contaminating the data. For 
instance, a number of limitations arise from these metaphor tasks such as: 
• The choice of topics to prime the participants to produce the metaphor in the 
respected languages could have influenced or affected the participants’ responses.  
• The time spent on the task was not recorded. 
• There are a limited number of prompts in the context independent task (only 2 in 
each language) and the context dependent task (5 in each language). 
(HCM2) Hypothesis 2: Scores on the two metaphor tasks in the L1 and the L2 will not 
be significantly different from one another.   
In order to examine the differences between the participants’ overall scores in the L1 and 
L2 on these creative metaphor tasks, I performed a paired-samples t-test. This includes 
looking at fluency and creativity for the context independent metaphor tasks and only the 
overall creative score for the context dependent metaphor tasks. Tables 7.7 and 7.9 
provide the results for the creativity and fluency scores respectively. Table 7.8 provides 
the descriptive statistics for the fluency scores (since these scores were not introduced 
earlier). Cohen’s d and effect size r are two possible ways to measure effect size in a 
study. Effect size compares two mean scores; in this case Japanese (L1) and English (L2) 
scores on a metaphor task, and considers the standard deviations. Using only significance 
is problematic due to its inherent bias towards large sample sizes. Cohen (1988) argued 
that significance test and effect size are both crucial for determining the probability that a 
phenomenon exists or not. 
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TABLE 7.7: PAIRED SAMPLES TEST FOR THE CREATIVITY SCORES ON THE CONTEXT INDEPENDENT 
METAPHOR TASK IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH 
 Paired Differences 
 M SD Std. Error 
95% confidence 
Interval t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
JCIMS_C 
ECIMS_C -2.169 3.421 .307 -2.777 -1.561 -7.061 123 .000 
Cohen’s d = 0.787 (effect size r = 0.366) (http://www.uccs.edu/~lbecker/) 
Cohen’s d > 0.2 = small; 0.5 = medium; 0.8 = large  (Cohen, 1977) 
Pearson r > 0.1 = small; 0.3 = medium; 0.5 = large 
 
TABLE 7.8: PAIRED SAMPLES STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR THE FLUENCY SCORES ON THE 
CONTEXT INDEPENDENT METAPHOR TASK IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH 
 Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean Correlation Sig. 
JCIMS_F 8.99 124 3.510 .315 .567 .010 ECIMS_F 6.64 124 2.611 .234 
 
 
TABLE 7.9: PAIRED SAMPLES TEST FOR THE FLUENCY SCORES ON THE CONTEXT INDEPENDENT 
METAPHOR TASK IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH 
 Paired Differences 
 M SD Std. Error 
95% confidence 
Interval t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
JCIMS_F 
ECIMS_F 2.355 2.958 .266 1.829 2.881 8.864 123 .000 
Cohen’s d = 0.760 (effect size r = 0. 355) 
 There was a significant difference between the Japanese (L1) context independent 
metaphor creativity scores (M=9.59, SD=2.78) and the English (L2) scores (M=11.78, 
SD=2.71) conditions; t(123)=-7.061, p<.00. These results were unexpected since 
intuitively one would likely presume that individuals would score higher in their first 
language. Yet the opposite occurred when simply measuring the fluency of responses in 
this task (L1 M=8.89, SD=3.54; L2 M=6.64, SD=2.61; t(123)=-0.864, p<.00). So these 
results suggest that in the L1, one can come up with more responses, but these responses 
are scored as being less creative. Why would this occur? One possibility is that the raters 
for the Japanese version gave lower overall scores than the raters for the English version. 
To minimize this possibility, I used multiple independent raters, so they did not influence 
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each other. Despite this independence in evaluating the responses, there was still good 
inter-rater reliability between the different raters (see Chapter 6). A more likely 
possibility for this difference is that in an L1, salience and conventionality have a greater 
effect on the language user, thereby increasing the participants’ fixedness and reducing 
one’s creativity. In the L2, the language is less known, less conventional and therefore 
does not have this effect and one is less influenced by salient and highly familiar 
responses. I further elaborate on these findings later in the discussion section of this 
chapter.  
 In regards to the scores for the context dependent metaphor task, Table 7.10 
shows the results from the t-test. As predicted, there was no significant difference in the 
scores for the Japanese (L1) context dependent metaphor scores (M=9.34, SD=2.46) and 
for the English (L2) version (M=9.07, SD=2.51) conditions; t(122)=1.11, p<.27.  
TABLE 7.10: PAIRED SAMPLES TEST FOR THE CREATIVITY SCORES ON THE CONTEXT DEPENDENT 
METAPHOR TASK IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH 
 Paired Differences 
 M SD Std. Error 
95% confidence 
Interval t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
JCDMS 
ECDMS  .325 3.24 .292 .904 .253 1.113 122 .268 
(HCM3) Hypothesis 3: The vocabulary test scores and self-reported TOEIC scores will 
show a positive relationship with the L2 metaphor tasks, but the not the L1 metaphor 
tasks.. 
Producing metaphors in an L2 obviously requires some linguistic ability in that language 
to generate and interpret them. Therefore, I collected two types of data that provided 
some insight into the participants’ English abilities. The first one was a standardized 
English test (TOEIC), which the participants simply inputted their score into the 
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questionnaire (if known), and the second was a vocabulary test, which the participants 
took along with completing the other tasks in this study. Interestingly, the standardized 
test (TOEIC) showed little relationship with the creative metaphor scores, but showed 
significant correlation with the metaphor fluency score (0.28, p<0.01) (see Table 7.11). In 
contrast, the vocabulary test showed significant correlations with the two creative 
metaphor scores (0.19, p<0.05; 0.22, p<0.05), but not with the metaphor fluency score. 
Predictably, these two English assessments had no relationship with the Japanese 
metaphor scores.  
TABLE 7.11: INTERCORRELATIONS FOR THE ENGLISH ASSESSMENT AND THE CREATIVE 
METAPHOR SCORES (ENGLISH ON THE LEFT AND JAPANESE ON THE RIGHT) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1.  TOEIC 1     
2.  VOCAB .25* 1    
3.  ECIMS_F .28** .14 1   
4.  ECIMS_C  .14 .19* .29** 1  
5.  ECDMS .04 .22* .16 .27** 1 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 
1.  TOEIC 1     
2.  VOCAB .25* 1    
3.  JCIMS_F .07 .10 1   
4.  JCIMS_C  -.13 -.02 .03 1  
5.  JCDMS .05 .12 .19* .28** 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).       
 
7.2.4 RESULTS FROM THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS AND CREATIVE METAPHOR 
PRODUCTION TASKS 
The final goal of this research was to investigate how the creative metaphor scores 
correlate with the scores from the creativity instruments. Table 7.12 provides the 11 
creativity instruments and 6 metaphor instruments means scores, standard deviations and 
minimum/maximum scores. Table 7.13 shows the intercorrelations between the variables. 
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TABLE 7.12: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS AND METAPHOR 
INSTRUMENTS 
 M SD Min, Max 
1. FFM_CPQ 27.73 10.55 5, 53 
2. CQP_SE 17.12 5.80 5, 32 
3. CQP_PM 13.33 4.25 2, 23 
4. CQP_IA 18.64 4.99 8, 32 
5. CQP_EM 23.76 3.67 13, 30 
6. ACHIEV 10.32 6.66 0, 34 
7. SELFBIO 146.76 39.56 56, 230 
8. CP_DRAW 18.69 7.02 6, 35 
9. CP_DRAWO 3.54 1.78 1, 6 
10. CP_DRAWF 2.40 1.37 1, 6 
11. CP_POEM 17.06 3.66 9, 26 
12. JCIMS_F  8.89 3.54 0, 22 
13. JCIMS_C  9.59 2.78 6, 18 
14. ECIMS_F 6.64 2.61 2, 19 
15. ECIMS_C 11.78 2.71 3, 18 
16. JCDMS  9.34 2.51 5, 17 
17. ECDMS 9.07 2.46 3, 17 
 
 
TABLE 7.13: INTERCORRELATIONS FOR THE CREATIVITY AND METAPHOR INSTRUEMENTS 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. FFM_CPQ 1                 
2. CQP_SE .79** 1                
3. CQP_PM .53** .41** 1               
4. CQP_IA -.63** -.56** -.32** 1              
5. CQP_EM .61** .49** .36** -.55** 1             
6. ACHIEV .46** .37** .20* -.25** .33** 1            
7. SELFBIO .35** .33** .22* -.23** .11 .32** 1           
8. CP_DRAW .16 .17 .14 -.11 .29** .19* .06 1          
9. CP_DRAWO .15 .16 .13 -.16 .14 .15 .02 .51** 1         
10. CP_DRAWF .01 .09 .05 .01 .08 .09 .08 .56** .12 1        
11. CP_POEM .04 -.03 -.01 -.03 .22* .01 -.12 .26** .16 .12 1       
12. JCIMS_F  .03 .03 -.10 -.10 .01 -.02 .02 -.07 -.05 .02 .02 1      
13. JCIMS_C -.12 -.12 -.02 -.02 .02 .08 .02 .26** .19* .03 .18* .03 1     
14. ECIMS_F -.05 -.10 -.11 -.16 -.16 .12 .08 -.05 .02 .03 -.13 .57** .01 1    
15. ECIMS_C .09 .13 .02 -.01 .10 .25** .01 .12 .18 -.03 .05 .16 .23** .29** 1   
16. JCDMS  .23* .17 .29** .04 .17* .21* .14 .27** .26** .03 .06 .13 .39** .19* .28** 1  
17. ECDMS -.03 .06 .02 -.01 -.02 .00 .03 .09 .08 .06 .18* .16 .27** .11 .20** .32** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
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(HC-CM1) Hypothesis 1: Scores on the creative metaphor tasks will show a positive 
relationship with scores on the creative products tasks. 
As indicated in the previous sections, the creative products failed to correlate with most 
of the other creativity instruments, but the verbal and figural creative products did 
correlate with each other, which I interpreted as suggesting that these instruments 
measured a domain specific “artistic creative potential” within the participants. The 
creative metaphors, as presented above, showed strong correlations between each of the 
different tasks and across the two different languages. This provides evidence for a 
general individual difference in one’s competency and/or disposition towards producing 
creative metaphors. This third and final set of hypotheses investigated the relationships 
between the creative instruments, for this specific hypothesis (HC-CM1), this entails the 
creative products and the creative metaphors. In order to more easily read these 
correlations between the scores on the creativity and metaphor performance tasks, I 
arranged those with significant correlations in the below format. I did not include the 
intercorrelations between the metaphor tasks since I already discussed these in the 
previous section.  
Japanese Context Independent Metaphor Score – Creativity (JCIM_C) 
• CP_DRAW (0.26, p<0.01) 
• CP_DRAWO (0.19, p<0.05) 
• CP_POEM (0.18, p<0.05) 
English Context Independent Metaphor Score – Creativity (ECIM_C) 
• No correlations with any of the creative products 
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Japanese Context Dependent Metaphor Score (JCDMS)  
• CP_DRAW (0.27, p<0.01) 
• CP_DRAWO (0.26, p<0.01) 
English Context Dependent Metaphor Score (ECDMS)  
• CP_POEM (0.18, p<0.05) 
The metaphor tasks, particularly the Japanese tasks, showed significant and positive 
correlations with the creative products. This indicates that these metaphor tasks could be 
an alternative or additional way to measure creativity, especially in the L1. These creative 
metaphor tasks require the participants to construct and explore conceptual combinations, 
which is really the cornerstone of the creative process (see Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992). 
(HC-CM2) Hypothesis 2: Scores on the creative metaphor tasks will show a positive 
relationship with the various creative personality traits. 
Despite the above results, which showed various metaphor tasks as having significant 
positive correlations with some of the scores of the creative products, the only metaphor 
task to show any signs of significant correlations with some of the creative personality 
scales was the Japanese Context Dependent Metaphor Task. Again this provides good 
evidence for the validity of using such a task as a way to measure the creative process.  
Japanese Context Dependent Metaphor Score (JCDMS)  
• FFM_CPQ (0.23, p<0.05) 
• CQP_PM (0.29, p<0.01) 
• CQP_EM (0.17, p<0.05) 
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(HC-CM3) Hypothesis 3: Scores on the creative metaphor tasks will show a positive 
relationship with real-life creativity. 
Both the Japanese Context Dependent Metaphor Score (JCDMS) and the English Context 
Independent Metaphor Score – Creativity (ECIMS-C) correlated significantly with real-
life creativity, as measured by a self-report of ACHIEV. This provides further 
verification for the JCDMS as a possible instrument to measure the creative process. It is 
a little more interesting that ECIMS_C also correlated with ACHIEV, which might point 
again to the creative process since this measure relies more on conceptual combination 
and less on language competence than the ECDMS.  
Japanese Context Dependent Metaphor Score (JCDMS)  
•  ACHIEV (0.21, p<0.05) 
English Context Independent Metaphor Score – Creativity (ECIMS_C) 
• ACHIEV (0.25, p<0.01) 
To elaborate briefly on these findings there are a number of other things to consider. 
Firstly, as previously stated, none of the Creative Product instruments showed any signs 
of significant correlations with the ACHIEV variable. Secondly this variable, which 
addressed past creative achievements through a self-reported biographical questionnaire, 
is often viewed as being indicative of creativity for as Hocevar (1981) stated “Past 
behavior is generally the best predictor of future behavior” (p. 459). This suggests that 
these metaphor tasks showed a stronger relationship to past creative achievement than the 
poem or the drawing, which have been commonly used in past research to measure a 
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creative product. I am not suggesting that these instruments are not effective, but rather it 
appears that they measure a very specific creative skill related to an artistic domain. In 
contrast, these metaphor tasks may be more revealing of a more general cognitive process 
that represents as Miall (1987) mentions the fact that “metaphor shows on a small scale 
all the principal features of the thought processes that are most significant in creativity” 
(p. 82). What needs to be further explored is why this occurred in the context independent 
task in the L2 and the context dependent task in the L1.  
7.2.5 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
In this section, I presented the results from the main study in this research. I first 
separately analyzed the results from the creativity instruments and the creative metaphor 
tasks and then explored the two sets of variables together. In conclusion, as for the 
personality scales, the FFM_CPQ showed to have the strongest relationship with the 
other creativity instruments and the metaphor tasks. It also had predictive strength for 
past creative achievements. Although the Creative Products mostly failed to positively 
and significantly correlate with the other creativity instruments and metaphor tasks, the 
products correlated with each other and might indicate a more domain specific creative 
artistic ability. In regards to the metaphor tasks, the four sets of creative metaphor 
variables between the two languages all significantly correlated with each other. This 
suggests the possibility of an individual difference or disposition towards novelty and 
originality when confronted with a prompt to produce a creative metaphor, regardless if 
this task is in an L1 or L2. One surprising finding to emerge from these metaphor tasks is 
the fact that the context independent task showed significant difference in scores between 
the L1 and L2, but as expected the context dependent task did not. More unexpectedly, 
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the L2 scores were significantly higher than the L1 scores. Finally, in regards to the 
relationships between the creativity instruments and the metaphor tasks, a number of 
significant correlations were found. The Japanese version of the Context Dependent 
Metaphor task showed the most consistent correlations with the creativity instruments. 
The results also indicated that these metaphor tasks outperformed the creative products 
used in this main study, in terms of correlations with past creative achievements and the 
creative personality. In this next section, I discuss and consider these findings in more 
detail. 
7.3 DISCUSSION 
Section 7.2 described the statistical tests that were conducted to investigate the 
hypotheses made in this thesis. The results of this study provided important insight into 
both the multifaceted nature of creativity and the process of creative metaphor production 
across two languages. In the first part of this section, I aim to interpret and explore in 
more detail some of these findings. First, I argue that the FFM_CPQ had the strongest 
predictor of real life creativity and possibly reflects the higher order factor called 
plasticity, which is associated with human growth and expansion (DeYoung, 2006). 
Secondly, I address the creative products used in this main study (the poem and two 
drawings) and issues that arose from using such instruments to measure the creative 
process and suggest that the creative metaphor production tasks are a more valid 
approach.  
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 Then in the second part of this section, I consider some of the findings in regards 
to the metaphors tasks. First, I consider one surprising finding in this thesis, specifically 
the fact that participants scored higher on the one of the creative metaphor tasks in the L2 
than the L1 and explore possible interpretations to this. Then I consider the individual 
difference, the need for novelty, as one possible way to explain the differences in the 
creativity scores between individuals in these metaphor tasks. I theoretically base this 
difference on one’s disposition towards fine and coarse semantic processing (Beeman, 
1998; Jung-Beeman, 2005) when confronted with a metaphor production prompt. Finally 
in the last section of this chapter, I examine some emergent themes that had not been 
anticipated or considered prior or during the research, but surfaced while looking more 
carefully at the results.  
7.3.1 DISCUSSION: THE CREATIVITY INSTRUMENTS 
 
7.3.1.1 The Five-Factor Model of the Creative Personality and Measuring Plasticity, a 
Higher Order Personality Factor  
One goal of this research was to explore different creativity instruments and seek out 
relationships between them in order to understand and identify certain aspects of the 
complex nature of creativity as a psychological construct. Specifically, I tested the 
predictive power of various independent variables such as creative personality scales, 
creative products, and self-belief scales had on individuals’ past creative achievements. 
The personality scale developed for this study, called the Five-Factor Model of the 
Creative Personality Questionnaire (FFM_CPQ), showed to have the strongest predictive 
power. 
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 The FFM_CQP is mainly comprised of items related to Openness to Experience, 
but it also contains a number of items from the Extraversion factor (see Chapter 5 for the 
full list of items in this questionnaire). This corresponds to recent work that has looked at 
higher order factors of the Big Five (Digman, 1997; DeYoung, 2006). These two higher 
order factors are labeled Stability (Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Emotional 
Stability), which is associated with socialization processes and Plasticity (Openness and 
Extraversion), which is associated with personal growth (DeYoung, 2006). DeYoung 
(2006) elaborates on this description of Plasticity, as having the tendency “to explore and 
engage flexibly with novelty, in both behavior and cognition” (p. 1138). In short, this 
questionnaire appeared to measure this tendency to explore novelty and seek out new 
ways to cognitively expand and grow. Therefore it more broadly reflects the creative 
personality than looking singularly at Openness to Experience.  
 There were a couple reasons why I developed this questionnaire. First, I wanted to 
construct a questionnaire that reflected local students’ perspectives of the creative 
personality. Secondly, from the pilot study, I needed a questionnaire that was more 
streamlined and abridged since the participants had to complete a number of tasks in this 
study. There have been attempts to develop a shorter 10-item version for the five-factor 
personality items (2 items for each factor) (see Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; and 
Oshio, Abe, & Cutrone, 2012 for a Japanese version), but these brief measures broadly 
cover all of the factors and my goal was to focus more on the items that aim to measure 
the creative personality.  
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 In contrast to this FFM_CPQ, the creative products showed limited associations 
with the other creativity instruments. In the next section, I consider some possible reasons 
for this and discuss how the creative metaphor tasks used in this study are a more reliable 
way to measure the creative process.  
7.3.1.2 Creative Generation: From Writing Haikus to Producing Metaphors 
As mentioned in the previous section, the verbal and figural creative products correlated 
with each other, which suggests that this might be indicative of an artistic dimension of 
creativity. Although in contrast to other studies, which have found associations between a 
creative production task and the personality trait, Openness to Experience, (Chamorro-
Premuzic & Reichenbacher, 2008; McCrae, 1987; Silvia et al., 2008, 2009), this study 
did not find any such associations between these creative products and the FFM_CPQ. 
Besides, the before mentioned differences between the FFM_CPQ and an instrument that 
specifically measures Openness as a discrete factor, these previous studies often relied on 
divergent thinking tasks (e.g., “generate unusual uses for a brick”) for the creative 
production task and this study used a verbal and figural creative product. Despite this 
lack of associations with the other creative instruments, namely the personality items, the 
drawing score did show a significant correlation with past creative achievements.  
 Therefore what these results suggest is that these scores for the creative products 
(a short poem and 2 sets of drawings) could likely be measuring artistic creativity or one 
narrow facet of this multidimensional construct. One problem of using creative product 
generation tasks is that they often overly rely on having artistic skills like drawing or 
writing and overlook everyday creativity or creativity in other domains like the sciences 
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or music. Other issues that arise in using creative production tasks like the ones in this 
study are the time constraints and pressure to produce a creative product like a poem “on 
the fly” or in “real time”. Conversely the creative metaphor production tasks in this study 
showed strong associations with a number of the creative instruments and the JCDMS 
also significantly correlated with the FFM_CPQ. Consequently, this study has provided 
some evidence for the plausibility that creative metaphor production is a valid and 
distinct instrument to measure the creative process. These creative metaphor tasks 
provided some insight into how the mind violates norms and disrupts expectations by 
conceptually combining distantly related concepts together in novel ways. On account of 
this, the remaining part of this chapter explores in more detail the results of the metaphor 
tasks.  
7.3.2 DISCUSSION: THE CREATIVE METAPHOR PRODUCTION TASKS 
A key theme that runs through this thesis is the idea of metaphor existing along a cline or 
continuum from the highly conventional to highly creative. The highly conventional ones 
are salient and familiar expressions that are common and widespread in language. In 
contrast, novel and creative metaphors are not typical in everyday language and thus are 
rather rare when doing corpus-based studies on metaphor (Deignan, 2005). Yet in this 
study, creative metaphors were intentional and thereby deliberately crafted by the 
participants for the purpose of completing the tasks in this research. Creativity refers to 
the “ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are new, surprising, and valuable” 
(Boden, 2004, p.1). Creative and novel metaphors defamiliarize and add interpretive 
work that requires one to “deconstruct or ‘unpack’” it in order to find the meaning within 
it (Knowles & Moon, 2006, p. 5). Defamiliarization is achieved through “the novelty of 
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an unusual linguistic variation” (Miall & Kuiken, 1994 p. 391). In short, creative 
metaphors surprise the reader by their unusualness and originality, but at the same time, 
they are crafted to be socially accepted, as language that is meaningful and appropriate.  
7.3.2.1 Creative Metaphor Production in an L1 and L2: Entrenchment and Exploration 
In this thesis, I hypothesized that this ability to generate creative metaphors is likely an 
individual difference. In this case, if one produced creative metaphors in an L1, one was 
also likely to produce them in an L2. This did appear in the data, as both L1 scores and 
L2 scores showed positive significant correlations. Therefore creative metaphoric 
competence, as assessed in this study, is a competency at the conceptual and personality 
level, which then appears in language, no matter if this is an L1 or L2. So this 
competency is not transferred from an L1 to an L2, but rather is projected onto both an 
L1 and L2 when confronted with a creative task. To illustrate this at the individual level, 
responses from participant 81 (see Table 7.14), are used to highlight creativity avoidance 
(i.e., having a low level of creative metaphoric competence). In each production task, this 
individual provided highly literal and straightforward responses both in Japanese and 
English (despite being instructed to respond as creatively as possible).  
TABLE 7.14: PARTICIPANT 81 RESPONSES TO THE CONTEXT METAPHOR TASKS IN THE L1 AND L2 
English Japanese 
1. In writing class, Mary has been told to look 
into her past and （explain）some of her 
memories for there is a lot of good drama 
there. 
2. After graduating from university, he has not 
been able to find a job. But still he bought a 
new car and a lot of new clothes. Now he has 
a lot of credit card debt and worries. He（is 
fool).  
3. Yesterday in Odaiba, AKB48 came to sign 
autographs for their fans. There were so 
1. A friend asked her to give a speech at his/her 
wedding reception, (she expressed the 
content of the speech with her body). 
2. His parents had many expectations that their 
son would be successful, so they got him into 
an expensive private university. But rather 
than studying hard, he began to party every 
night and in the end he had to drop out of 
school. His parents dream (was different 
than the son’s dream). 
3. It was really exciting for I was competing 
against the top-level skaters in the world in 
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many people waiting outside and when they 
finally opened up the gate to let the fans 
approach the tables, (fans run to AKB48). 
4. I met this really great girl or boy last night. 
We went out and had a great time. When I got 
home I couldn’t sleep. She or he really (is 
very cute/handsome). 
 
the Olympics. So I will never forget this 
experience. This experience (showed my 
competitive spirit). 
4. When I passed the university entrance exam, 
my parents (pinched my cheek). 
 
* In the parenthesis above are the participant’s responses to selected items from the context 
dependent metaphor tasks. 
In contrast, participant 123 showed the opposite or a disposition towards producing novel 
and creative responses (i.e., having a high level of creative metaphoric competence). To 
accomplish this, this individual used imagery and extended conventional metaphors, as 
seen below in Table 7.15.   
TABLE 7.15: PARTICIPANT 123 RESPONSES TO THE CONTEXT METAPHOR TASKS IN THE L1 AND 
L2 
English Japanese 
1. In writing class, Mary has been told to look 
into her past and (opened a book of her 
story) some of her memories for there is a lot 
of good drama there. 
2. After graduating from university, he has not 
been able to find a job. But still he bought a 
new car and a lot of new clothes. Now he has 
a lot of credit card debt and worries. He (is 
now standing on the edge of hell). 
3. Yesterday in Odaiba, AKB48 came to sign 
autographs for their fans. There were so 
many people waiting outside and when they 
finally opened up the gate to let the fans 
approach the tables, (fans flowed there in 
like a muddy stream).  
4. I met this really great girl or boy last night. 
We went out and had a great time. When I got 
home I couldn’t sleep. She or he really (was 
a national treasure). 
 
1. She has a beautiful voice. Whenever I hear 
her voice, I imagine (walking along a clear 
lake deep in the forest with a heavy 
morning mist rising). 
2. His parents had many expectations that their 
son would be successful, so they got him into 
an expensive private university. But rather 
than studying hard, he began to party every 
night and in the end he had to drop out of 
school. His parents dream (was tossed into a 
trash bin like torn up pieces of tissue 
paper). 
3. It was really exciting for I was competing 
against the top-level skaters in the world in 
the Olympics. So I will never forget this 
experience. This experience （has lit a 
bonfire in my heart). 
Such examples above show that some individuals (as in participant 123) have a tendency 
or a disposition towards novelty while others (as in participant 81) have an avoidance of 
novelty. This convergence of producing creative metaphors in both languages suggests 
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that it is a stable individual difference. This difference is likely both a personality trait, 
which involves risk taking, openness, and novelty seeking, as well as a cognitive trait, 
which involves the combinatorial ability of combining distantly related concepts together 
in new and meaningful ways. 
 Future studies could usefully conduct an in-depth analysis that compares the 
response strategies of the participants across the two languages. For instance, in the 
Japanese data, we have an image metaphor (a “beautiful voice” represented as “walking 
along a clear lake”), an ontological metaphor (an abstract entity, a “dream” is represented 
as something concrete “torn up pieces of tissue paper”), and a conceptual metaphor (a 
passionate experience is represented with heat, i.e., “passion is heat”). It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine these responses in such detail, but from the data, it appears 
that the participants used a wide range of strategies to creatively complete these tasks 
ranging from imagery to conceptual metaphors and to more novel instantiations of 
metaphors.  
 Despite the fact that the data showed a strong correlation between the responses in 
both and L1 and L2, as previously indicated, it was also hypothesized that differences in 
scores between the two languages would not be significant. The results for the context 
independent metaphor task proved otherwise.  
 The discrepancy in the creative metaphor production scores between the 
participants’ L1 and L2, which favored the L2, may be surprising at first glance, but at 
the same time has the potential to be interpreted from a number of different perspectives. 
Firstly, it can be assumed that in the participants’ L1, conventional metaphors, which are 
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those “that are most alive and most deeply entrenched, efficient, and powerful” (Lakoff 
& Turner, 1989, p. 129), are more highly salient for the participants, or as Giora (2003) 
describes as being more likely “on our minds” and thus influential in the responses on the 
creative metaphor production tasks. In this perspective, these conventional metaphors, 
which have become conventionalized and entrenched in the individuals’ minds is 
predominantly an effect of usage (Svanlund, 2007).  
 To elaborate on this explanation, these differences in scores could be related to 
the tendency that people resort to, when faced with a generative task such as those in this 
thesis that required participants to produce a creative metaphor, the “path of least 
resistance strategy” or the least cognitively demanding route (Ward, Patterson, Sifonis, 
Dodds, & Saunders, 2002). For instance, the L1 task is less cognitively demanding for it 
is easier to make or simply recall metaphorical associations between concepts due to 
these concepts having greater associative strength between them. In contrast, in the L2, 
metaphorical associations are likely not as robust or entrenched within the L2 mental 
lexicon and therefore require the individual to seek out possible relations with new 
concepts, which in the end are viewed as being more original and creative. Shamay-
Tsoory and colleagues (2011) discuss characteristics of an original response, which is the 
ability to produce a new and infrequent response that still within the context is 
appropriate. This process of coming up with an original response requires the interaction 
of  (1) generating new and unique ideas while at the same time (2) inhibiting 
stereotypical automatic thinking patterns. Again this inhibiting stereotypical or 
conventional metaphorical responses is likely more difficult to do in the L1 since these 
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associations are more entrenched and automatic in the thinking process (see Figure 7.3 
for a representation of this process).  
 
Figure 7.3: A representation of the creative metaphor prompt and subsequent automatic retrieval 
and inhibitory process to seek out a novel response 
 
Another Possible Interpretation and Limitation of this Study 
A completely different approach to interpreting the difference in scores between the two 
languages is to consider the problems of assessing creativity in an L2. For instance in this 
study, I used native speakers of English to assess the participants’ L2 scores for creativity 
and there is the possibility that the evaluators assessed a creative metaphor as a novel 
innovation, for it was different, new, unfamiliar, but in fact it was a linguistic error or 
deficiency (see Kachru, 1985). Another methodological issue of assessment is the 
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possibility that the participants simply transferred a conventional metaphor from their L1 
directly onto the L2 and then the evaluator viewed it as creative, new and original since 
such a conventional expression possibly does not exist in the L2 (or in this case English). 
This is a limitation of this study and future studies need to consider the importance of 
using bilingual evaluators who have conceptual and linguistic knowledge of both systems 
to code the metaphors for creativity and to be aware of possible transfer of conventional 
L1 metaphors onto the L2. 
 In the next section, I focus my attention not on how I found differences between 
the cumulative creative scores between the L1 and L2, as outlined above, but on how I 
also found significant correlations between all four sets of these creative metaphor tasks. 
This suggests that this ability to generate a creative response to a metaphor prompt is an 
individual difference, yet what this actually means is still rather unclear. Therefore in the 
next section, I explore this individual difference by looking more closely at the 
participants’ responses and attempting to illustrate the different cognitive processes in 
producing a novel, as compared to a conventional response. I conclude by pointing out 
that this difference may be the result of one’s disposition towards novelty.  
7.3.2.2 An Individual Difference: The Need for Novelty 
In Chapter 3, I discussed Jung-Beeman’s (2005) coarse semantic coding theory. In this 
theory, he suggests that when one is confronted with (novel) figurative language, the 
right hemisphere may be recruited in order to activate larger diffuse semantic fields. This 
enables one to find meaning in the language and consequently successfully process it. 
The sensitivity of the brain to novel figurative language has been demonstrated in a 
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number of studies (Mashal et al., 2005; Mashal et al., 2007; Pobric et al., 2008; Schmidt 
et al., 2007)16. This novelty, often in the form of combining distant semantic concepts 
together in unfamiliar ways, gives an “unfamiliar air” to the language and is one of the 
innovative aspects of everyday creativity.  
 Jung-Beeman’s approach, which examines bilateral brain processes for 
comprehending natural language, focuses more on the process of comprehension and less 
on the process of producing creative metaphors. In contrast, this study relied on creative 
metaphor production tasks. To return to some examples used in this study, one task 
prompted the participants with a topic concept (“Life is ___”. e.g., Life) and then they 
had to complete the metaphor in a creative way and provide an interpretation of it. 
Another task primed the participants to think of a metaphor topic that was embedded 
within the context of a sentence and asked them to creatively complete the sentence with 
a metaphor (“In writing class, Mary has been told to look into her past and _______ some 
of her memories for there is a lot of good drama there.” e.g., the act of recalling past 
memories). Participants’ responses to these prompts could be indicative of differing 
semantic processes used to complete the metaphor, as in fine and coarse semantic 
processing. The latter involves the search for more distant and diffuse semantic relations 
for the prompt and the former concentrates more deeply within a singular semantic field 
                                                      
 
16 This is still a controversial topic, but to reiterate my stance, I am not saying the right hemisphere is necessary for metaphor comprehension, but rather 
only for novel metaphor comprehension and production. As stated in the conclusion of a recent quantitative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies that 
addressed this issue, “Neither the overall contrast nor the subgroup analysis on metaphors revealed any general RH advantage for figurative language 
processing. However, many recent publications no longer propose a general strong RH dominance but claim that the RH is involved in processing mainly 
novel, unconventional conceptual combinations, such as novel metaphors. The results from the novel/conventional contrast confirm to this and are also in 
line with the GSH: only novel, but not conventional metaphors report robust RH activation in the RIFG and right ACC” (Bohrn, Altmann, & Jacobs, 
2012, p. 2681). (RH – right hemisphere; GSH – Graded Salience Hypothesis; RIFG – right inferior frontal gyrus; ACC - anterior cingulate cortex) 
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of related word associations. That is, using this coarse semantic processing provides the 
cognitive mechanism with an opportunity to “stretch” from the literal or expected (Katz, 
2006) in order to intentionally generate a creative metaphor. This ability is shared in all 
normally developed humans, but like other individual differences, it is more prominent in 
some or otherwise some are more inclined towards it, consequently, responses to these 
prompts ranged from the highly expected to the highly unexpected. 
Examples from the Study: Fine and Coarse Semantic Processing 
From the results of this study, as stated above, it appears that some individuals were more 
prone to fine semantic production or providing a response that is closely related to the 
target concept. These types of responses were highly salient and required the least 
amount of cognitive effort. For instance, some responded to the prompt that asked them 
to complete the sentence describing a beautiful voice with a concept that is part of a 
music frame, such as a famous singer or a musical instrument. On the other hand, some 
individuals were more open to coarse semantic production than others. This required 
inhibiting salient responses, as well as, being sensitive to and seeking out distant 
semantic relations. Moreover in many cases, it required one to shift outside the frame, in 
this case music, to a distant frame and that despite its distance some relational structure 
between the two concepts can be discerned. One example, from the previously mentioned 
metaphor task (e.g., describing a beautiful voice), was “the dripping of ice above a hot 
spring”, which conjures a nature frame with the soft, natural, and rhythmic sound of 
water dripping into a warm pool. This response was rated high by all of the evaluators. 
This nonobvious and unconventional response is innovative and overcomes the habitual 
way of viewing a beautiful voice outside the music frame. It is what is “out of our minds” 
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or not salient that makes it creative, novel, and new, yet it also conjures the familiar, as in 
the beautiful sounds or what some may describe as music produced in this kind of natural 
setting. See figure 7.4 for an illustration of this process. 
 
Figure 7.4: Illustration of fine and coarse semantic production for the “Beautiful Voice” prompt 
in the context dependent metaphor task 
 
Examples from the Study: From Conventionality to Conceptual Reorganization 
A scale of metaphoricity is often used to describe stages or states the metaphor is in from 
dead, to inactive, to active and fresh (Goatly, 2011). In the context independent metaphor 
tasks in this research, which asked the participants to creatively produce a metaphor using 
a copula, these metaphors also fell on a continuum or scale of conventionality towards an 
increasing degree of creativity. The further along this scale, the more “risky” the 
metaphor becomes since it is closer to anomalies and a possible break down in the 
addressee being able to comprehend the meaning of it (Nair, Carter, & Toolan, 1988). 
The more distant the two concepts are, the higher degree of conceptual reorganization or 
radical innovation it takes to produce and process (see Traugott, 1985, p. 23). Figure 7.5 
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uses examples from the prompt, “Life is __” to illustrate this. Salient or familiar and 
conventional responses used some variation of the “journey” frame. This is evident from 
the wide number of responses in this study that provided some “journey” as the response 
or some variant of it like “road”, “rocky road” or “boat journey”. Yet in all of these, it is 
rather straightforward to recognize the conventionality of the responses. These responses 
are processed quite effortlessly and in turn the evaluators gave them low scores for 
creativity. On the other hand, responses that require conceptual reorganization forces one 
to reconsider how we normally view a concept such as an “electrocardiogram”. Such 
metaphors require more cognitive effort in order to seek out meaning in it. A metaphor 
like “Life is an electrocardiogram” is rather novel, but there are familiar features that it 
has that similarly map to our understanding of life such as the up and down nature of it 
and how life oscillates back and forth, but it also has the more obvious referent in that 
this machine actually does represent life, or the beating of the heart. 
                                             
                                          
  
Figure 7.5: An outline of conventionality and conceptual reorganization in responses from the 
“Life is _____” metaphor prompt (the number in parenthesis is the total for that response) 
 The second response, “stir-fried vegetables” (as shown in the above figure) again 
takes more effort and is less obvious, but it is an apt metaphor for the participant 
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explained it in this way, “stir-fried vegetables, basically are not decided for you, but you 
have to choose the ones to cook with and also the spices you use. Everyone also cuts up 
the vegetables differently. So if ten people made stir-fried vegetables, you are likely to 
get ten different kinds of vegetables. This is the same as life” (participant 22). So this 
metaphor highlights the diversity of life and the uniqueness of each individual. 
 In Chapter 3, I presented Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) careeer of metaphor 
model and the differences in these responses above reflect different cognitive processes, 
based on how conventionalized the metaphor is. They point out that metaphors proceed 
along a path of conventionalization, as they become more familiar, common, and widely 
used. That is to say, as the associations between the two concepts (e.g., LIFE; 
JOURNEY) become stronger, it shifts from comparative to categorical processing. 
Categorical processing is more rapid, effortless and less cogntively costly, as the 
abstraction of the metaphor becomes lexicalized. In this view, the topic (e.g., LIFE) is 
included in the category of the vehicle or souce (e.g., JOURNEY) and inherits relevant 
features of this category (e.g., movement, beginning and end, requires exertion, etc.). The 
process of comparison for novel metaphors, or those that are less familiar and well-
known, are more similar to analogies and require more effort. Here the properties of the 
vehicle or souce (e.g., STIR-FRIED VEGETABLES) are aligned and then mapped onto 
the topic (e.g., LIFE). Here the relevant features do not accentuate the “movement” often 
associated with metaphors that describe life, but the choice each individual has in 
determining his/her life and the diversity of life in general.  
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 Past research has typically focused more on the processing of metaphors and 
differences between conventional and novel ones. In these studies, in order to understand 
the language prompt, one is required to use different processess (i.e., categorization or 
comparison). In this study, I did not focus on the processing of metaphor, but rather 
looked at metaphor production by the participants. Differences in their responses were 
clearly evident and these observable differences were based on conventionality and 
novelty. In these metaphor production tasks, each participant had to rely on one’s own 
disposition or tendency to produce a metaphor and some showed signs of a greater 
disposition towards producing novel ones regardless of the language.  
Examples from the Study: From Conventionality to Conceptual Reorganization 2 
The previous example focused on responses from the context independent metaphor task. 
In this part, I focus on the context dependent metaphor task and provide a similar 
illustration of how responses moved along a continuum from the highly conventional and 
automatic to the unconventional and creative. In prompt number 3 in the Japanese 
version, the context of the sentence was as follows: 
• His parents had many expectations that their son would be successful, so they got 
him into an expensive private university. But rather than studying hard, he began 
to party every night and in the end he had to drop out of school. His parents dream 
_______.  
The above sentence prompts the participants to come up with a way to express the 
disappointment of the parents dream. As such, the most common responses had to deal 
with this dream being “crushed”, “smashed”, “vanished” or “torn apart”, all 
 292 
metaphorical, but highly conventional and prototypical responses for conveying 
disappointment.  
 A number of other participants extended this conventional metaphor by inhibiting 
this common response and used exemplars of things that vanish or break easily. What 
could be happening here is when the participant is confronted with this prompt, this gives 
rise to an ad hoc category (see Barsalou, 1983; Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015) such as 
“things that vanish” or “things that break easily” or “things discarded without care”. The 
following are some examples from the responses to this prompt that appear to fit into 
such ad hoc categories; “a sand castle”, “dust in the wind” or “expensive wine glasses”.  
 Finally some participants responded in novel, but also appropriate ways. In one 
example, the participant used beautiful imagery that describes decay, but more 
importantly the disregard for these dreams, as something easily discarded, “The parents 
dream was trampled on like dead leaves on the side of the road”. Figure 7.6 illustrates the 
movement from the highly familiar responses towards those that are more unexpected, 
unconventional and novel responses. Although the last 2 types are clearly divided in this 
illustration, in reality, there are less clear-cut borders between them and they should be 
viewed as gradations of creativity. That is to say, three independent evaluators have 
judged the unconventional ones as being more creative and this could be based on the 
responses using one of the following techniques: 
• Vivid imagery in the response 
• Unusualness or surprisingness of the response 
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Figure 7.6: Illustration of the continuum from the conventional to the unconventional from the 
“Disappointed Dream” prompt in the context dependent metaphor task 
 
Creative Metaphor Production and a Need for Novelty 
In this section, I have outlined the differences between the conventional and creative 
responses to these sets of metaphor tasks. If the salient response is automatic and least 
cognitively demanding, what might trigger one to inhibit this response and seek out less 
conventional and novel responses to a metaphor prompt when the participants well knew 
that this study was anonymous and had no immediate effect on his/her academic affairs 
or life in general? One possibility is an individual difference or a dispositional tendency 
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that is important for creativity and has been called a number of different, but similar 
labels such as “need for uniqueness” (Dollinger, 2003), “novelty seeking” (Bevins, 2001; 
Wentworth & Witryol, 2003), and “need for novelty” (Houston & Mednick, 1963; 
González-Cutre et al., 2016). These all point out the importance of novelty for creativity 
and exploratory and risk taking behaviors. Earlier studies showed that the need for 
uniqueness is associated with a number of creativity related concepts like innovativeness 
(Skinner, 1996) and divergent thinking within a Japanese context (Okamoto & Takaki, 
1992). Moreover Dollinger (2003) draws attention to the notion that in fact it may be 
more accurate to say that it is the unique-avoidant individuals who are more prone to 
provide the common, expected, and conventional response. This need for uniqueness is 
an individual difference and likely is related to a motivational process that produces 
creative outcomes (Okamoto & Takaki, 1992). 
 In a recent study, using the term a “need for novelty”, González-Cutre and 
colleagues (2016), have suggested that this “need” is crucial for motivation. In fact, they 
have even proposed that this “need for novelty” be included into the basic psychological 
needs as outlined in Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000). In short, this need 
for novelty is an individual difference that likely motivates an individual to use coarse 
semantic processing in order to seek out unusual, new, and surprising responses to a 
prompt. This individual difference, as measured by the creative metaphors scores, does 
appear between the L1 and L2, which suggests that it is a disposition or tendency one has 
to explore unique and novel possibilities. Since creativity is closely related to novelty, 
this “need for novelty” contributes crucially to one’s ability to produce creative responses 
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for it acts as a motivator to seek out and explore possible new and unusual ones rather 
than rely on the conventional and least cognitively demanding responses.    
7.3.3 DISCUSSION: EMERGENT THEMES 
The last two topics discussed in this chapter emerged unexpectedly while looking at the 
responses in more depth and I believe they provide some additional insight for this study 
and therefore they are included here. First I address the evaluative process of creative 
metaphors and how the evaluators scored higher metaphors that used an embodied 
concept for the source or one that is experienced through the sensory-motor systems (e.g., 
rain, as compared with liberty). Secondly I consider the differences in emotional valence 
of these metaphor responses, whereby, those rated more creative, also appeared to have 
more emotionality and this could include both negative and positive value.  
Creative Metaphors: The Importance of an Embodied Source for Creativity   
In general, for nominal metaphors (e.g., A is B), the topic is more abstract and the vehicle 
is more concrete or embodied. For instance, the novel metaphor mentioned in Chapter 2 
“the therapy was an archeological dig”, an archeological dig (the vehicle or source) is 
highly experiential and involves working with one’s hands likely at some historical site 
and sifting through artifacts and dirt. In contrast, therapy (the topic) is more abstract and 
involves dialogues and exploring the patient’s mind, memories, and fears. So this 
metaphor is novel and original, but also appropriate. It is appropriate because there are 
sufficient features that can be mapped from the source onto the topic allowing one to 
construe the concept of “therapy” in a new way. On the other hand, “therapy is a dream”, 
may seem original to the reader (one has probably never heard this before!), but since the 
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source uses an abstract concept (e.g., “dream”), it may not be viewed as being very 
appropriate as a metaphor and therefore is likely viewed as not being highly creative. 
Moreover, what features of dream could map onto therapy, which might provide some 
insight into this concept (besides the polysemous meaning of the word, “wonderful or 
perfect”)? Nonetheless this assumption that nominal metaphors are viewed as being more 
creative when using a concrete source domain is highly intuitive and not based on any 
empirical data, as far as I know.  
 In this study, I used three independent raters to assess the context independent 
metaphors and they scored the metaphors that had used an embodied or more concrete 
concept for the source (e.g., mountains), as compared to those that had used an abstract 
concept (e.g., eternity), as being more creative. Categorizing the participants’ responses 
to the two English prompts for this metaphor production task, I categorized them as either 
abstract or concrete and then conducted an independent samples t-test to compare the 
mean scores between these two category types. There was a significant difference in the 
scores for abstract responses (n=58, M=1.36, SD=0.34) and concrete responses (n=191, 
M=2.15, SD=0.52) conditions; t(247)=-10.96, p<0.00. The concrete responses had a 
slightly larger standard deviation due to these responses as either being rated lower due to 
its conventionality or higher due to its novelty, but these scores were significantly higher 
than the responses that used an abstract concept. Figure 7.7 shows this continuum of 
participants’ responses from the abstract to the concrete (conventional) to the concrete 
(original). Similarly the raters rated these responses on the same cline from low to 
medium to high scores for creativity.  
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Figure 7.7: Examples from the participants’ responses to the “Memories are ___” prompt, as 
illustrated on a continuum from the abstract to the concrete. 
 
 In summary, this suggests that regardless of the originality of the source concept 
used to complete the metaphor tasks, concrete concepts were viewed as more creative 
than abstract ones. This is likely due to the fact that concrete concepts have greater 
imageability and context availability (see Chapter 2.21 on Paivio’s dual-coding theory 
and Schwanenflugel’s context availability theories) and therefore they have more 
structure and possible features to map onto the topic. In addition to this concrete source 
priority for creativity in the metaphor responses, another emergent theme from this study 
had to do with emotionality of the creative responses, which is discussed in the next 
subsection.  
Creative Metaphors: Do They Evoke a Greater Emotional Response?  
It has been long thought that metaphor and the emotions are closely related (see 
Kövecses, 2003). While further examining the responses to the Context Dependent 
Metaphor Task, which required the participants to complete a sentence that primed them 
to produce a metaphor and was then scored on a 4-point scale for creativity, the responses 
that were evaluated as being highly creative also often had a stronger emotional valence, 
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either having positive or negative value. To further illustrate this, below are two 
responses taken from JCDM Task #3 (priming the participants to produce a metaphor to 
describe a disappointed dream), the prompt to this task has already been described in 
more detail in a previous section. For instance, in the following two responses, though 
both were scored as creative responses, they vary greatly in the character of emotion they 
evoke.  
• His parents dream was sucked into a black hole (両親の夢はブラックホールに
吸い込まれた ryoshin no yume ha burakuhoru ni suikomareta) (subject 86) 
• His parents dream was like looking for a pearl in mountain of snow (両親の夢は
雪山から真珠を見つけ出すようなものだ ryoshin no yume ha yukiyama kara 
shinju wo mitsukedasu youna mono da)  (subject 51) 
The first one is bleak and irredeemable. It conjures up a negative emotion, as this 
disappointed dream has become utterly hopeless for it has been sucked up into the 
expansive darkness of a black hole. In contrast, the second one still offers hope. The 
dream is actually mapped onto a pearl, which is a positive image, and despite being 
buried among the snow, so it is hidden from sight; it still evokes the feeling that it might 
be discovered again.  
 To further illustrate the relationship between creativity and emotion, below are 
some responses taken from the ECDM Task #2, which has the following prompt.  
After graduating from university, he has not been able to find a job. But still he 
bought a new car and a lot of new clothes. Now he has a lot of credit card debt and 
worries. He (＿＿＿＿). 
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 This context aimed to prime the participants to consider debt, or the state of being 
in debt. This obviously has negative valence attached to the context of the sentence and 
likely primes the conceptual metaphor DEBT IS A WEIGHT (BURDEN) or BEING IN 
DEBT IS SINKING / STUCK. This conceptual structure appeared in a number of 
responses as seen below. The first response below also used the concept of hierarchies in 
society and the lowest are those without money or in debt. The next two responses used 
the idea of movement forward is a positive thing and being unable to do this or being 
“stuck” is the negative result of this debt. The next two used a similar idea for this lack of 
movement, but instead of being stuck, one is trapped.  
• He has been anchored the bottom of the society. (subject 17) 
• He is a bottomless swamp. (subject 14) 
• He is stuck in the mud. (subject 59) 
• He fall down in big hole. (subject 15) 
• He is a rat in a bag. (subject 89) 
 Below is a response that used this idea of weight and descending into a “big 
hole”, but instead used a more positively charged concept to convey this, as in a 
spelunker, or one who explores caves. This one can be construed more positively. For 
instance, yes he is in debt or has sunk into these deep crevices, but he is also enjoying 
himself and having fun and the possibility of coming up from these dark regions is rather 
high.  
• He is a spelunker. (subject 20) 
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 On the other hand, the response below conveys this state of downward falling or 
the motion of sinking in a more positive or mysterious way. He is immature and has 
caused himself to fall, but the mystery or the hope in this response lies in the 
interpretation: Does he pass through the stage of metamorphosis and emerge from the 
pupa or will he deteriorate on the ground? Yet, clearly there is a certain amount of hope 
in this response much more so, than being “in a bottomless swamp”.  
• He is a fell butterfly pupa. (subject 97) 
 In stark contrast to this weight and sinking representation of debt, some responded 
with the opposite, as in floating or having a buoyant feeling above the ground. This could 
be interpreted as this individual is not very “well-grounded” and takes responsibilities 
very “lightly”. This type of person is really representative in the character of Peter Pan, as 
in the second response below. Peter Pan represents an individual who flies about in a 
free-spirited manner and never grows up or takes on the responsibilities of an adult. 
Again, these responses are emotionally more positive.  
• He is a balloon filled with air. (subject 6) 
• He was Peter Pan. (subject 21) 
 Lastly, the below response conveys this state of being in debt or acting in this 
irresponsible way as decay. This individual’s behavior is a rotten vegetable to which one 
can assume this refers to the fact that his behavior is substandard and contemptible. 
Rotten food interestingly though is over ripened or at the final stage of being, as in old 
age. In contrast, this man just graduated from university. Yet again this response is quite 
negative and evokes feelings of hopelessness.  
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• He is a rotten vegetable. 
 These are just a few examples of responses from the Japanese and English 
Context Dependent Metaphor Task that scored high on the creativity scale by the raters 
and showed to have emotional valence associated with the response. This emotion ranges 
from the negative to positive. This emotional valence and assessing the positive and 
negative valence of a generated creative metaphor is one area in this study that emerged 
from examining the responses in more detail and had not been anticipated or predicted 
beforehand.  
7.3.4 SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION 
In this discussion on metaphors, I first examined possible interpretations to why 
responses on the L2 for the context independent metaphor tasks scored higher than the 
L1. One possible reason for this is that the associations between words are stronger in the 
L1, which leads to a higher degree of entrenchment in comparison to the L2. This is 
similar to the idea of functional fixedness (Duncker, 1945), or a cognitive bias that limits 
the person to consider other more creative responses aside from the conventional or 
expected response. In the main study, participants when confronted with a topic in the 
Context Independent Metaphor Task in the L1 more likely fixated on a very limited 
number of semantic associations and thus produced a very common and familiar 
response. Recovering these “fixed” or “entrenched” associations between the words from 
memory is automatic, fluent, and consequently therefore requires more effort to inhibit. 
In summary, in the L1, providing a conventional response is more likely because such a 
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response is simply more familiar and available to the participants and such associations 
are likely not as strong in the L2.  
 Secondly I traced how the metaphor responses in these tasks followed a trajectory 
from the conventional to the novel. I argued that differences in scores on these tasks 
could be attributed to an individual difference and in this case the disposition towards 
uniqueness or novelty. The responses that were scored high in creativity had a number of 
features, as compared to those that were scored low in creativity. Firstly, they often relied 
on using a more distant semantic domain as the source. Secondly, they involved 
conceptual reorganization. Thirdly, the sources used to complete the metaphor were 
embodied and more physical or concrete entities. Fourthly, they had a higher level of 
emotional valence. These all could be viewed as defining features of creativity. These 
key differences between the conventional and creative responses elaborated on in this 
discussion section on metaphor are outlined in Table 7.16.   
TABLE 7.16: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NOVEL RESPONSES 
Conventional responses Creative responses 
• Salient, familiar, prototypical 
• Stay within the same frame as the target 
concept 
• Short, automatic responses 
• Cognitively less demanding 
• Low risk 
• Fine semantic processing 
• Use an abstract response or concrete 
response that is highly conventional 
• Low emotional valence 
• Optimally innovative 
• Leap from one frame to a semantically 
distant frame 
• Vivid, unfamiliar & surprising responses 
• Inhibit the stereotypical/conventional 
response 
• Involve conceptual reorganization 
• Risk taking 
• Coarse semantic processing 
• Emotional valence (positive or negative) 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations for 
Future Research 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I have explored the idea that creative metaphor production is an individual 
difference and consequently would appear in both the L1 and L2. This individual 
difference has been described as the disposition towards novelty. That is to say, some 
individuals are more prone to seeking out unfamiliar and more distant semantic 
relationships between concepts. Using scores from these creative metaphor production 
tasks, I also analyzed the relationships between this competency and other instruments 
commonly used to measure the multifaceted nature of creativity. This final chapter aims 
to bring together and summarize the findings and consider the implications of this study 
for research into creativity in language and creativity research. I then conclude the 
chapter by pointing out some of the limitations of this study and possible avenues of 
future research.  
8.2 A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS FROM THIS STUDY 
As stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, this study has explored the 
relationship between two intersecting and diverging bodies of research, metaphor and 
creativity studies. One major obstacle to better integrating these two fields has to do with 
the problem of viewing metaphor as a unitary construct. Chapter 3 went into great depth 
to distinguish conventional and creative metaphors. As many in the field of cognitive 
linguistics started to draw attention to the varying states a metaphor could be found in, 
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spanning from dead and active (Goatly, 2011) to sleeping and waking (Müller, 2009), 
metaphor began to be viewed as having varying degrees of conventionality and creativity. 
In addition, a number of researchers have theorized that different cognitive processes are 
also involved in processing these different types of metaphors (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; 
Giora, 2003). Hence, metaphor has come to be viewed as lying along a continuum from 
the conventional to the creative and this is heavily weighted in terms of quantity towards 
the conventional. That is to say, conventional metaphors are ubiquitous in language, 
creative metaphors to a lesser extent. In order to further consider this distinction, Pope 
(2005) has even described the conventional side of metaphor as a contradictory pole to 
creativity for “when metaphors become routine or over-familiar they dull rather than 
sharpen experience, and they tend to inhibit rather than enable creativity” (p. 139). Thus 
it is important to point out that not all metaphors are the same and many are not at all 
creative or may in fact inhibit creativity. Highlighting this has been one of the aims of 
this study in order to specifically measure the creative dimension of metaphor production. 
 Once I had established that metaphors vary greatly in their degree of 
conventionality and creativity in opposing directions, the next objective of this study was 
to develop a way to experimentally get participants to generate or produce creative 
metaphors. Chapter 5 reported the development of the various instruments used to 
measure creative metaphoric competence with the aim of minimizing the reliance on 
linguistic ability such as memory retrieval of conventional expression in order to 
complete them. These tasks were designed to be heuristic, an important characteristic of 
creativity, and not to be answered by rote. That is to say, these tasks did not have a 
straightforward response and had been sufficiently left open-ended and uncertain to allow 
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for a multitude of possible responses. Therefore the creativity of the varying responses 
could then be identified and scored. It is important to note here that when discussing and 
using “creativity” as a measurable value that is discernable in the collected responses 
from the participants, this brings about a crucial and somewhat controversial theme in 
this study and that is, “what exactly does one mean by creativity” since many view the 
term itself as something that is difficult to define. Although it may seem rather simple 
and rudimentary to explain this term, in reality defining it has been highly problematic to 
the point that some have estimated that close to 60 definitions can be found in the 
psychological literature (Taylor, 1988 as cited in Furnham, Batey, Anand, & Manfield, 
2008). Despite its elusiveness, one characteristic that has continued to be a key element in 
its definition is the concept of “novelty”. From the 1953 definition by Stein, “the creative 
work is a novel work that is accepted as tenable or useful or satisfying by a group in some 
point in time” (p. 311 italics are mine) to the more contemporary and encompassing 
definition of it, “creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process and environment by 
which an individual or group produces a perceptible product that is both novel and useful 
as defined within a social context” (Plucker et al., 2004, p. 90 italics are mine), novelty 
has played a major role in the conceptualization of this term.  
 Outside of the psychological literature, those working in the field of cognitive 
linguistics have also pointed out that novelty is an important characteristic of 
metaphorical creativity (Kövecses, 2010; Knowles & Moon, 2006). Kövecses (2010) 
highlighted this importance of viewing novelty and the unconventional as graded 
concepts “that range from completely new and unconventional [to those that are] well-
worn, entrenched and completely conventional cases” (p. 664). In a special issue on 
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metaphorical creativity, Downing and Mujic (2013) also pointed out how a number of 
papers in that issue employ “a definition of metaphorical creativity as the capacity to 
produce phenomena which are novel and adaptive” (p. 134-5 italics are mine). Despite 
this generally accepted view that creativity is closely linked and dependent on novelty as 
a defining characteristic, Nacey (2013), in contrast, has argued that it is a “bit of a 
stretch” to view all language that is novel and intelligible as ‘creative’. She notes that its 
intelligibility is basically due to our ability to interpret anomalous language (Pollio & 
Burns, 1977, see Chapter 3) and not necessarily due to it being creative per se (Nacey, 
2013 p. 203). For her, the best indicator of creativity is intentionality, i.e., the speaker or 
writer deliberately meant to be creative. In this research, the participants were all 
explicitly asked to respond creatively, so one has to assume that all the participants’ 
intentionality attempted to be creative in their responses. Despite clearly explicating to 
the participants in this study to be creative, as evidenced by the range of responses, many 
did not comply with this or likely did not have the disposition to provide a creative 
response to the metaphor prompts.  
 As previously mentioned, positioning metaphors along a continuum, it was then 
possible to disambiguate creative metaphors from those viewed as highly familiar, 
common and conventional. Distinguishing creative from conventional metaphors relies 
heavily on the use of consensual assessment. This process reflects the view that 
creativity, not only needs to be novel, as mentioned above, but also “adaptive” and 
“useful” within a social context, as judged by the raters. In language (as opposed to a 
creative product or invention), this usefulness is closely aligned to the interlocutor (in this 
case the rater) being able to find meaning within the metaphor and therefore finding it 
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appropriate. Exactly how the raters identified the creative responses has not been 
investigated in this study, but they likely relied on the following two-step process: Assess 
the novelty of the response and then the appropriateness of it. Although the individual 
raters also likely relied on various individual idiosyncrasies when rating the responses, 
nonetheless, they scored them with good inter-rater reliability, as shown in Chapter 6. 
Therefore this study used raters’ subjective views of creativity as a way to score the 
creativity of the responses. Using subjective scoring methods has become a more 
commonly accepted method for scoring creativity instruments (see Sivia et al., 2008). 
 Consequently, I was able to gather a set of variables that assessed the participants’ 
creativity on a number of metaphor tasks in both the L1 and L2. Chapter 8 analyzed the 
results from these creativity scores and the results showed the participants’ responses 
falling on a continuum from the highly conventional to the creative. At one end of the 
scale, some individuals (regardless of using the L1 or L2 and the type of metaphor task) 
were more inclined to use the least cognitively demanding response to complete the 
metaphor tasks, such responses were highly normative, familiar and rather effortless to 
produce and process. On the other end, some individuals were more prone to seek out a 
unique and original response in order to find a novel, surprising, and vivid way to 
complete the task.  
 The second aim of this study was then to look at how the variables obtained from 
these creative metaphor tasks may relate to other creativity measurements. It has become 
more commonplace to approach creativity from a multifaceted manner in order to grasp 
its multiple dimensions (Batey et al. 2006; Ward & Kolomyts, 2010 see Chapter 4 for a 
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detailed review of this). In Chapter 5, the broad set of creativity measurements that aimed 
to measure the varying facets of creativity, was discussed. It was shown in the study that 
the creative personality scale, the Five Factor Model of the Creative Personality 
Questionnaire (FFM-CPQ), had predictive strength for real world creativity, as measured 
by a self-report form that asked the participants about their past creative achievements in 
various domains of experience. As for the creative products, they exhibited very limited 
correlations with any of the other creative measurements. In contrast, scores on the 
creative metaphor tasks were found to have strong correlations with a number of the 
creative measurements, as indicated in Chapter 8.  
 In summary, these creative metaphor tasks have great potential for providing 
insight into the creative process. For example, the context independent tasks used in this 
study partially reflect the different stages of the creative process. A general model of the 
creative process typically involves four stages: analysis, ideation, evaluation, and 
implementation (Zeng et al., 2011; as also presented in Chapter 6). These stages can be 
represented in a model that shows the cognitive process of generating a creative metaphor 
and then providing an interpretation of it (see Figure 9.1) (see Birdsell, 2017 for a similar 
model for interpreting visual metaphors). The first stage is the analysis, when one 
confronts a metaphor task. One has to first understand the task and be familiar with the 
topic. Secondly, one needs to inhibit the conventional response. Then using ideation, one 
seeks out remote concepts and combinatorial possibilities through using divergent 
thinking. Finally, one needs to evaluate these possible combinations, which requires 
convergent thinking, refining and selecting the most appropriate response and then 
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provide an interpretation of it. The final stage, implementation, would involve actually 
using the metaphor or sharing it with others.  
 
Figure 8.1: The creative process of generating a creative metaphor in the context independent task 
 Therefore metaphor research intersects with creativity research when creative and 
conventional metaphors are disentangled and viewed as involving separate cognitive 
processes. It is proposed here that creative metaphoric competence is an individual 
difference that involves a disposition towards uniqueness or novelty. This variance 
between individuals appeared regardless of the outcome and the language used to 
complete the metaphor tasks. That is to say, some individuals still sought out creative 
responses, even when they were well aware that this seeking out would have no 
immediate impact on their lives (i.e., the anonymous factor). These results indicate that 
some individuals are more inclined and prone to seek out semantic relations between 
distant concepts and this combinatorial ability is an important part of the creative process.  
 Theoretically creative metaphoric competence could be organized within the 
more established metaphoric competence framework, as outlined and proposed by 
Littlemore and Low (2006b). Specifically, Littlemore and Low (2006b) argued that 
metaphoric competence plays an important role in all of the language competencies, as 
Analysis 
Inhibit the 
conventional response 
Ideation Evaluation 
• Understand the activity 
• Familiar with the topic  
• Divergent thinking, 
combing remote concepts 
• Mapping features 
• Convergent thinking, refining, 
and selecting an appropriate 
generated metaphor (aptness, 
novelty)  
• Provide an interpretation 
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proposed by Bachman (1990) (see Figure 8.2). For instance, sociolinguistic competence 
refers to cultural knowledge that is shared among the speakers of that language, which is 
often expressed by way of metaphor. Textual competence, which relates to cohesion 
within text or spoken language, also widely uses metaphor for closing off an encounter 
and structuring an argument (Littlemore & Low, 2006b). Creative metaphoric 
competence is most closely linked with one of the language functions associated with 
illocutionary competence, namely, the imaginative function. Bachman (1990) describes 
this as the function that allows one to “create or extend our own environment for 
humorous or aesthetic purposes”, which includes “creating metaphor or other figurative 
uses of language” (p. 94). In this case, creative metaphoric competence is a narrow subset 
of a more general metaphoric competence and looks specifically at the imaginative 
function in language. Moreover, as argued in this thesis, this competency also is 
dependent upon a non-linguistic competency, or what might be called “creative 
cognition”. This is the ability to conceptually combine concepts together in novel ways 
and the propensity to seek out these combinatorial possibilities. This individual difference 
is projected onto language, which then is constrained by language competence at both the 
organizational and pragmatic levels, but appears within the imaginative function of 
language.  
 311 
 
Figure 8.2: Bachman’s (1990, p. 87) components of language competence with Littlemore and 
Low’s (2006) metaphoric competence 
 
8.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CLASSROOM: DEVELOPING CREATIVE METAPHORIC 
COMPETENCE IN INDIVIDUAL LEARNERS 
In this study, the ability to produce creative metaphors has been labeled, creative 
metaphoric competence, which is a sub-facet to metaphoric competence, a more general 
and all encompassing ability that also includes producing and understanding conventional 
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and familiar metaphorical expressions. This more general ability develops with lexical 
knowledge, especially in an L2, as demonstrated in a study by Azuma (2004), which 
showed larger lexical knowledge enhanced student’s understanding and use of 
metaphorical expressions in the L2. Metaphoric competence in second language learning 
has been shown to be important for one’s overall competence in that target language 
(Littlemore & Low, 2006) and numerous studies have looked for ways to integrate 
metaphor into the language-learning classroom (see Chapter 2.3.2). These studies have 
typically involved developing students’ awareness and knowledge of conventional 
metaphorical expressions in the target language. In regards to creative metaphoric 
competence, this has largely been ignored. 
 Creativity has often been relegated to a peripheral role in the language learning 
classroom, but recent interest in creativity in natural everyday language has been steadily 
increasing (Carter, 2004; Cook, 2000; Veale, Feyaerts, & Forceville, 2013) and this 
increasingly also includes researching it from an L2 perspective (Bell, 2005; Nacey, 
2013: Pitzl, 2011). For instance Pitzl (2012) examined the creative use of idioms and 
metaphors by performing a qualitative study using an English as a lingua franca (ELF) 
corpus. In her study, she found that metaphorical creativity is widely used by speakers 
from all different L1 backgrounds, but she did note, which is similar to the findings in 
this study, “differences between individual ELF speakers concerning the frequency with 
which creative idioms and metaphors are used – some speakers are clearly more prone to 
the use of these expressions than others” (Pitzl, 2012, p. 47). The findings in this 
research, which used a completely different method of data collection and analysis, found 
similar results.  
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 Creative metaphoric competence relies less on vocabulary knowledge and 
knowledge of the conventional patterns and structures of the language and more on risk 
taking, combinatorial abilities, and exploring possible semantic connections. This 
competency nonetheless can be enhanced and should be viewed as a creative potential 
within the individual. Carter (2007) proposed, “further research needs to be dedicated to 
the development of creative competence in and through language” (Carter, 2007, p. 606). 
What Carter means by “creative competence” is probably not completely clear nor how 
this competency can be developed “in and through language”, but results from this study, 
which used creative metaphor tasks provide evidence for a creative metaphoric 
competence that did show up in both types of metaphor tasks and in two different 
languages. In order to find practical ways of developing creative metaphoric competence 
within the individual, the metaphor tasks in this study are one example of a pedagogical 
tool that could be used to teach students to expand and widen their semantic networks. In 
addition, as mentioned in the previous section, these metaphor tasks also have the 
potential to develop the creative process within the individual through ideation of novel 
ideas and then the evaluation of these ideas.  
8.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR CREATIVITY RESEARCH 
So far, in this chapter I have provided a summary of this study and outlined a component 
of metaphoric competence, that is, creative metaphoric competence, and shown it as a 
discrete ability, which surfaced in individuals in both an L1 and L2. I have also briefly 
discussed how the tasks used in this study to measure creative metaphoric competence 
could be implemented in the classroom to develop language learners’ creative potential. 
 314 
Now this section of the chapter examines the creative instruments developed for this 
study in more detail and considers some implications they have for creativity research in 
Japan.  
  Creativity has increasingly become an important part of education in Japan, as 
evidenced in the preamble in the Basic Act on Education from 2006, which stated, “we 
will implement education that values the dignity of the individual, that endeavors to 
cultivate a people rich in humanity and creativity” (MEXT, 2006b). Therefore as 
creativity has become one of the main pillars in education in Japan (and in many places 
around the world), it is crucial to consider ways to approach this term and more 
importantly to measure it. In addition to instruments that require the participants to 
generate a tangible product (similar to the poem, drawing tasks, or creative metaphor 
tasks), questionnaires and self-reports are also insightful ways to measure different 
aspects of creativity. For instance, The Past Creative Achievements Questionnaire from 
this study, which evolved from a number of self-report scales in the literature (Batey, 
2007; Carson et al., 2005; see Silvia et al., 2012 for an assessment of a number of these 
self-report scales) and was developed to look at creativity from a wide range of domains 
of experiences (e.g., from music, art and writing to math, science, and computers) and 
spanned from everyday creativity (e.g., taken a music class) to more eminent forms of 
creativity (e.g., publicly played a music concert), has great potential to be used in 
creativity research in Japan. Using this instrument provides the researcher a variable to 
measure creativity under the assumption that past creative achievement is a good 
indicator of future creativity (see Barron & Harrington, 1981).  
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 A second scale developed for this study was the Creativity Self-beliefs scale, 
which was also developed from previous research (Kaufman & Baer, 2004; Kaufman, 
2006; Kaufman, Cole, & Baer, 2009). Again this scale looked at creativity from multiple 
different dimensions like arts and performance to science and math to the social self. This 
type of scale has been increasingly used in creativity research and has been shown to be a 
powerful predictor of educational attainment (Batey et al., 2010; Furnham & Bachtiar, 
2008; Putwain et al., 2012). In this study, the creativity self-beliefs scale was not a strong 
predictor, but was still positively related to past creative achievements. Therefore this 
instrument could be used in various educational contexts within Japan to investigate the 
role creativity self-beliefs have on various tasks deemed important to creativity such as 
problem solving, hypothesis generation, and similar to this study, creative metaphoric 
competence. From a pedagogical vantage point, since strong relationships have been 
shown to exist in the past, it is important for those involved in education to find ways to 
boost learners’ self beliefs in their creativity, especially if the goal of education is “to 
cultivate a people rich in humanity and creativity”.  
 Finally, two personality questionnaires that aimed to measure the creative 
personality were developed for this study. One relied on items from the five-factor model 
of personality, which mostly comprised of Openness and Extraversion items. The second 
one brought together different traits commonly reported in the literature as being 
important for creativity such as: motivation, tolerance of ambiguity, curiosity, and 
persistence. The questionnaire developed from the five-factor model items showed good 
predictability for real life creativity and has the potential to be used as a short and viable 
way to measure the creative personality within the Japanese context. The second 
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questionnaire did not show any such predictability and did not correlate with most of the 
other creative measurements and therefore likely needs to be further modified to be 
applied in future studies.  
 Therefore it is recommended from the results of this study that the following three 
questionnaires have good potential to be used in future research by investigators within a 
Japanese context who aim to measure creativity from multiple different perspectives.  
• The Past Creative Achievements Questionnaire (see Appendix G for the full list 
of items used in the final study) 
• The Creative Self-Beliefs Questionnaire (see Appendix H) 
• The Five Factor Model of the Creative Personality (FFM_CPQ) (see Appendix D)  
 
8.5 LIMITATIONS 
This study was exploratory in nature and forming any generalizations from the results 
should be approached with caution. There were a few shortcomings in this study, which 
have been previously alluded to throughout the thesis. Most of these limitations were 
methodological in nature. The first limitation had to do with the method of data 
collection, which could have benefited from tighter researcher control in some places. For 
instance, despite each participant in this study using roughly the same amount of time (2 
hours) to complete all of the steps, this research would have benefited from having a 
controlled timer monitoring the participants’ time spent on each task. This would have 
provided additional information about the participants’ engagement with these tasks, 
which could have provided insight into whether or not the creative responses actually 
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took additional time to generate. A second possible limitation, which is common in many 
studies, is that it could have used a wider range of participants. It would definitely be 
worthwhile and interesting to see and compare the results from different groups within 
the larger society (business employees, high school students, the elderly, etc.). Moreover 
this research was solely completed within a Japanese university context with Japanese as 
the L1 and English as the L2, it would also be prudent and informative to conduct a 
similar study using a different set of languages  
 In addition to the before mentioned methodical concerns, there are also some 
limitations with the materials used in this study. When contrasting and comparing results 
from a metaphor prompt in two different languages, there is always the possibility of a 
contaminating influence of context on the responses. The context independent tasks used 
generalizable and relatable topics for university students such as “Life” and “Love” and 
“Memories” and the context dependent task used a complete sentence that aimed to prime 
the participants to think of a topic like “Disappointment” and “Anger”. There is a certain 
amount of unknown influence that the topic prime had on the participants’ responses in 
each language. Obviously, it would make no sense to use the same topics, simply 
translated into the other language. Ideally, it would have been beneficial to reverse 
translate these two metaphor tasks and conduct another smaller and separate pilot study 
with a different group of participants in order to see if similar results could be discerned 
when the topic primes are in the opposite language. It is important for future research to 
consider these limitations and to resolve some of these shortcomings. In the next section, 
I discuss some possible directions for future research. 
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8.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: DIRECTIONS AND 
POSSIBILITIES 
The findings and issues raised by this study indicate several possible directions for future 
research. For instance, future research needs to consider social and contextual factors that 
may influence one’s creativity. This includes participants’ expectant evaluation on the 
metaphor tasks and modulating the mood of the participants while completing these 
metaphors tasks. In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, future research could 
also usefully explore the relationship between creativity and the emotions or the 
emotional side of creativity.   
The Effects of Expected Evaluation on Creative Metaphor Production Tasks 
In this study, participants were told that all data collected would remain anonymous 
therefore they knew they were not going to be evaluated since this was not one of the 
aims of this study. Despite this lack of expected evaluation, a number of the participants 
still were motivated and produced highly creative responses to the tasks, but on the other 
hand, a number of participants also provided very simple, stereotypical and familiar 
responses. This raises the question, what would have happened if the participants knew 
they were going to be evaluated for their responses? Moreover what if the students knew 
that these evaluations would be conducted in two differing ways: informational 
(informal) or controlling (formal, grade-based) and how would this also influence their 
motivation to complete these tasks? These types of evaluations could also be extended 
beyond informal/formal dichotomy and include teacher/peer evaluations, too. These types 
of evaluations likely would have had an impact on their responses to the production tasks. 
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Shalley and Perry-Smith (2001) have conducted a similar study using the variables of 
expected evaluation and modeling by measuring creativity on job-related problems. In 
their study, they showed that participants scored higher levels of creativity when they 
expected to have an informational rather than a controlling evaluation. The point here is 
that minor adjustments like the prospect of evaluation or modeling the task may have 
important implications to the creativity scores. In this study, I have presented a rather 
static view of creativity as an individual difference, but doing further research could 
capture the more dynamic view of creativity and how social and contextual factors may 
inhibit or encourage higher levels of creativity. 
Mood Modulation and Its Influence on Creative Metaphor Production Tasks 
Similar to the above recommendation, another possible direction for future research 
involves mood modulation and its influence on creativity. One of the changes made in the 
final study had to do with changing the environment and procedure of collecting the data. 
In the pilot study, the participants sat at desks in a classroom and proceeded through each 
section in a rigid manner by following timed PowerPoint slides that guided them through 
all of the sections. The overall environment, the strict adherence to the timed slides, and 
the difficulty and unusualness of the tasks all likely contributed to high levels of anxiety 
among the participants. By and large, this negative affect likely adversely influenced their 
cognitive performance and thus had a detrimental effect on their efforts towards 
generating creative responses on the various tasks. This negative affect, especially in the 
form of elevated anxiety restricts working memory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and may 
even restrict attentional focus (Gasper & Clore, 2002) to which Mirous and Beeman 
(2012) suggest that negative affect “may also narrow conceptual attention” (p, 334).  
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 In short, it would be beneficial for future research to conduct creative metaphor 
production tasks in two varying conditions, one that induces negative affect (elevated 
anxiety) and one that induces positive affect. Previous studies show that positive affect 
enhances creative problem solving and insight into problems (see Mirous and Beeman, 
2012), but as far as I know this has not been done with creative metaphor production 
tasks. Such a test could provide researchers a better understanding of how different 
research environments or social situational factors may enhance or obstruct creativity. 
This is crucial on two levels. First from a research perspective, it is important for 
researchers to be aware of the effects of situational factors on participants’ creativity 
scores. Secondly in order to develop students’ creative competence within an educational 
setting like a foreign language classroom, it is important to know which situational 
factors are conductive to creativity and which ones may inhibit it.  
Creativity and the Emotions: Are Creative Responses More Emotional? 
One additional and final point that I would suggest about future research, which I briefly 
touched on in the previous chapter, has to do with creativity and emotional valence. This 
was not analyzed in detail, but rather emerged from looking over the responses from the 
participants. It would be interesting to rate these responses using two groups of 
independent judges, one group for creativity and the other for emotionality. It is 
hypothesized that higher creativity scores would also score higher on emotionality. Most 
of the research on emotions and creativity, as mentioned in the above section, have 
looked at how positive moods enhance creativity (see Baas, Dreu, & Nistad, 2008 for a 
meta-analysis of research that has addressed this topic), using a variety of methods such 
as creative problem solving (Estrada et al., 1994; Isen et al., 1987) and word association 
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tests (Isen et al., 1985). Despite this wide interest in investigating the influence positive 
or negative moods have on creative production, there has been scant research on how a 
creative product, in turn, influences an emotional response from the observer (or 
evaluator), as compared to a less creative product. Therefore one possible direction for 
future research is to look at the responses to the metaphor production tasks that have been 
evaluated as being highly creative and examine whether or not these are also highly rated 
for emotionality.  
8.7 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
Reflecting on this thesis, I hypothesized that creative metaphoric competence is an 
individual difference that is projected onto both an L1 and an L2 and results from this 
study supported this hypothesis. That is to say, individuals differ in their ability, but more 
likely their propensity to seek out and explore creative metaphors. Moreover these 
creative metaphor tasks provide researchers an additional instrument to measure the 
creative process. Responses to the metaphor tasks varied in their creativity, yet the novel 
responses that were evaluated as being highly creative still had communicative intent for 
within these responses, the familiar could be found, appreciated, and provide coherence 
to the overall content of the sentence. Giora (2003) calls this “optimal innovation” or 
precisely “novelty that allows for the recoverability of the familiar” (p. 176). Creative 
metaphors, as one example of the more broad study of creative language, provide “a 
valuable window into the real-time activation of semantic knowledge and its use in 
language processing” (Coulson & Davenport, 2012 p. 401) and this thesis aimed to 
contribute to this growing body of research.  
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 Creative metaphors provide a small glimpse into the creative process, a process 
that involves exploration and insight into a concept. For example, in the metaphor prompt 
“Life is __”, a majority of the participants provided a conventional “journey” response or 
some variation of it (i.e., journey, trip, road, voyage, adventure, etc.), yet participant #60 
responded with the following: “Life is an unagai (eel) restaurant” and provided the 
following explanation, “the sauce used for grilling the eel is passed on from generation to 
generation and each one trying to make it better and improve it for future generations”. In 
this instance, life is not progressing along a linear path, but it is knowledge learned and 
passed down from generation to generation. Such creative metaphors not only have the 
power to influence how one understands the topic, “life”, but also how one views the 
source, as in, the skilled trade of an unagi chef. 
 In sum, this study supports the idea that metaphors should not be viewed as a 
unitary type of figurative language. In contrast, metaphor types should be distinguished 
from the conventional and familiar to the novel and creative and this will further advance 
theories that aim to better understand creativity and language processing. The individual 
ability to cope with and produce semantic violations that are inherent in creative 
metaphors involves risk taking. It is risky because the combination does not adhere to a 
semantic rule and thus comprehension of the metaphor is more unpredictable. Some 
individuals are more prone to seek out this novelty and take this risk.  
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